“Maritime Security” has emerged as a central concept in Southeast Asia’s policy lexicon. However, as is the case in much of the world, the term’s precise meaning is not consistently clear. Which challenges and state activities should be categorized as maritime security and which should be considered elements of another domain is generally ambiguous. This ambiguity can be useful to leaders seeking to build unity of action among government agencies with overlapping maritime policy mandates and to diplomats seeking to rely on euphemistic qualities to support flexible political narratives that minimize the risks associated with security dilemmas.  However such linguistic polysemy only works for so long and introduces risk. Left unclarified, terms will develop assumed meanings. For example, many Southeast Asians regard contemporary American talk about maritime security as a thin veil for something better understood as “Great Power Competition at Sea.” Therefore, even the most benign initiatives are factored into regional calculations aimed at balancing between external powers. Within the region, it is also possible for lexical disconnects to lead to problematic misinterpretations of policy intent and diplomatic signals.

Recognizing that understanding the varied conceptualizations of maritime security is an academic puzzle with real-world practical implications in Southeast Asia, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies convened a roundtable of experts to take stock of regional maritime security definitions. These specialists surveyed national policy documents and policymaker discourse to assess how maritime security is defined, used, and conceptualized in seven key Southeast Asian coastal states (the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand), ASEAN as a multinational institution, and the Quad members (Australia, Japan, India, and the United States). This stocktaking enabled the team to identify and discuss the significance of the convergences and divergences. Noting the transnational nature of discourse, the phrase “Southeast Asian conceptualizations” was adopted as a shorthand.  This does not specifically mean usage by Southeast Asian individuals or the region’s national governments but refers to the security-related discourse taking place in the region.  While the primary goal of the project was to improve communication by providing common reference points, the project also discovered findings of practical policy importance.

Discussions of each country’s conceptualization of maritime security and the implications of the term’s varying definitions across the region are available in the following 14 article series:

Evolving Conceptualizations of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia by John Bradford

The Philippines’ Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Jay Batongbacal

Vietnam’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Nguyen Nam Duong

Brunei Darussalam’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Asyura Salleh

Malaysia’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Tharishini Krishnan

Indonesia’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Gilang Kembara

Singapore’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by YingHui Lee

Thailand’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Somjade Kongrawd

ASEAN Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Dita Liliansa

Australia’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by David Letts

India’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Prakash Gopal

Japan’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Kentaro Furuya

The United States’ Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Blake Herzinger

Maritime Security Conceptualizations in Southeast Asia: The Implications of Convergence and Divergence by John Bradford

US Department of State – Republic of China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea

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Executive Summary

This study examines the maritime claims of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the SouthChina Sea. The PRC’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea are inconsistent with international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“Convention”).

The PRC asserts four categories of maritime claims* in the South China Sea:

• Sovereignty claims over maritime features. The PRC claims “sovereignty” over more than one hundred features in the South China Sea that are submerged below the sea surface at high tide and are beyond the lawful limits of any State’s territorial sea. Such claims areinconsistent with international law, under which such features are not subject to a lawfulsovereignty claim or capable of generating maritime zones such as a territorial sea.

• Straight baselines. The PRC has either drawn, or asserts the right to draw, “straight baselines” that enclose the islands, waters, and submerged features within vast areas of ocean space in the South China Sea. None of the four “island groups” claimed by the PRCin the South China Sea (“Dongsha Qundao,” “Xisha Qundao,” “Zhongsha Qundao,” and“Nansha Qundao”) meet the geographic criteria for using straight baselines under the Convention. Additionally, there is no separate body of customary international law that supports the PRC position that it may enclose entire island groups within straight baselines.

• Maritime zones. The PRC asserts claims to internal waters, a territorial sea, an exclusive economic zone, and a continental shelf that are based on treating each claimed South China Sea island group “as a whole.” This is not permitted by international law. The seaward extent of maritime zones must be measured from lawfully established baselines, which are normally the low-water line along the coast. Within its claimed maritime zones, the PRC also makes numerous jurisdictional claims that are inconsistent with international law.

• Historic rights. The PRC asserts that it has “historic rights” in the South China Sea. Thisclaim has no legal basis and is asserted by the PRC without specificity as to the nature orgeographic extent of the “historic rights” claimed.

The overall effect of these maritime claims is that the PRC unlawfully claims sovereignty or someform of exclusive jurisdiction over most of the South China Sea. These claims gravely underminethe rule of law in the oceans and numerous universally-recognized provisions of international lawreflected in the Convention. For this reason, the United States and numerous other States haverejected these claims in favor of the rules-based international maritime order within the SouthChina Sea and worldwide.

* Islands in the South China Sea over which the PRC claims sovereignty are also claimed by other States. This studyexamines only the maritime claims asserted by the PRC and does not examine the merits of sovereignty claims toislands in the South China Sea asserted by the PRC or other States. The United States takes no position as to whichcountry has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea, which is not a matter governed by the law of the sea.

Limits in the Seas



This series, issued by the Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs in the Department of State, aims to examine coastal States’ maritime claims and/or boundaries, and assess their consistency with international law.  The studies represent the views of the United States Government only on the specific matters discussed therein and do not necessarily reflect an acceptance of the limits claimed.

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Bảng lương tối thiểu vùng năm 2022 của 63 tỉnh, thành phố

THƯ VIỆN PHÁP LUẬT trân trọng gửi tới quý khách hàng Bảng lương tối thiểu vùng năm 2022 của của 63 tỉnh, thành phố theo quy định tại Nghị định 90/2019/NĐ-CP như sau:

bảng tra cứu lương tối thiểu vùng 2022

1. Hà Nội

Quận/huyện/thị xã/thành phố thuộc tỉnhVùngLương tối thiểu(đồng/tháng
– Các quận: Ba Đình, Bắc Từ Liêm, Cầu Giấy, Đống Đa,  Hà Đông, Hai Bà Trưng, Hoàn Kiếm, Hoàng Mai, Long Biên, Nam Từ Liêm, Tây Hồ, Thanh Xuân.- Các huyện: Gia Lâm, Đông Anh, Sóc Sơn, Thanh Trì,  Thường Tín, Hoài Đức, Thạch Thất, Quốc Oai, Thanh Oai, Mê Linh, Chương Mỹ- Thị xã Sơn TâyI4.420.000
– Các huyện: Ba Vì, Đan Phượng, Phú Xuyên, Phúc Thọ , Ứng Hòa, Mỹ ĐứcII3.920.000
Tiếp tục đọc “Bảng lương tối thiểu vùng năm 2022 của 63 tỉnh, thành phố”

Trình Quốc hội gói phục hồi kinh tế – xã hội gần 350.000 tỷ đồng

11:07 04/01/2022 CAND

Gói phục hồi kinh tế – xã hội (KTXH) gồm 5 nhóm giải pháp chủ yếu với quy mô thực hiện trong hai năm 2022 – 2023.

Sáng 4/1, tại Phiên khai mạc Kỳ họp bất thường lần thứ nhất, Quốc hội khóa XV, thừa ủy quyền của Thủ tướng Chính phủ trình bày Tờ trình tóm tắt Dự thảo Nghị quyết của Quốc hội về chính sách tài khóa, tiền tệ để hỗ trợ Chương trình phục hồi và phát triển KTXH, Bộ trưởng Bộ Kế hoạch và Đầu tư (KH&ĐT) Nguyễn Chí Dũng cho biết, Chương trình xác định khung những vấn đề trọng tâm, cần tập trung giải quyết, bao gồm 5 nhóm nhiệm vụ, giải pháp chủ yếu với quy mô thực hiện dự kiến trong năm 2022-2023 như sau:

Trình Quốc hội gói phục hồi kinh tế - xã hội gần 350.000 tỷ đồng -0
Các đồng chí lãnh đạo, đại biểu tham dự phiên khai mạc.

Thứ nhất, mở cửa nền kinh tế gắn với đầu tư nâng cao năng lực y tế, phòng, chống dịch bệnh (60 nghìn tỷ đồng). Thứ hai, bảo đảm an sinh xã hội và hỗ trợ việc làm (53,15 nghìn tỷ đồng). Thứ ba, hỗ trợ phục hồi doanh nghiệp, hợp tác xã, hộ kinh doanh (110 nghìn tỷ đồng). Thứ tư, phát triển kết cấu hạ tầng, khơi thông nguồn lực xã hội cho đầu tư phát triển (113,85 nghìn tỷ đồng). Thứ 5, cải cách thể chế, cải cách hành chính, cải thiện môi trường đầu tư kinh doanh. Ngoài ra, huy động từ các Quỹ tài chính ngoài ngân sách Nhà nước (NSNN) khoảng 10 nghìn tỷ đồng.

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Lawmakers reveal mixed thoughts over $15 bln stimulus package

By Hoai Thu, Hoang Thuy   January 5, 2022 | 04:30 pm GMT+7 vnexpressLawmakers reveal mixed thoughts over $15 bln stimulus packageA man prepares food inside an eatery in Hanoi, December 26, 2021. Photo by VnExpress/Pham Chieu

Lawmakers have expressed mixed opinions on the government’s VND347 trillion ($15 billion) stimulus package, with some urging for more cash while others worry about inflation.

“We plan to provide a large amount through fiscal policy but the amount through monetary policy is not meeting expectations from businesses and the people,” said Trinh Xuan An, a member of the National Assembly’s National Defense and Security Committee.

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Freedom House Report 2021: Democracy under Siege

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As a lethal pandemic, economic and physical insecurity, and violent conflict ravaged the world, democracy’s defenders sustained heavy new losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favor of tyranny.

WRITTEN BYSarah RepucciAmy Slipowitz, Freedom House

As a lethal pandemic, economic and physical insecurity, and violent conflict ravaged the world in 2020, democracy’s defenders sustained heavy new losses in their struggle against authoritarian foes, shifting the international balance in favor of tyranny. Incumbent leaders increasingly used force to crush opponents and settle scores, sometimes in the name of public health, while beleaguered activists—lacking effective international support—faced heavy jail sentences, torture, or murder in many settings.

These withering blows marked the 15th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. The countries experiencing deterioration outnumbered those with improvements by the largest margin recorded since the negative trend began in 2006. The long democratic recession is deepening.

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Luật Năng lượng Nguyên tử

Độc lập – Tự do – Hạnh phúc
Luật số: 18/2008/QH12Hà Nội, ngày 03 tháng 06 năm 2008



Căn cứ Hiến pháp nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam năm 1992 đã được sửa đổi, bổ sung một số điều theo Nghị quyết số 51/2001/QH10;
Quốc hội ban hành Luật năng lượng nguyên tử,

Chương 1.


Điều 1. Phạm vi điều chỉnh

Luật này quy định về các hoạt động trong lĩnh vực năng lượng nguyên tử và bảo đảm an toàn, an ninh trong các hoạt động đó.

Điều 2. Đối tượng áp dụng

Luật này áp dụng đối với tổ chức, cá nhân trong nước, người Việt Nam định cư ở nước ngoài, tổ chức, cá nhân nước ngoài, tổ chức quốc tế tiến hành các hoạt động trong lĩnh vực năng lượng nguyên tử tại Việt Nam.

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Has Washington’s Policy Toward Taiwan Crossed the Rubicon?

December 10, 2021  by Paul Heer, The National Interest

Testimony from officials in the State Department and Defense Department this week included subtle but important shifts in the U.S. policy toward Taiwan

The ground shifted under Washington’s policy toward Taiwan on December 8, a shift no less seismic for being subtle and semantic. During a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner asserted that Taiwan is “a critical node within the first island chain (in the Western Pacific), anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners … that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

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How Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Gwyneth Paltrow Short-Circuit Your Ability to Think Rationally

The sketchy rhetorical tricks of politicians, celebs, and con men—and how they work.


By Eric Roston +Follow18:00 GMT+7, 15 tháng 10, 2021

I’m not saying 1 only total losers 2 would skip this story, but a bunch of people did warn me. If you read on, you’ll discover how only I 3 can protect you from the shadowy groups 4 peddling lies 5 to control your children6


  1. Paralipsis, or bringing up a statement or thread solely to disassociate oneself from it.
  2. Ad hominem statement, or denigrating a person or people instead of grappling with their arguments.
  3. Authoritarian appeal to fear.
  4. Appeal to conspiracy.
  5. Projection technique, or falsely accusing enemies of using one’s own unethical tactics.
  6. Authoritarian appeal to fear.]

If a version of this message sounds familiar, it’s because it contains some of the most common techniques deployed by the authoritarians, con men, bosses, and questionable cultural figures swirling around us. Donald Trump. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Even Barstool Sports’ Dave Portnoy, Elon Musk, and Gwyneth Paltrow have inadvertently used some of these methods. (Respectively, prejudicescare tactics, and faux intimacy.)

Tiếp tục đọc “How Donald Trump, Elon Musk, and Gwyneth Paltrow Short-Circuit Your Ability to Think Rationally”

The controversial future of nuclear power in the U.S.

As the climate crisis worsens, the discussion intensifies over what role nuclear power should play in fighting it.

By LOIS PARSHLEY, PUBLISHED MAY 4, 2021• 15 MIN READ, National Geographic

President Joe Biden has set ambitious goals for fighting climate change: To cut U.S. carbon emissions in half by 2030 and to have a net-zero carbon economy by 2050. The plan requires electricity generation—the easiest economic sector to green, analysts say—to be carbon-free by 2035.

Where is all that clean electricity going to come from?

few figures from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) illustrate the challenge. In 2020 the United States generated about four trillion kilowatt-hours of electricity. Some 60 percent of that came from burning fossil fuels, mostly natural gas, in some 10,000 generators, large and small, around the country. All of that electricity will need to be replaced—and more, because demand for electricity is expected to rise, especially if we power more cars with it.

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US Federal Trade Competition

Competitive Guidance

Competition Policy Guidance

In conjunction with its law enforcement and advocacy work, the FTC provides guidance about the application of the U.S. antitrust laws to promote transparency and encourage compliance with the law. These resources aid antitrust practitioners, policy makers, businesses, and consumers with questions about the antitrust laws or competition policy. Core competition documents have been developed with the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division to promote sound U.S. competition policy.  This site also contains links to Advisory Opinions, which provide guidance concerning proposed conduct. The Bureau of Competition has developed educational resources aimed at consumers and businesses to prevent consumer injury, increase business compliance and augment its enforcement efforts.





Fossil Fuel’s Downfall Could Be America’s Too

How U.S. polluters might drag the country’s economy down with them.

By Adam Tooze DECEMBER 3, 2021, 4:31 AM FP

A steel mill is seen outside Pittsburgh.

The United Nations climate change conference (known as COP26) in Glasgow, Scotland, was billed as historic. By that measure, the conference didn’t deliver. But it nevertheless marks a moment of transition. Glasgow completed the process begun at the 2015 Paris conference, under which nations progressively raised their national commitments to decarbonization. All the major economies of the world are now notionally committed to reaching net-zero emissions between 2050 and 2070. As a result, Glasgow also marked the moment when climate politics began to focus on the energy transition as a matter of industrial policy. It was symptomatic that a prominent commitment to reduce coal burning was included in the final resolution. It was not enough, but it was a significant first. It was also symptomatic that Britain’s conservative government put the emphasis on businesses. That dismayed many activists, but it was a prompt eagerly seized on by U.S. climate envoy John Kerry.

Kerry finished the conference hailing an impending transformation. Firms that were willing to innovate and gamble on the energy transition would be opening up the “greatest economic opportunity since the Industrial Revolution,” he said. In a Financial Times op-ed published in November, Kerry added: “Like the proverbial cavalry, the first movers [in business] are coming. … Companies should seize this opportunity by propelling the shift—rather than being buffeted in its wake.” Meanwhile, in the New York Times, columnist Thomas Friedman chimed in to declare if we are looking to save the world, “we will get there only when Father Profit and risk-taking entrepreneurs produce transformative technologies that enable ordinary people to have extraordinary impacts on our climate without sacrificing much—by just being good consumers of these new technologies. In short: we need a few more Greta Thunbergs and a lot more Elon Musks.”

Read more on Foreign Affairs >>

Vietnam announces renewable energy plan

By New Straits Times
December 2, 2021 @ 9:50am

Vietnam announces renewable energy plan
A statue of late Vietnamese revolutionary leader Ho Chi Minh in Ho Chi Minh City.Vietnam has announced a plan to have renewable energy account for three quarters of its national power production capacity by 2045. AFP Pic

VIETNAM has announced a plan to have renewable energy account for three quarters of its national power production capacity by 2045.

Authorities also hope to achieve 70 per cent of actual production through renewable sources under its commitments made during the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2021 (COP 26) last month.

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US Congressional Research Service: China’s Political System in Charts – A Snapshot Before the 20th Party Congress

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The political system of the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) defies easy categorization. China is both a nation state and a Leninist “Party-state,” with the Party being the Communist Party of China (CPC or Party), also known as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

The political system operates under two “constitutions,” one for the Party, China’s dominant political institution, and one for the state.1 State institutions operate fundamentally differently from their Western counterparts. In the case of China’s national parliament, for example, because China eschews separation of powers, a third of the delegates are sitting senior Party and state officials, with China’s top leader, CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping, among them.2

The parliament, like every other political institution in China, both reports to the Party and includes a Party cell within it. Atop the political system is a leader, Xi, who is not subject to direct or competitive indirect election, and who has signaled an intention to remain in power indefinitely.3

As strategic competition between the United States and China has grown more acute in recent years, Congress has shown a strong interest in understanding China’s political system. In the 116th Congress, Members introduced 99 bills referencing the CPC, six of which were enacted into law.4 More than 100 such bills are pending in the 117th Congress. This report seeks to provide Congress with a detailed understanding of China’s political system ahead of the CPC’s 20th
National Congress, which is scheduled to convene in the second half of 2022.

The report openswith a discussion of how the CPC exercises its self-anointed leadership role in China’s Partystate.

The report then briefly discusses the ways the CPC has embedded its claim to Taiwan within China’s political system.

The main part of the report introduces readers to China’s major political institutions through 16 organization charts and accompanying explanatory text.

All individuals’ names are listed in Chinese style, with family names preceding given names. CRS Visual Information Specialist Mari Y. Lee created all the charts in this report.

Note on Sources and Language
Much of the information in this report is drawn from PRC sources, including Chinese-language official websites and Chinese-language reports from China’s state-controlled media. Where English translations of these sources are known to exist, CRS has endeavored to identify them in the footnotes. Because of the difficulty of tracing Romanized personal names back to their original Chinese characters, and because the names of Chinese political bodies can often be translated into English in multiple ways, CRS has included Chinese characters in the charts in this report for reference.

1. Although in English the Party-state refers to both documents as “constitutions,” the Chinese-language terms are different. The Party document is a “ zhangcheng章程.” The state document is a “ xianfa 宪法.” The Party constitution is also sometimes referred to in English as the Party “charter.” “Constitution of the Communist Party of China,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, at; “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China,” at
“领导干部比例降低!一图看懂第十三届全国人大代表构成” (“The Proportion of Leadership Cadres Has Fallen! See the Composition of the 13th NPC Delegates in One Chart”), 新京报(Beijing News) via Huanqiu, March 4, 2018, at
3. Chris Buckley and Adam Wu, “Ending Term Limits for China’s Xi Is a Big Deal. Here’s Why,” New York Times, March 10, 2018.
4. The six laws from the 116th Congress referencing the CPC are the Let Everyone Get Involved in Opportunities for National Service Act (P.L. 116-35), the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020 (P.L. 116-92), the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-145), the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act (P.L. 116-222), Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (P.L. 116-260 ), and the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (P.L. 116-283).

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