Xi and Putin Have the Most Consequential Undeclared Alliance in the World

It’s become more important than Washington’s official alliances today.

By Graham Allison, a professor of government at the Harvard Kennedy School.

MARCH 23, 2023, 5:42 PM

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s decision to visit Moscow this week in his first trip abroad since his reelection comes as no surprise to those who have been watching carefully. When one steps back and analyzes the relationship between China and Russia, the brute facts cannot be denied: Along every dimension—personal, economic, military, and diplomatic—the undeclared alliance that Xi has built with Russian President Vladimir Putin has become much more consequential than most of the United States’ official alliances today.

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US Navy denying china’s claims of illegally entering waters

Al Jazeera English – 23-3-2023

The United States has denied Chinese claims that a US destroyer was driven out from waters around the contested Paracel Islands after it “illegally” entered the area.

China’s state media described the US ship as having trespassed in “Chinese territorial waters”.

The US Navy on Thursday disputed the PLA statement, saying the destroyer was conducting “routine operations” in the South China Sea and was not expelled by Chinese ships.

Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu joins us live from Beijing to give us the latest updates.

Thấy gì từ các công trình nước sinh hoạt tập trung ở Tây Nguyên? (2 bài)

Bài 1 – Hàng trăm công trình không hiệu quả

Báo dân tộc – Lê Hường – 12:08, 08/06/2021

Những năm qua, vùng nông thôn các tỉnh khu vực Tây Nguyên, từ nhiều nguồn vốn khác nhau, hàng trăm công trình cấp nước sinh hoạt tập trung được đầu tư, xây dựng; nhưng, hiện nay số công trình hoạt động hiệu quả, chỉ chiếm một tỉ lệ rất nhỏ. Thực trạng này, gây lãng phí ngân sách nhà nước, đồng thời đời sống sinh hoạt của người dân vẫn tiếp tục gặp khó khăn.

Công trình nước sạch ở xã Ea Pô bỏ hoang

Nhiều công trình vừa đưa vào sử dụng đã ngưng hoạt động, nhiều công trình khác hư hỏng không được sử chữa dẫn đến bỏ hoang gây lãng phí… Trong khi đó, người dân vẫn phải sử dụng nguồn nước không đảm bảo để ăn uống, sinh hoạt. Đó là thực tế tồn tại lâu nay tại nhiều vùng nông thôn, miền núi của khu vực Tây Nguyên.

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AR6 Synthesis Report: Climate Change 2023

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is the United Nations body for assessing the science related to climate change.

Summary for Policy Makers >>

Longer Report >>

More information >>

Headline Statements

Headline statements are the overarching conclusions of the approved Summary for Policymakers which, taken together, provide a concise narrative.

ACurrent Status and Trends
Observed Warming and its Causes
A.1Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850–1900 in 2011–2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals (high confidence). {2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2}.
Observed Changes and Impacts
A.2Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected (high confidence). {2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.2 and 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)
Current Progress in Adaptation and Gaps and Challenges
A.3Adaptation planning and implementation has progressed across all sectors and regions, with documented benefits and varying effectiveness. Despite progress, adaptation gaps exist, and will continue to grow at current rates of implementation. Hard and soft limits to adaptation have been reached in some ecosystems and regions. Maladaptation is happening in some sectors and regions. Current global financial flows for adaptation are insufficient for, and constrain implementation of, adaptation options, especially in developing countries (high confidence). {2.2, 2.3}
Current Mitigation Progress, Gaps and Challenges
A.4Policies and laws addressing mitigation have consistently expanded since AR5. Global GHG emissions in 2030 implied by nationally determined contributions (NDCs) announced by October 2021 make it likely that warming will exceed 1.5°C during the 21st century and make it harder to limit warming below 2°C. There are gaps between projected emissions from implemented policies and those from NDCs and finance flows fall short of the levels needed to meet climate goals across all sectors and regions. (high confidence) {2.2, 2.3, Figure 2.5, Table 2.2}
BFuture Climate Change, Risks, and Long-Term Responses
Future Climate Change
B.1Continued greenhouse gas emissions will lead to increasing global warming, with the best estimate of reaching 1.5°C in the near term in considered scenarios and modelled pathways. Every increment of global warming will intensify multiple and concurrent hazards (high confidence). Deep, rapid, and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions would lead to a discernible slowdown in global warming within around two decades, and also to discernible changes in atmospheric composition within a few years (high confidence). {Cross-Section Boxes 1 and 2, 3.1, 3.3, Table 3.1, Figure 3.1, 4.3} (Figure SPM.2, Box SPM.1)
Climate Change Impacts and Climate-Related Risks
B.2For any given future warming level, many climate-related risks are higher than assessed in AR5, and projected long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than currently observed (high confidence). Risks and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages from climate change escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence). Climatic and non-climatic risks will increasingly interact, creating compound and cascading risks that are more complex and difficult to manage (high confidence). {Cross-Section Box.2, 3.1, 4.3, Figure 3.3, Figure 4.3} (Figure SPM.3, Figure SPM.4)
Likelihood and Risks of Unavoidable, Irreversible or Abrupt Changes
B.3Some future changes are unavoidable and/or irreversible but can be limited by deep, rapid and sustained global greenhouse gas emissions reduction. The likelihood of abrupt and/or irreversible changes increases with higher global warming levels. Similarly, the probability of low-likelihood outcomes associated with potentially very large adverse impacts increases with higher global warming levels. (high confidence) {3.1}
Adaptation Options and their Limits in a Warmer World
B.4Adaptation options that are feasible and effective today will become constrained and less effective with increasing global warming. With increasing global warming, losses and damages will increase and additional human and natural systems will reach adaptation limits. Maladaptation can be avoided by flexible, multi-sectoral, inclusive, long-term planning and implementation of adaptation actions, with co-benefits to many sectors and systems. (high confidence) {3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3}
Carbon Budgets and Net Zero Emissions
B.5Limiting human-caused global warming requires net zero CO2 emissions. Cumulative carbon emissions until the time of reaching net-zero CO2 emissions and the level of greenhouse gas emission reductions this decade largely determine whether warming can be limited to 1.5°C or 2°C (high confidence). Projected CO2 emissions from existing fossil fuel infrastructure without additional abatement would exceed the remaining carbon budget for 1.5°C (50%) (high confidence). {2.3, 3.1, 3.3, Table 3.1}
Mitigation Pathways
B.6All global modelled pathways that limit warming to 1.5°C (>50%) with no or limited overshoot, and those that limit warming to 2°C (>67%), involve rapid and deep and, in most cases, immediate greenhouse gas emissions reductions in all sectors this decade. Global net zero CO2 emissions are reached for these pathway categories, in the early 2050s and around the early 2070s, respectively. (high confidence) {3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.5, Table 3.1} (Figure SPM.5, Box SPM.1)
Overshoot: Exceeding a Warming Level and Returning
B.7If warming exceeds a specified level such as 1.5°C, it could gradually be reduced again by achieving and sustaining net negative global CO2 emissions. This would require additional deployment of carbon dioxide removal, compared to pathways without overshoot, leading to greater feasibility and sustainability concerns. Overshoot entails adverse impacts, some irreversible, and additional risks for human and natural systems, all growing with the magnitude and duration of overshoot. (high confidence) {3.1, 3.3, 3.4, Table 3.1, Figure 3.6}
CResponses in the Near Term
Urgency of Near-Term Integrated Climate Action
C.1Climate change is a threat to human well-being and planetary health (very high confidence). There is a rapidly closing window of opportunity to secure a liveable and sustainable future for all (very high confidence). Climate resilient development integrates adaptation and mitigation to advance sustainable development for all, and is enabled by increased international cooperation including improved access to adequate financial resources, particularly for vulnerable regions, sectors and groups, and inclusive governance and coordinated policies (high confidence). The choices and actions implemented in this decade will have impacts now and for thousands of years (high confidence). {3.1, 3.3, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.7, 4.8, 4.9, Figure 3.1, Figure 3.3, Figure 4.2} (Figure SPM.1; Figure SPM.6)
The Benefits of Near-Term Action
C.2Deep, rapid and sustained mitigation and accelerated implementation of adaptation actions in this decade would reduce projected losses and damages for humans and ecosystems (very high confidence), and deliver many co-benefits, especially for air quality and health (high confidence). Delayed mitigation and adaptation action would lock-in high-emissions infrastructure, raise risks of stranded assets and cost-escalation, reduce feasibility, and increase losses and damages (high confidence). Near-term actions involve high up-front investments and potentially disruptive changes that can be lessened by a range of enabling policies (high confidence). {2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8}
Mitigation and Adaptation Options across Systems
C.3Rapid and far-reaching transitions across all sectors and systems are necessary to achieve deep and sustained emissions reductions and secure a liveable and sustainable future for all. These system transitions involve a significant upscaling of a wide portfolio of mitigation and adaptation options. Feasible, effective, and low-cost options for mitigation and adaptation are already available, with differences across systems and regions. (high confidence) {4.1, 4.5, 4.6} (Figure SPM.7)
Synergies and Trade-Offs with Sustainable Development
C.4Accelerated and equitable action in mitigating and adapting to climate change impacts is critical to sustainable development. Mitigation and adaptation actions have more synergies than trade-offs with Sustainable Development Goals. Synergies and trade-offs depend on context and scale of implementation. (high confidence) {3.4, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.9, Figure 4.5}
Equity and Inclusion
C.5Prioritising equity, climate justice, social justice, inclusion and just transition processes can enable adaptation and ambitious mitigation actions and climate resilient development. Adaptation outcomes are enhanced by increased support to regions and people with the highest vulnerability to climatic hazards. Integrating climate adaptation into social protection programs improves resilience. Many options are available for reducing emission-intensive consumption, including through behavioural and lifestyle changes, with co-benefits for societal well-being. (high confidence) {4.4, 4.5}
Governance and Policies
C.6Effective climate action is enabled by political commitment, well-aligned multilevel governance, institutional frameworks, laws, policies and strategies and enhanced access to finance and technology. Clear goals, coordination across multiple policy domains, and inclusive governance processes facilitate effective climate action. Regulatory and economic instruments can support deep emissions reductions and climate resilience if scaled up and applied widely. Climate resilient development benefits from drawing on diverse knowledge. (high confidence) {2.2, 4.4, 4.5, 4.7}
Finance, Technology and International Cooperation
C.7Finance, technology and international cooperation are critical enablers for accelerated climate action. If climate goals are to be achieved, both adaptation and mitigation financing would need to increase many-fold. There is sufficient global capital to close the global investment gaps but there are barriers to redirect capital to climate action. Enhancing technology innovation systems is key to accelerate the widespread adoption of technologies and practices. Enhancing international cooperation is possible through multiple channels. (high confidence) {2.3, 4.8}

‘It can be done. It must be done’: IPCC delivers definitive report on climate change, and where to now


The world is in deep trouble on climate change, but if we really put our shoulder to the wheel we can turn things around. Loosely, that’s the essence of today’s report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

The IPCC is the world’s official body for assessment of climate change. The panel has just released its Synthesis Report, capping off seven years of in-depth assessments on various topics.

The report draws out the key insights from six previous reports, written by hundreds of expert authors. They spanned many thousands of pages and were informed by hundreds of thousands of comments by governments and the scientific community.

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El Nino sẽ khiến mùa hè năm nay nắng nóng, khô hạn diện rộng

SKĐS – Chu kỳ La Nina chấm dứt để chuyển sang El Nino, dự báo mùa hè năm 2023 sẽ khắc nghiệt với khô hạn diện rộng, nắng nóng gay gắt với nền nhiệt cao.

Nắng nóng đến sớm

Theo Trung tâm Khí tượng thủy văn quốc gia nhận định, nắng nóng có khả năng xuất hiện cục bộ tại Tây Bắc Bộ, vùng núi phía Tây Bắc và Trung Trung Bộ trong nửa cuối tháng 3, đầu tháng 4/2023; riêng khu vực Nam Bộ có thể xuất hiện nhiều ngày nắng nóng, tập trung ở các tỉnh miền Đông Nam Bộ.

Cao điểm nắng nóng năm nay xuất hiện từ tháng 6 đến tháng 8, chủ yếu ở Bắc Bộ và Trung Bộ, cường độ nắng nóng có thể gay gắt hơn so với cùng thời kỳ năm 2022. Trong các tháng này, nhiệt độ trên phạm vi cả nước phổ biến ở mức cao hơn khoảng 0,5 độ C so với trung bình nhiều năm cùng thời kỳ.

Cũng theo cơ quan khí tượng, từ tuần sau, các hình thế thời tiết gây nắng nóng bắt đầu xuất hiện đó là vùng áp thấp nóng phía Tây mở rộng về nước ta, áp cao cận nhiệt đới ổn định và khối khí biển từ vịnh Bengal thổi tới theo hướng Tây Nam. Đối với Bắc Bộ và Trung Bộ, thời gian xảy ra nắng nóng dự báo khoảng từ ngày 21 đến ngày 24/03, còn Nam Bộ khả năng cường độ nắng sẽ tiếp tục duy trì.

El Nino sẽ khiến mùa hè năm nay nắng nóng, khô hạn diện rộng - Ảnh 2.
Mùa hè năm nay sẽ đến sớm và nắng nóng gay gắt hơn.

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