I am an attorney in the Washington DC area, with a Doctor of Law in the US, attended the master program at the National School of Administration of Việt Nam, and graduated from Sài Gòn University Law School. I aso studied philosophy at the School of Letters in Sài Gòn.
I have worked as an anti-trust attorney for Federal Trade Commission and a litigator for a fortune-100 telecom company in Washington DC. I have taught law courses for legal professionals in Việt Nam and still counsel VN government agencies on legal matters. I have founded and managed businesses for me and my family, both law and non-law.
I have published many articles on national newspapers and radio stations in Việt Nam.
In 1989 I was one of the founding members of US-VN Trade Council, working to re-establish US-VN relationship.
Since the early 90's, I have established and managed VNFORUM and VNBIZ forum on VN-related matters; these forums are the subject of a PhD thesis by Dr. Caroline Valverde at UC-Berkeley and her book Transnationalizing Viet Nam.
I translate poetry and my translation of "A Request at Đồng Lộc Cemetery" is now engraved on a stone memorial at Đồng Lộc National Shrine in VN.
I study and teach the Bible and Buddhism. In 2009 I founded and still manage dotchuoinon.com on positive thinking and two other blogs on Buddhism. In 2015 a group of friends and I founded website CVD - Conversations on Vietnam Development (cvdvn.net).
I study the art of leadership with many friends who are religious, business and government leaders from many countries.
In October 2011 Phu Nu Publishing House in Hanoi published my book "Positive Thinking to Change Your Life", in Vietnamese (TƯ DUY TÍCH CỰC Thay Đổi Cuộc Sống).
In December 2013 Phu Nu Publishing House published my book "10 Core Values for Success".
I practice Jiu Jitsu and Tai Chi for health, and play guitar as a hobby, usually accompanying my wife Trần Lê Túy Phượng, aka singer Linh Phượng.
Japan has signed a ¥36.6 billion ($345 million) loan agreement with Vietnam to provide the Southeast Asian country with six patrol boats to boost its maritime law enforcement capabilities, as Beijing steps up its claims in the South China Sea.
As tensions between Taiwan and China continue to escalate, satellite images reportedly show amphibious armoured vehicles and mobile missile launchers massing at military bases near the island nation.
Though Taiwan, a country of 25 million people, is happy as an independent democracy, Beijing insists it is a “breakaway province” and “inviolate” Chinese territory, repeatedly stating it will use force to bring the island back under China’s control.
May’s low and July’s high have something in common: They both reflect TSMC’s distinctive role in the global tech economy. Although far from a household name, TSMC controls roughly half of the world’s contract chip manufacturing. Brand-name companies that design their own chips—most notably Apple—rely on TSMC’s world-class production so they don’t have to spend tens of billions to build their own factories. Crack open your iPhone and you’ll find a chip from TSMC. If you could crack open an American guided missile, you’d likely find one there too. Its prowess has elevated TSMC to No. 362 on the Global 500, with $35 billion in revenue. Today it gets 60% of sales from the U.S. and about 20% from mainland China.
The US-China tech innovation race is challenging the laissez-faire economic model. State interventionism, techno-nationalism and US tech funding initiatives are increasing. This paper outlines the implications for markets, academia, research organizations, and governments of the US-China competition to achieve innovation advantage.
A US-China tech innovation race has sparked a paradigm shift in global trade and commerce that is challenging the long-standing primacy of the world’s open trading system.
Current thinking is tilting towards increased state activism and interventionism, not only in the technology landscape but in many of the industries of the future.
Driving this change is techno-nationalism: a mercantilist-like behavior that links tech innovation and enterprise directly to the national security, economic prosperity and social stability of a nation.
In response to decades of Beijing’s innovation-mercantilism, the US has embarked on its own innovation offensive. Washington’s future tech funding initiatives could surpass the scale of the “moonshot” projects last seen during the space race with the former Soviet Union.
Download “Techno-nationalism: The US-China tech innovation race” by Alex Capri
The innovation race involves a broad range of emerging and foundational technologies that will define the industries of the future, including:
Artificial Intelligence (AI) and machine learning
Quantum computing and information systems
Next generation communication (including 5G and 6G)
Underlying themes: US techno-nationalism and innovation
As Washington and its allies ramp up techno-nationalist initiatives, core themes will drive the paradigm shift.
Public-private partnerships (PPP) – Technology alliances and government-funded initiatives will play an increasingly important role in advancing long-term innovation in the US, the EU and other traditionally open markets.
Avoiding the China innovation model – The US and EU innovation agendas will not seek to emulate China’s centralized, authoritarian system of techno-nationalism, but, rather, to turbo-charge markets and leverage entrepreneurial ecosystems, as well as academic and defense establishments.
Balancing tensions between MNEs, markets and techno-nationalism – Multinational enterprises (MNEs) will remain the primary drivers of R&D and innovation in free markets and play a vital role in PPP initiatives. They will be pulled into the US-China technology war in a variety of ways which will require a careful balancing of market forces, the interests of MNEs and the needs of state actors.
Multilateral technology alliances – US techno-nationalist policy will increasingly align with the security, economic and ideological objectives of the EU and other historic allies. This will produce more cooperation between the US and its partners.
Section I – The US-China innovation race: The role of the state
This section examines trends for public-spending in R&D and innovation and reviews a series of techno-nationalist funding initiatives from the US government.
It analyzes state activism in free markets and why governments are uniquely qualified to promote innovation and “blue-sky” technologies in ways that the private sector cannot.
Finally, Section I spotlights a historic example of techno-nationalism: SEMATECH and the US semiconductor public-private partnership, which led to a technological leapfrog by the US semiconductor industry, past Japan, in the 1990s.
Section II – MNEs, markets and governments: Navigating new complexities
Section II focuses on non-state actors and their increasingly complex role in public-private partnerships. It explores the tensions between open market forces, multinational companies, and techno-nationalist state activism.
To highlight these tensions, the report analyzes Facebook’s “Libra initiative and Beijing’s efforts to reduce dependency on the US dollar via the digital Yuan, and the challenges those create for MNEs. A US semiconductor sector case study illustrates how state activism can have detrimental effects on markets and backfire on the very parties it is looking to protect.
Section II concludes with an analysis of how open-sourced innovation could be a game-changer in the US-China technology war, particularly regarding future 5G wireless competition.
Section III – Academia and techno-nationalism: Open versus closed systems
Universities, research organizations and academia have become hot zones in the US-China innovation race. Human capital development is key to conducting leading-edge R&D and driving innovation.
Section III looks at how US export controls are affecting R&D activities at universities. It highlights the rules-based frameworks that universities must build to handle increasing government funding into academia.
The section showcases China’s Thousand Talents program and highlights its challenges for public-private partnerships involving academia. It also discusses why the US, in particular, should keep its human capital and innovation pipeline open as it pertains to foreign students, fundamental research programs and, ultimately, why an open system (despite China’s exploitation of it) is better than a closed one.
Finally, section III looks at how some inevitable strategic decoupling between Chinese and US entities will result in the ring-fencing of more “sensitive” R&D activities within the US defense establishment.
Listen to a summary of the report in this podcast featuring Alex Capri and Andrew Staples, Director of Research and Outreach.
Vietnam has confirmed 29 new coronavirus cases and another fatality of the disease, all closely tied to Da Nang outbreak, the Ministry of Health said in its August 9 update at 18.00hrs.
19 cases aged 7 to 85 were registered in Da Nang City, the epicenter of the outbreak. They include 8 people who had close contact with COVID-19 patients, 3 patients given treatment at Da Nang Hospital, three caregivers, a medical worker, a servant, along with three others.
HONOLULU (29 July 2020)—In recent years, relations with Southeast Asia have emerged as an important pillar of US engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is central to US foreign policy in the region, with a growing focus on the five countries bound together by the Mekong River—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.
As they emerge from a tumultuous history, these countries must confront new elements of great-power competition even as their youthful populations push for economic growth and integration into the wider region and the world. Among other impacts, urbanization, infrastructure expansion, and climate change all affect the Mekong River, the natural resources along its banks, and the 240 million people who live in the region.
Theo hãng tin Reuters, thông tin trên được Lầu Năm Góc công bố hôm 6/8. Đây là cuộc điện đàm đầu tiên giữa ông Esper và Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng Trung Quốc Ngụy Phượng Hòa kể từ tháng 3 tới nay. Cuộc điện đàm diễn ra trong lúc quan hệ hai bên đang ở mức thấp nhất trong hàng chục năm qua.
23h tối 6/8, tuyến đường Phan Huy Ích (quận Bình Tân và Gò Vấp) vẫn ngập sâu. Cả đoạn đường dài nước ngập hơn nửa mét khiến hàng loạt phương tiện bị chết máy. Người dân bì bõm dẫn bộ phương tiện, rẽ sóng để tìm đường về nhà.
President Trump signed an executive order on Thursday that will prohibit Americans from doing business with ByteDance, the company that owns TikTok, and a similar order that bans transactions involving WeChat, a social messaging app, with its owner, Tencent, beginning September 20, in an effort to bar the China-owned social media platforms from the U.S. due to national security concerns.
Vietnam documented a total of 43 new cases of novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on Wednesday, including 42 local infections and one imported patient who was quarantined upon arrival, the second-largest single-day increase in cases since January.
Vietnam reported two new coronavirus patients on Wednesday morning, both registered in the central province of Quang Nam and traced to Da Nang, a neighboring city that is the country’s outbreak epicenter.
Prime minister also says stronger Indo-Pacific alliance with like-minded nations is a ‘critical priority’ for Australia.
Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said his government held a less dramatic view of US-China strategic tensions than a predecessor who warned of a potential “hot war” before US presidential elections in November, but added that a conflict is no longer inconceivable.
Republican senators line up in favor of Microsoft purchase
Mnuchin says Democratic leaders agree new approach needed
The Trump administration will announce measures shortly against “a broad array” of Chinese-owned software deemed to pose national-security risks, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said.
The comments suggest a possible widening of U.S. measures beyond TikTok, the popular music-video app owned by ByteDance Ltd., one of China’s biggest tech companies. President Donald Trump told reporters Friday that he plans to ban TikTok from the U.S., but his decision hasn’t been announced. Pompeo signaled he expects a Trump announcement “shortly.” Chinese newspapers slammed a potential ban on TikTok.
A book stating the undisputable case for Vietnam’s sovereignty over Hoang Sa (Paracel) and Truong Sa (Spratly) archipelagoes in Bien Dong Sea has been translated into Japanese by Prof. Kazutaka Hashimoto from the Kanto Gakuin University and released in the country.
The Japanese version of the book “Hoang Sa – Truong Sa: Luan cu va Su kien” (Hoang Sa – Truong Sa: Evidence and Events). Photos: VNA
According to VNA, the original version named “Hoang Sa – Truong Sa: Luan cu va Su kien” (Hoang Sa – Truong Sa: Evidence and Events) by author Dinh Kim Phuc was published by the Thoi Dai (Times) Publishing House in 2012.
Dr. Tran Cong Truc, with 30 years of experience in border works, including 10 years being the Head of State Border Committee, has directly participated in border delimitation negotiation with other countries as a Vietnam delegate. Vietnam Times proudly introduces Dr. Truc and his colleagues’ series of articles about the process of forming and managing Vietnam territorial borders.
Territorial sovereignty has been the top priority throughout history
In January 1077, national hero Ly Thuong Kiet led the fight against invaders along the bank of the Cau River. Legend has it that every night, he sent a confidant to sneak into Truong Hong and Truong Hat temple, which located on the battleground on Nhu Nguyet river‘s bank (the present Cau river) to read out loud the following poem: