How Britain let Russia hide its dirty money – podcast

 
 
This week, as Russia continues its invasion of Ukraine, we revisit this piece by Oliver Bullough from 2018. For decades, politicians have welcomed the super-rich with open arms. Now they’re finally having second thoughts. But is it too late?

 theguardianFri 4 Mar 2022 

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Photo by Amer Ghazzal Sale of Chelsea football club, Stamford Bridge.
 Photograph: Amer Ghazzal/REX/Shutterstock

 

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Was it inevitable? A short history of Russia’s war on Ukraine

To understand the tragedy of this war, it is worth going back beyond the last few weeks and months, and even beyond Vladimir Putin

US president Bill Clinton raises his glass to toast with Russian president Boris Yeltsin at a dinner reception in the Kremlin Hall in 1995.
 Photograph: Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP

 

theguardian – 

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When presidents lie to make a war

theguardianDD Guttenplan – Sat 2 Aug 2014 10.00 BST

Fifty years on we know the trigger for war with Vietnam was a fiction. Will it be another 50 before we know the truth about Iraq?

Lyndon Johnson in 1964
Lyndon Johnson’s repeated accusation that the Gulf of Tonkin attacks were unprovoked was the beginning of a disillusion that would lead Daniel Ellsberg to leak the Pentagon Papers. Photograph: Yoichi R Okamoto/AP Photograph: Yoichi R Okamoto/AP

Once there was a president who warned the world about conduct his government would not tolerate. And when this “red line” was crossed, or seemed to be, he took the US to war. Though this might sound like America’s involvement in Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Belgrade, or Libya, and what may yet become a wider war in Syria, this story began 50 years ago, on 4 August 1964.

Tiếp tục đọc “When presidents lie to make a war”

19 năm cuộc chiến Iraq: Kế hoạch loại bỏ Saddam Hussein được chuẩn bị “bài bản” thế nào?

Soha –  Đại sứ Nguyễn Quang Khai – 24/03/2022 20:12

Ngày 20/3 năm nay, người Iraq tưởng nhớ lại 19 năm ngày liên quân 49 nước do Mỹ cầm đầu xâm lược đất nước của họ vào năm 2003, lật đổ chế độ của Tổng thống Saddam Hussein.

Rạng sáng ngày 20/3/2003, cuộc tấn công mở màn bằng các cuộc không kích nhắm vào toà nhà chính phủ và bộ máy lãnh đạo Iraq. Tổng thống Mỹ George W. Bush tuyên bố chiến dịch “Tự do cho Iraq – Operation Iraqi Freedom” bắt đầu. Các lực lượng bộ binh của Mỹ và Anh được máy bay, xe tăng, đại bác… yểm trợ từ Kuwait vượt biên giới tràn vào lãnh thổ Iraq.

Iraq bị đánh hội đồng. Hội đồng Bảo an Liên hợp quốc không có cuộc họp nào, không có lệnh trừng phạt được áp đặt, không có nghị quyết lên án Mỹ và đồng minh.

Tiếp tục đọc “19 năm cuộc chiến Iraq: Kế hoạch loại bỏ Saddam Hussein được chuẩn bị “bài bản” thế nào?”

International law : Crime of Genocide — Luật quốc tế: Hình tội diệt chủng

Genocide was first recognised as a crime under international law in 1946 by the United Nations General Assembly (A/RES/96-I). It was codified as an independent crime in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the Genocide Convention). The Convention has been ratified by 149 States (as of January 2018). The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has repeatedly stated that the Convention embodies principles that are part of general customary international law. This means that whether or not States have ratified the Genocide Convention, they are all bound as a matter of law by the principle that genocide is a crime prohibited under international law. The ICJ has also stated that the prohibition of genocide is a peremptory norm of international law (or ius cogens) and consequently, no derogation from it is allowed.

The definition of the crime of genocide as contained in Article II of the Genocide Convention was the result of a negotiating process and reflects the compromise reached among United Nations Member States in 1948 at the time of drafting the Convention. Genocide is defined in the same terms as in the Genocide Convention in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Article 6), as well as in the statutes of other international and hybrid jurisdictions. Many States have also criminalized genocide in their domestic law; others have yet to do so. 

(Note: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the law that established the  ICC)

Definition

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide


(Rome Statue of International Court, Part II, Art. 6)



Article II

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

  • Killing members of the group;
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  • Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Elements of the crime

The Genocide Convention establishes in Article I that the crime of genocide may take place in the context of an armed conflict, international or non-international, but also in the context of a peaceful situation. The latter is less common but still possible. The same article establishes the obligation of the contracting parties to prevent and to punish the crime of genocide.

The popular understanding of what constitutes genocide tends to be broader than the content of the norm under international law. Article II of the Genocide Convention contains a narrow definition of the crime of genocide, which includes two main elements:

A mental element: the “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such”; and

A physical element, which includes the following five acts, enumerated exhaustively:
  • Killing members of the group;
  • Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
  • Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
  • Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
  • Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

The intent is the most difficult element to determine. To constitute genocide, there must be a proven intent on the part of perpetrators to physically destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. Cultural destruction does not suffice, nor does an intention to simply disperse a group. It is this special intent, or dolus specialis, that makes the crime of genocide so unique. In addition, case law has associated intent with the existence of a State or organizational plan or policy, even if the definition of genocide in international law does not include that element.

Importantly, the victims of genocide are deliberately targeted – not randomly – because of their real or perceived membership of one of the four groups protected under the Convention (which excludes political groups, for example). This means that the target of destruction must be the group, as such, and not its members as individuals. Genocide can also be committed against only a part of the group, as long as that part is identifiable (including within a geographically limited area) and “substantial.”

Nguồn Genocide >>

Diệt chủng được Đại hội đồng Liên hợp quốc công nhận lần đầu tiên là hình tội theo luật quốc tế vào năm 1946 (A/RES/96-I). Diệt chủng được đưa vào hệ thống luật như hình tội độc lập trong Công ước Ngăn ngừa và Trừng phạt Tội Diệt chủng (Công ước Diệt chủng) năm 1948. Công ước được 149 Quốc gia phê chuẩn (tính đến tháng 1 năm 2018). Tòa Công lý Quốc tế (ICJ) đã nhiều lần tuyên bố Công ước là hiện thân của các nguyên tắc đã là một phần của luật tục quốc tế chung. Điều này nghĩa là dù các Quốc gia có phê chuẩn Công ước Diệt chủng hay không, thì tất cả các Quốc gia đều bị ràng buộc về mặt pháp lý bởi nguyên tắc diệt chủng là hình tội bị cấm theo luật quốc tế truyền thống. Tòa Công lý Quốc tế cũng tuyên bố cấm diệt chủng là quy tắc bắt buộc của luật pháp quốc tế (gọi là jus cogens) và do đó, không được phép làm yếu tội diệt chủng.

Định nghĩa tội diệt chủng được nêu trong Điều II của Công ước Diệt chủng là kết quả của quá trình thương lượng và phản ánh sự thỏa hiệp đã đạt được giữa các Quốc gia Thành viên Liên hợp quốc vào năm 1948 tại thời điểm soạn thảo Công ước. Diệt chủng cũng được định nghĩa trong Đạo luật Rome về Tòa Hình sự Quốc tế (ở Điều 6) với từ ngữ tương tự như định nghĩa trong Công ước Diệt chủng, cũng như trong các đạo luật của các thẩm quyền quốc tế và thẩm quyền hỗn hợp khác. Nhiều Quốc gia cũng hình sự hóa diệt chủng trong luật trong nước của họ; một số Quốc gia khác thì chưa làm như vậy.

(Chú thích: Đạo luật Rome về Tòa Hình sự Quốc tế (ICC) là đạo luật thiết lập Tòa Hình sự Quốc tế)

Định nghĩa

Công ước về Ngăn ngừa và Trừng phạt Tội diệt chủng

(Đạo luật Rome về Tòa Hình sự Quốc Tế, Phần II, Điều 6)

Điều II

Trong Công ước này, diệt chủng nghĩa là bất kỳ hành vi nào sau đây được thực hiện với chủ ý tiêu diệt, toàn bộ hoặc một phần, của một nhóm quốc gia, dân tộc, chủng tộc hoặc tôn giáo, như:
  • Giết các thành viên trong nhóm;
  • Gây hại nghiêm trọng về thể xác hoặc tinh thần cho các thành viên trong nhóm;
  • Cố ý gây ra cho nhóm các điều kiện sống được tính toán để dẫn đến hủy diệt toàn bộ hoặc một phần thể chất của nhóm;
  • Áp đặt các biện pháp có chủ ý ngăn cản sinh đẻ trong nhóm;
  • Ép chuyển trẻ em thuộc nhóm này sang nhóm khác.
Các yếu tố cấu thành tội diệt chủng

Công ước Diệt chủng quy định tại Điều I rằng tội diệt chủng có thể diễn ra trong bối cảnh xung đột vũ trang, ở trong nước hoặc ở các nước với nhau, nhưng cũng có thể diễn ra trong bối cảnh hòa bình. Bối cảnh hòa bình ít phổ biến hơn nhưng vẫn có thể xảy ra. Điều I này cũng thiết lập nghĩa vụ ngăn ngừa và trừng phạt tội diệt chủng của các nước ký Công ước.

Cách hiểu phổ thông về những gì cấu thành tội diệt chủng có khuynh hướng rộng hơn điều khoản luật theo luật quốc tế. Điều II của Công ước Diệt chủng có định nghĩa tội diệt chủng hẹp hơn, gồm hai yếu tố chính:

Yếu tố ý định: “chủ ý tiêu diệt, toàn bộ hoặc một phần, của một nhóm quốc gia, dân tộc, chủng tộc hoặc tôn giáo”; và

Yếu tố thể chất, gồm 5 hành vi sau đây, được liệt kê đầy đủ:
  • Giết các thành viên trong nhóm;
  • Gây hại nghiêm trọng về thể xác hoặc tinh thần cho các thành viên trong nhóm;
  • Cố ý gây ra cho nhóm các điều kiện sống được tính toán để dẫn đến hủy diệt toàn bộ hoặc một phần thể chất của nhóm;
  • Áp đặt các biện pháp có chủ ý ngăn cản sinh đẻ trong nhóm;
  • Ép chuyển trẻ em thuộc nhóm này sang nhóm khác.

Chủ ý là yếu tố khó xác định nhất. Để cấu thành tội diệt chủng, phải chứng minh người thủ phạm có chủ ý tiêu diệt thân thể một nhóm quốc gia, dân tộc, chủng tộc hoặc tôn giáo. Hủy diệt văn hóa thì không đủ để cấu thành tội diệt chủng. Chủ ý chỉ phân tán nhóm (không cho nhóm sống tập trung với nhau) cũng không đủ để  cấu thành tội diệt chủng.  Đây là  chủ ý đặc biệt, tiếng Latinh là dolus specialis,  và chủ ý đặc biệt này làm cho tội diệt chủng trở thành khác thường. Thêm vào đó, án lệ thường xem những kế hoạch  hoặc chính sách diệt chủng của Nhà nước hoặc của một tổ chức là bằng chứng chủ ý diệt chủng, dù rằng  định nghĩa diệt chủng trong luật quốc tế không nói đến kế hoạch và chính sách.

Điều quan trọng là, các nạn nhân diệt chủng bị cố ý nhắm vào – không phải là vô tình  – vì họ là thành viên thực sự hay bị hiểu nhầm là thành viên  của một trong bốn nhóm được bảo vệ theo Công ước (các nhóm khác, ví dụ nhóm chính trị, thì không được bảo vệ).  Điều này có nghĩa là mục tiêu bị hủy diệt phải là một nhóm, chứ không phải là các thành viên với tư cách cá nhân. Diệt chủng cũng có thể nhắm vào chỉ một phần của nhóm, không hẳn là toàn bộ nhóm, miễn là phần đó có thể nhận dạng (kể cả phần đó nằm trong khu vực địa lý giới hạn) và diệt chủng “với số lượng người đáng kể”, không phải là làm hại vài người lẻ tẻ.

(Phạm Thu Hương dịch và chú thích)

mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

Chuỗi bài:

The Struggle for Myanmar – Podcast

Is Myanmar heading into civil war — or already there?

Nikkei – Nikkei staff writers – February 5, 2022 09:29 JST

NEW YORK — Welcome to Nikkei Asia’s podcast: Asia Stream.

Every week, Asia Stream tracks and analyzes the Indo-Pacific with a mix of interviews and reporting by our correspondents from across the globe.

New episodes are recorded weekly and available on Apple PodcastsSpotify and all other major platforms, and on our YouTube channel

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How the US created a world of endless war – podcast

In 2008, many of Barack Obama’s supporters hoped he would bring the global war on terror to a close. Instead, he expanded it – and his successors have done nothing to change course. By Samuel Moyn

A US Reaper drone at a base in Nevada.

A US Reaper drone at a base in Nevada. Photograph: Josh Smith/Reuters

 theguardian – Fri 17 Sep 2021 12.00 BST

Written by Samuel Moyn, read by Christopher Ragland and produced by Esther Opoku-Gyeni

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Joint Statement on Armed Forces Day in Myanmar

MEDIA NOTE

US Department of StateOFFICE OF THE SPOKESPERSON

MARCH 26, 2022

Following is a joint statement on Armed Forces Day in Myanmar issued by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union and the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Australia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Canada, Georgia, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Montenegro, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Republic of Korea, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Begin text: 

On Armed Forces Day, we remember those killed and displaced by violence over the last year, including at least 100 people killed on this day alone one year ago.

Some countries continue to supply lethal assistance to Myanmar’s military regime, enabling its violence and repression. We urge all countries to support the people of Myanmar by immediately stopping the sale or transfer of arms, military equipment, materiel, dual-use equipment, and technical assistance to Myanmar, in line with UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/75/287.  We reiterate our call on the military to cease its violence and restore Myanmar’s path to democracy.

End text.

Interview with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy | DW News

Mar 23, 2022
In an exclusive interview for Eurovision News in Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has told TV reporters that he is ready to discuss a commitment from his country not to seek NATO membership in exchange for a cease-fire, Russian troop withdrawal and guarantee of Ukraine’s security.

In an exclusive interview for Eurovision News in Kyiv, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has told TV reporters that he is ready to discuss a commitment from his country not to seek NATO membership in exchange for a cease-fire, Russian troop withdrawal and guarantee of Ukraine’s security.

The revolt against liberalism: what’s driving Poland and Hungary’s nativist turn? – podcast

For the hardline conservatives ruling Poland and Hungary, the transition from communism to liberal democracy was a mirage. They fervently believe a more decisive break with the past is needed to achieve national liberation. By Nicholas Mulder

theguardian

Written by Nicholas Mulder, read by Tanya Cubric and produced by Esther Opoku-Gyeni

Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán at an electoral rally in April 2018.
Hungary’s prime minister Viktor Orbán at an electoral rally in April 2018. Photograph: Zsolt Szigetvary/EPA

Sat 21 Aug 2021 12.00 BST – Last modified on Mon 23 Aug 2021 09.19 BST

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Sau World Cup là đại học

HUY ĐĂNG – TẤN PHÚC 24/3/2022 6:00 GMT+7

TTCTBên cạnh các khoản thưởng tiền tỉ, những lời tán dương không dứt, các cô gái của bóng đá Việt Nam còn nhận một phần quà đặc biệt ý nghĩa sau thành tích giành vé dự World Cup: suất học bổng đại học.

 Đội trưởng tuyển nữ Việt Nam Huỳnh Như. Ảnh: Nguyên Khôi

Với riêng các nữ tuyển thủ ở TP.HCM, có ít nhất hai trường đại học trao tặng học bổng cho họ, là Đại học Hoa Sen và Đại học Công nghệ thông tin.

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G7 Leaders’ Statement (in Brussels, Belgium)

MARCH 24, 2022• STATEMENTS AND RELEASES

  1. We, the Leaders of the G7, met today in Brussels at the invitation of the German G7 Presidency, to further strengthen our cooperation in light of Russia’s unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal aggression and President Putin’s war of choice against independent and sovereign Ukraine. We will stand with the government and people of Ukraine.
  2. We are united in our resolve to restore peace and stability and uphold international law. Following the United Nations General Assembly resolution on March 2022, we will continue to stand with the overwhelming majority of the international community, in condemning Russia’s military aggression and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause.
  3. We remain appalled by and condemn the devastating attacks on the Ukrainian population and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and schools. We welcome the investigations of international mechanisms, including by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. We will work together to support the gathering of evidence of war crimes. The siege of Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities, and the denial of humanitarian access by Russian military forces are unacceptable. Russian forces must immediately provide for safe pathways to other parts of Ukraine, as well as humanitarian aid to be delivered to Mariupol and other besieged cities.
  4. The Russian leadership is obligated to immediately comply with the order of the International Court of Justice to suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine, without any further delay. We also urge Russia to withdraw its military forces and equipment from the entire territory of Ukraine.
  5. We further call upon the Belarusian authorities to avoid further escalation and to refrain from using their military forces against Ukraine. Moreover, we urge all countries not to give military or other assistance to Russia to help continue its aggression in Ukraine. We will be vigilant regarding any such assistance.
     
  6. We will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of this aggression, including the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, accountable for their actions. To this end, we will continue to work together, along with our allies and partners around the world.
  7. We underline our resolve to impose severe consequences on Russia, including by fully implementing the economic and financial measures we already imposed. We will continue to cooperate closely, including by engaging other governments on adopting similar restrictive measures to those already imposed by G7 members and on refraining from evasion, circumvention and backfilling that seek to undercut or mitigate the effects of our sanctions. We task the relevant Ministers in a focused initiative to monitor the full implementation of sanctions and to coordinate responses related to evasive measures, including regarding gold transactions by the Central Bank of Russia. We stand ready to apply additional measures as required, continuing to act in unity as we do so. We commend those partners who have aligned with us in these efforts.
  8. Russia’s attack has already risked the safety and security of nuclear sites in Ukraine. Russian military activities are creating extreme risks for the population and the environment, with the potential for catastrophic result. Russia must comply with its international obligations and refrain from any activity that imperils nuclear sites, allowing unhindered control by the Ukrainian authorities, as well as full access by and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  9. We warn against any threat of the use of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons or related materials. We recall Russia’s obligations under the international treaties to which it is a signatory, and which protect us all. In this regard, we categorically denounce Russia’s malicious and completely unfounded disinformation campaign against Ukraine, a state in full compliance with international non-proliferation agreements. We express concern about other countries and actors that have amplified Russia’s disinformation campaign.
     
  10. We are resolved in our support to the Ukrainian people in their heroic resistance to Russia’s unjustifiable and illegal aggression. We will step up our support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries. We thank all those who are already providing humanitarian aid to Ukraine and ask others to join. We will furthermore collaborate in our efforts to bolster democratic resilience and defend human rights in Ukraine and neighbouring countries.
  11. We will continue efforts to support Ukraine in defending its networks against cyber incidents. In preparation for any Russian malicious cyber response to the actions we have taken, we are taking steps to increase the resilience of the infrastructure in our respective nations by strengthening our coordinated cyber defences and improving our shared awareness of cyber threats. We will also work to hold accountable those actors that engage in destructive, disruptive, or destabilising activities in cyberspace.
  12. We further commend neighbouring states for their solidarity and humanity in welcoming Ukrainian refugees and third country nationals from Ukraine. We highlight the need to further increase international assistance to countries neighbouring Ukraine, and, as a concrete contribution to this end, underline our commitment to receiving, protecting, and supporting refugees and displaced persons as a consequence of the conflict. We thus all stand ready to welcome them on our territories. We will take further steps to broaden our support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries.
  13. We are concerned by the escalating and reinforced repression against the Russian people and the increasingly hostile rhetoric of the Russian leadership, including against ordinary citizens. We deplore the Russian leadership’s attempt to deprive Russian citizens of access to unbiased information through censorship, and denounce its malicious disinformation campaigns, which we will not leave unaddressed. We express our support to those Russian and Belarusian citizens standing up against the unjustified war of aggression against their close neighbour Ukraine. The world sees them.
  14. The people of Russia must know that we hold no grievances against them. It is President Putin, his government and supporters, including the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, who are imposing this war and its consequences on Russians and it is their decision that besmirches the history of the Russian people.
  15. We are taking further steps to reduce our reliance on Russian energy, and will work together to this end. At the same time, we will ensure secure alternative and sustainable supplies, and act in solidarity and close coordination in the case of possible supply disruptions. We commit to actively support countries willing to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports. We call on oil and gas producing countries to act in a responsible manner and to increase deliveries to international markets, noting that OPEC has a key role to play. We will work with them and all partners to ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies. This crisis reinforces our determination to meet the goals of the Paris agreement and of the Glasgow climate pact and limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5°C, by accelerating reduction of our reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy. 
  16. We stand in solidarity with our partners who have to bear the rising price of President Putin’s unilateral choice to wage war in Europe. His decision is putting the global economic recovery at risk, undermines the resilience of global value chains and will have severe impacts on the most fragile countries. We call on the international community to take action by fully recognising Russia’s responsibility and protecting the most vulnerable countries, with the support of international and regional institutions.
  17. More immediately, President Putin’s war places global food security under increased pressure. We recall that the implementation of our sanctions against Russia takes into account the need to avoid impact on global agricultural trade. We remain determined to monitor the situation closely and do what is necessary to prevent and respond to the evolving global food security crisis. We will make coherent use of all instruments and funding mechanisms to address food security, and build resilience in the agriculture sector in line with climate and environment goals. We will address potential agricultural production and trade disruptions, in particular in vulnerable countries. We commit to provide a sustainable food supply in Ukraine and support continued Ukrainian production efforts.
  18. We will work with and step up our collective contribution to relevant international institutions including the World Food Programme (WFP), in parallel with Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions, to provide support to countries with acute food insecurity. We call for an extraordinary session of the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to address the consequences on world food security and agriculture arising from the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We call on all participants of the Agriculture Markets Information System (AMIS) to continue to share information and explore options to keep prices under control, including making stocks available, in particular to the WFP. We will avoid export bans and other trade-restrictive measures, maintain open and transparent markets, and call on others to do likewise, consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, including WTO notification requirements.
  19. International organisations and multilateral fora should no longer conduct their activities with Russia in a business as usual manner. We will work closely with our partners to act as appropriate, based on shared interests, as well as rules and regulations of respective institutions.
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Remarks by President Biden in Press Conference in NATO Headquarters (Brussels, Belgium)

MARCH 24, 2022

NATO Headquarters
Brussels, Belgium

6:32 P.M. CET
 
THE PRESIDENT:  Good evening, everyone.  With all the press that’s here, you must be getting very tired.  Am I the 16th or 17th?  At any rate, all kidding aside, thank you for taking the time.

I — today marks one month since Russia began its carnage in Ukraine, the brutal invasion of Ukraine.  And we held a NATO summit the very next day.  At that time, my overwhelming objective, wanting that summit, was to have absolute unity on three key important issues among our NATO and European allies.

First was to support Ukraine with military and humanitarian assistance. 

Second was to impose the most significant — the most significant sanctions — economic sanction regime ever, in order to cripple Putin’s economy and punish him for his actions.

Third was to fortify the eastern flank of our NATO Allies, who were obviously very, very concerned and somewhat at — worried what would happen.

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