Downing of US drone in Russian jet encounter prompts counter claims of violations in the sky – an international law expert explores the arguments

Academic rigour, journalistic flair, The Conversation

A U.S. surveillance drone flies over the USS Coronado in the Pacific Ocean during an April 2021 drill. U.S. Navy/Chief Mass Communication Specialist Shannon Renfroe

Published: March 15, 2023 4.43pm GMT

Author

  1. Ashley S. Deeks Professor of Scholarly Research in Law, University of Virginia

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I worked for the State Department from 1999-2010 and for the National Security Council from 2021-22.

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The details are disputed, but either way the result was the same: On March 14, 2023, a U.S. drone crashed into the Black Sea after an encounter with Russian aircraft.

According to the U.S. version of events, the unarmed MQ-9 surveillance drone was flying in international airspace when two Russian fighter jets dumped fuel on the drone before colliding with it in violation of international law.

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The weaponizing of social media: A Private Company Is Using Social Media to Track Down Russian Soldiers

Open-source investigations were once potent journalistic tools, but in Ukraine, they’re being used on the battlefield.

MARCH 2, 2023, 6:00 AM

By Jack Hewson, FP

On Oct. 12, 2022, Russian soldier Aleksey Lebedev logged onto VKontakte, Russia’s most popular social network, and uploaded a photo of himself in military fatigues crouching in a large white tent. He had been smart enough to obscure his face with a balaclava, but unfortunately for Lebedev and his comrades, he did not obscure the exact location from which he had posted: Svobodne village in southern Donetsk.

Russian soldier Aleksey Lebedev posted on the social media site VKontakteRussian soldier Aleksey Lebedev posted on the social media site VKontakte

Russian soldier Aleksey Lebedev posted on the social media site VKontakte on Oct. 12. The Ukrainian military investigations company Molfar noted the location on Google Maps (inset); a satellite version from Google Maps is pictured in the bottom inset. VKONTAKTE/GOOGLE MAPS VIA MOLFAR

Lebedev’s post was picked up by a Ukrainian military investigations company called Molfar. This lead was transferred to an analyst in its open-source intelligence (OSINT) branch, and investigators spent the next few hours constructing a target location profile for Lebedev and his military unit. The unit’s location was believed to be a training base for Russian and pro-Russian separatist troops. After discovering two other photos posted from the same location by pro-Russian servicemen—as well as other corroborating evidence, which was shared with Foreign Policy—Molfar passed its findings onto Ukrainian intelligence.

Read more on Foreign Affairs >>

Vietnam feels impact of Russia-Ukraine war in energy prices, defence industry

channelnewsasia.com

Vietnam’s state utility EVN says it could run out of cash by May unless it raises electricity prices.

Vietnam feels impact of Russia-Ukraine war in energy prices, defence industry
After China and India, Vietnam has the world’s third-largest pipeline of new coal power projects (Photo: AFP/STR)

HANOI: Vietnam may be thousands of kilometres away from the Russia-Ukraine war, but it is feeling the effects of the conflict, particularly in energy prices and its defence industry.

The Southeast Asian country is seeking to hike electricity prices for the first time since 2019 amid the ongoing global energy crisis, following record losses by its state utility.

Vietnam produces around 40 million tonnes of coal each year and imports another 29 million tonnes or so, with most of the coal going towards fuelling the country’s power plants.

However, the cost of doing so has increased exponentially.

“Because of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, the price of coal in the global market in 2022 has increased by sixfold since 2020, and by 2.6-fold since 2021,”  said chairman of Vietnam Valuation Association Nguyen Tien Thoa. 

Vietnam’s state utility EVN has forecast it could run out of cash by May this year unless it raises electricity prices. This comes as the firm expects combined losses of nearly US$4 billion for 2022 and this year.

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Russian missiles rain down on Ukraine towns on Christmas Day

euractiv.com

EURACTIV.com with Reuters 26 Dec 2022

People from the collective ‘Kyivska Kolyada’ ride in the train after singing Christmas carols and collect money for the Ukrainian army at a metro station in Kyiv, Ukraine, 25 December 2022. 2022 is the first year Orthodox churches were allowed to hold a Christmas prayer service on 24 December. Traditionally, the Orthodox church celebrates Christmas on 6 January. [EPA-EFE/OLEG PETRASYUK]

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Russian forces bombarded scores of towns in Ukraine on Christmas Day as Russian President Vladimir Putin said he was open to negotiations, a stance Washington has dismissed as posturing because of continued Russian attacks.

Russia on Sunday launched more than 10 rocket attacks on the Kupiansk district in the Kharkiv region, shelled more than 25 towns along the Kupiansk-Lyman frontline, and in Zaporizhzhia hit nearly 20 towns, said Ukraine’s top military command.

Russia’s defence ministry said on Sunday that it had killed about 60 Ukrainian servicemen the previous day along the Kupiansk-Lyman line of contact and destroyed numerous pieces of Ukrainian military equipment.

Reuters was not able to independently verify the reports.

Putin’s 24 February invasion of Ukraine – which Moscow calls a “special military operation” – has triggered the biggest European conflict since World War Two and confrontation between Moscow and the West since the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.

Despite Putin’s latest offer to negotiate, there is no end in sight to the 10-month conflict.

“We are ready to negotiate with everyone involved about acceptable solutions, but that is up to them – we are not the ones refusing to negotiate, they are,” Putin told Rossiya 1 state television in an interview broadcast on Sunday.

An adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Putin needed to return to reality and acknowledge it was Russia that did not want talks.

“Russia single-handedly attacked Ukraine and is killing citizens,” the adviser, Mykhailo Podolyak, tweeted. “Russia doesn’t want negotiations, but tries to avoid responsibility.”

Russian attacks on power stations have left millions without electricity, and Zelenskyy said Moscow would aim to make the last few days of 2022 dark and difficult.

“Russia has lost everything it could this year. … I know darkness will not prevent us from leading the occupiers to new defeats. But we have to be ready for any scenario,” he said in an evening video address on Christmas Day.

Ukraine has traditionally not celebrated Christmas on 25 December, but 7 January, the same as Russia. However, this year some Orthodox Ukrainians decided to celebrate the holiday on 25 December and Ukrainian officials, starting with Zelenskyy and Ukraine’s prime minister, issued Christmas wishes on Sunday.

The Kremlin says it will fight until all its territorial aims are achieved, while Kyiv says it will not rest until every Russian soldier is ejected from the country.

Asked if the geopolitical conflict with the West was approaching a dangerous level, Putin on Sunday said: “I don’t think it’s so dangerous.”

Kyiv and the West say Putin has no justification for what they cast as an imperial-style war of occupation.

Blasts at Engels airbase

Blasts were heard at Russia’s Engels air base, hundreds of kilometres (miles) from the Ukraine frontlines, Ukrainian and Russian media reported on Monday.

Russia’s governor of Saratov region, home to the Engels air-base, said law enforcement agencies were checking information about “an incident at a military facility”.

“There were no emergencies in residential areas of the (Engels) city,” Roman Busargin, the governor of the region, said on the Telegram messaging app. “Civil infrastructure facilities were not damaged.”

The air base, near the city of Saratov, about 730 km (450 miles) southeast of Moscow, was hit on 5 December in what Russia said were Ukrainian drone attacks on two Russian air bases that day. The strikes dealt Moscow a major reputational blow and raised questions about why its defences failed, analysts said.

Ukraine has never publicly claimed responsibility for attacks inside Russia, but has said, however, that such incidents are “karma” for Russia’s invasion.

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5 takeaways from Volodymyr Zelensky’s historic visit to Washington

Kevin Liptak

By Kevin Liptak, CNN

Updated 9:01 PM

volodymyr zelensky

Watch Zelensky unveil flag during historic speech to Congress

CNN —  Three-hundred days after his country was invaded by Russia, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky jetted to Washington, DC, for talks on what the next 300 days might bring.

Shrouded in secrecy until the last minute, the historic visit was heavy with symbolism, from Zelensky’s drab green sweatshirt to President Joe Biden’s blue-and-yellow striped tie to the Ukrainian battle flag unfurled on the House floor.

But the trip was about far more than symbols. Biden wouldn’t invite Zelensky to Washington – and endure a risky trip outside Ukraine for the first time since the war began – if he did not believe something real could be accomplished meeting face-to-face instead of over the phone.

Emerging from their talks, both men made clear they see the war entering a new phase. As Russia sends more troops to the frontlines and wages a brutal air campaign against civilian targets, fears of a stalemate are growing.

Yet as Zelensky departed Washington for a lengthy and similarly risky return trip to Ukraine, it wasn’t clear that a pathway to ending the conflict was any clearer.

Biden shakes hands with Zelensky as he arrives at the White House.
Zelensky, left, is greeted by Rufus Gifford, chief of protocol for the state department, after landing in the United States on Wednesday.
President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses Congress as Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Vice President Kamala Harris hold up a Ukrainian national flag signed by Ukrainian soldiers at the Capitol in Washington on Wednesday, December 21.

President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses Congress as Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Vice President Kamala Harris hold up a Ukrainian national flag signed by Ukrainian soldiers at the Capitol in Washington on Wednesday, December 21.Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

Zelensky addresses the joint meeting of Congress.
Zelensky holds an American flag that was gifted to him by Pelosi. The flag was flown over the Capitol earlier in the day.
Zelensky addresses Congress.
Zelensky addresses the joint meeting.
Guests of the the Ukrainian delegation wave as Zelensky acknowledges them during his address.
Zelensky is greeted as he arrives to address Congress.
Zelensky speaks during a news conference with Biden in the East Room of the White House.
Biden speaks during the news conference.
Members of the media listen during the news conference in the East Room of the White House.
Biden speaks during the news conference.
Zelensky meets with Biden in the Oval Office of the White House.
<img src="https://media.cnn.com/api/v1/images/stellar/prod/221221145629-09-zelensky-us-visit-1221.jpg?c=original&q=w_1280,c_fill&quot; alt="Zelensky speaks after giving Biden a gift. He <a href="https://www.cnn.com/europe/live-news/russia-ukraine-war-news-12-21-22/h_5daaaace8ac5173e9d501b3b86978113&quot; target="_blank">presented Biden

Biden holds the Cross of Combat Merit. "He's very brave," Zelensky said of the soldier. "And he said give it to very brave President, and I want to give you, that is a cross for military merit."
Zelensky sits with Biden and first lady Jill Biden inside the White House.
Biden and Zelensky walk down the Colonnade of the White House as they make their way to the Oval Office.
Biden and Zelensky walk into the White House after Zelensky's arrival.
Biden and first lady Jill Biden welcome Zelensky at the White House on Wednesday.
Biden shakes hands with Zelensky as he arrives at the White House.
Zelensky, left, is greeted by Rufus Gifford, chief of protocol for the state department, after landing in the United States on Wednesday.
President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses Congress as Rep. Nancy Pelosi and Vice President Kamala Harris hold up a Ukrainian national flag signed by Ukrainian soldiers at the Capitol in Washington on Wednesday, December 21.
Zelensky addresses the joint meeting of Congress.
In pictures: Zelensky’s wartime visit to US
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Cuộc chiến tranh hạ tầng

TƯỜNG ANH 04/12/2022 09:37 GMT+7

TTCTTrên mạng Internet những ngày này lan truyền hình ảnh vệ tinh cho thấy hầu hết các thành phố lớn của Ukraine chìm trong bóng tối. Các cuộc tấn công của Matxcơva vào hạ tầng năng lượng Kiev đang ảnh hưởng thế nào tới cục diện chiến sự?

Cuộc chiến tranh hạ tầng - Ảnh 1.

Ekaterina Martynyuk thắp nến trong căn hộ của bà ở Kherson, Ukraine, ngày 15-11, cả thành phố đã cúp điện và nước từ khi quân Nga rút đi năm ngày trước. Ảnh: Getty Images

Từ 23-11, lần đầu tiên trong lịch sử Ukraine, ba nhà máy điện hạt nhân còn lại của nước này (Rivne, Khmelnytsky và Nam Ukraine) được đặt ở chế độ khẩn cấp, hầu hết các nhà máy nhiệt điện tạm thời cúp điện, 11 khu vực chìm trong bóng tối, bao gồm Kiev, Lvov và Odessa. 

Hệ thống nước và sưởi ấm đã ngừng hoạt động ở nhiều thành phố. Kiev mất điện 70%. Thông tin liên lạc và giao thông một số nơi cũng gián đoạn. Thị trưởng Kiev Vitaly Klitschko kêu gọi người dân, những ai có thể, tạm thời sơ tán về vùng quê để trụ qua mùa đông 2022 này.

Tiếp tục đọc “Cuộc chiến tranh hạ tầng”

What’s the Harm in Talking to Russia? A Lot, Actually.

Diplomacy is neither intrinsically moral nor always strategically wise.

FP

By Raphael S. Cohen, the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force, and Gian Gentile, the deputy director of the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division.

Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a commission on military-technical cooperation with foreign states in 2017.
Russian President Vladimir Putin chairs a commission on military-technical cooperation with foreign states in 2017.

NOVEMBER 22, 2022, 1:36 PM

Give diplomacy a chance.” This phrase gets repeated in almost every conflict, and the war in Ukraine is no exception. A chorus of commentators, experts, and former policymakers have pushed for a negotiated peace at every turn on the battlefield: after the successful defense of Kyiv, once Russia withdrew to the east, during the summer of Russia’s plodding progress in the Donbas, after Russia’s rout in Kharkiv oblast, and now, in the aftermath of Russia’s retreat from Kherson. The better the Ukrainian military has done, the louder the calls for Ukraine to negotiate have become.

And today, it’s no longer just pundits pushing for a negotiated settlement. The U.S. House of Representatives’ progressive caucus penned a letter to President Joe Biden calling for a diplomatic solution, only to retract it a short time later. Republican House leader Kevin McCarthy has promised to scrutinize military aid to Ukraine and push for an end to the war. Even Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Mark Milley has reportedly pushed for Ukraine to negotiate, although he subsequently made clear that the decision should be Kyiv’s alone.

And why not negotiate? Isn’t a diplomatic solution the best—indeed, the only—option for any kind of long-term settlement between Russia and Ukraine? And if so, what could possibly be the harm in exploring those options? Quite a lot, actually: Despite the way it is commonly portrayed, diplomacy is not intrinsically and always good, nor is it cost-free. In the Ukraine conflict, the problems with a push for diplomacy are especially apparent. The likely benefits of negotiations are minimal, and the prospective costs could be significant.

First, the argument that most wars end with diplomacy and so, therefore, will the war in Ukraine is misleading at best. Some wars—such as the U.S. Civil War and World War II—were fought to the bitter end. Others—like the American Revolution, the Spanish-American War, World War I, or the First Gulf War—were won on the battlefield before the sides headed to the negotiating table. Still others—like the Korean War—ended in an armistice, but only after the sides had fought to a standstill. By contrast, attempts at a diplomatic settlement while the military situation remained fluid—as the United States tried during the Vietnam War and, more recently, in Afghanistan—have ended in disaster. Even if most wars ultimately end in diplomatic settlements, that’s not in lieu of victory.

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Pushing Ukraine to negotiate now sends a series of signals, none of them good.

At this particular moment, diplomacy cannot end the war in Ukraine, simply because Russian and Ukrainian interests do not yet overlap. The Ukrainians, understandably, want their country back. They want reparations for the damage Russia has done and accountability for Russian war crimes. Russia, by contrast, has made it clear that it still intends to bend Ukraine to its will. It has officially annexed several regions in eastern and southern Ukraine, so withdrawing would now be tantamount, for them, to ceding parts of Russia. Russia’s economy is in ruins, so it cannot pay reparations. And full accountability for Russian war crimes may lead to Russian President Vladimir Putin and other top officials getting led to the dock. As much as Western observers might wish otherwise, such contrasts offer no viable diplomatic way forward right now.

Nor is diplomacy likely to forestall future escalation. One of the more common refrains as to why the United States should give diplomacy a chance is to avert Russia making good on its threats to use nuclear weapons. But what is causing Russia to threaten nuclear use in the first place? Presumably, it is because Russia is losing on the battlefield and lacks other options. Assuming that “diplomatic solution” is not a euphemism for Ukrainian capitulation, as its proponents insist, Russia’s calculations about whether and how to escalate would not change. Russia would still be losing the war and looking for a way to reverse its fortunes.

Diplomacy can moderate human suffering, but only on the margins. Throughout the conflict, Ukraine and Russia have negotiated prisoner swaps and a deal to allow grain exports. This kind of tactical diplomacy on a narrow issue was certainly welcome news for the captured troops and those parts of the world that depend on Ukrainian food exports. But it’s not at all clear how to ramp up from these relatively small diplomatic victories. Russia, for example, won’t abandon its attacks on Ukrainian infrastructure heading into the winter as it attempts to freeze Ukraine into submission, because that’s one of the few tactics Russia has left.

At the same time, more expansive diplomacy comes at a cost. Pushing Ukraine to negotiate now sends a series of signals, none of them good: It signals to the Russians that they can simply wait out Ukraine’s Western supporters, thereby protracting the conflict; it signals to the Ukrainians—not to mention other allies and partners around the world—that the United States might put up a good fight for a while but will, in the end, abandon them; and it tells the U.S. public that its leaders are not invested in seeing this war through, which in turn could increase domestic impatience with it.

Starting negotiations prematurely carries other costs. As Biden remarked in June: “Every negotiation reflects the facts on the ground.” Biden is right. Ukraine now is in a stronger negotiating position because it fought rather than talked. The question today is whether Ukraine will ultimately regain control over Donbas and Crimea, not Kharkiv and Kherson. This would not have been the case had anyone listened to the “give diplomacy a chance” crowd back in the spring or summer.

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Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin meet during the U.S.-Russia summit at Villa La Grange on June 16, 2021 in Geneva, Switzerland.
Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin meet during the U.S.-Russia summit at Villa La Grange on June 16, 2021 in Geneva, Switzerland.

Talking With Russia Is Tempting—and Wrong

Why it’s still too soon for negotiations to end the war in Ukraine.

ARGUMENT JAMES TRAUB

Natalia Pevnevy celebrates atop her car in Liberty Square following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksky's surprise visit in Kherson, Ukraine.
Natalia Pevnevy celebrates atop her car in Liberty Square following Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenksky’s surprise visit in Kherson, Ukraine.

Ukrainians Are Holding Strong as Some in West Falter

Ukrainian identity has been fundamentally changed by invasion.

ARGUMENT THOMAS SHERLOCK

There are plenty of reasons to believe that Kyiv will be in an even stronger bargaining position as time passes. The Ukrainians are coming off a string of successes—most recently retaking Kherson—so they have operational momentum. While Ukraine has suffered losses, Western military aid continues to flow in. Despite Russia’s missile strikes on civilian infrastructure, Ukrainian morale remains strong. By contrast, Russia is on the back foot. Its military inventories have been decimated, and it is struggling to acquire alternative supplies. Its mobilization effort prompted as many Russian men to flee the country as were eventually mobilized to fight in Ukraine. Moreover, as the Institute for the Study of War has assessed, “Russian mobilized servicemen have shown themselves to be inadequately trained, poorly equipped, and very reluctant to fight.”

By contrast, a negotiated settlement—even if it successfully freezes a conflict—comes with a host of moral, operational, and strategic risks. It leaves millions of Ukrainians to suffer under Russian occupation. It gives the Russian military a chance to rebuild, retrain, and restart the war at a later date. Above all, a pause gives time for the diverse international coalition supporting Ukraine to fracture, either on its own accord or because of Russian efforts to drive a wedge into the coalition.

Eventually, there will come a time for negotiations. That will be when Russia admits it has lost and wants to end the war. Or it will come when Ukraine says that the restoration of its territory isn’t worth the continued pain of the Russian bombardment. So far, neither scenario has come to pass. Indeed, the only softening of Russia’s position was Putin’s statement last month seemingly ruling out nuclear use—at least for the time being. Apart from that, the Kremlin seems intent on doubling down, even as its military continues to be slowly pushed out of Ukraine. That’s hardly an invitation to negotiate.

Might these arguments against the reflexive call for negotiations mean that war continues for months and possibly even years? Perhaps. But it’s not yet clear that there is a viable diplomatic alternative. And even if there was, it should be Ukraine’s choice whether or not to pursue it. Ukraine and its people, after all, are paying the price in blood. If the United States and its allies are sending tens of billions of dollars in military and economic aid to Ukraine, this is only a tiny fraction of what Washington has recently spent on defense and other wars. Thanks to the Ukrainians’ excellent use of this aid, the military threat from the United States’ second-most important adversary has been dealt a serious blow. The cold, if cruel, reality is that the West’s return on its investment in Ukraine seems high.

The harshness of these realities, however, does not make current calls for a negotiated settlement intrinsically moral. If diplomacy means ramming through a settlement when the battlefield circumstances dictate otherwise, it is not necessarily the morally more justifiable or strategically wiser approach. Sometimes fighting—not talking—is indeed the better option.

“To everything there is a season,” Ecclesiastes says, including “a time of war, and a time of peace.” There will come a time for diplomacy in Ukraine. Hopefully, it will come soon. But it doesn’t seem to be today.

Raphael S. Cohen is the director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program at the Rand Corporation’s Project Air Force.

Gian Gentile is the deputy director of the Rand Corporation’s Army Research Division.

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ICJ: Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – Declarations of Intervention by United States and Sweden

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands
Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928

Press Release
Unofficial
No. 2022/33
8 September 2022
Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)


The United States of America files a declaration of intervention in the
proceedings under Article 63 of the Statute

THE HAGUE, 8 September 2022. Yesterday, the United States of America, invoking Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, filed in the Registry of the Court a declaration of intervention in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).


Pursuant to Article 63 of the Statute, whenever the construction of a convention to which States other than those concerned in the case are parties is in question, each of these States has the right to intervene in the proceedings. In this case, the construction given by the judgment of the Court will be equally binding upon them.


To avail itself of the right of intervention conferred by Article 63 of the Statute, the United States relies on its status as a party to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (the “Genocide Convention”). In its declaration of intervention, the United States emphasizes that “all States Parties have a significant interest in ensuring the correct interpretation, application, or fulfilment of the Genocide Convention”, adding that its “views on the questions at issue in this case are further informed by the United States’ long history of supporting efforts to
prevent and punish genocide”.


In accordance with Article 83 of the Rules of Court, Ukraine and the Russian Federation have been invited to furnish written observations on the United States’ declaration of intervention. The United States’ declaration of intervention will be available on the Court’s website shortly.


  • 2 – History of the proceedings
    The history of the proceedings can be found in press releases Nos. 2022/4, 2022/6, 2022/7,
    2022/11, 2022/25, 2022/26, 2022/27, 2022/28, 2022/29 and 2022/31, available on the Court’s
    website.

Note: The Court’s press releases are prepared by its Registry for information purposes only
and do not constitute official documents.


The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations.
It was established by the United Nations Charter in June 1945 and began its activities in April 1946.
The Court is composed of 15 judges elected for a nine-year term by the General Assembly and the
Security Council of the United Nations. The seat of the Court is at the Peace Palace in The Hague
(Netherlands). The Court has a twofold role: first, to settle, in accordance with international law,
through judgments which have binding force and are without appeal for the parties concerned, legal
disputes submitted to it by States; and, second, to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred
to it by duly authorized United Nations organs and agencies of the system.


Information Department:
Mr. Andrey Poskakukhin, First Secretary of the Court, Head of Department (+31 (0)70 302 2336)
Ms Joanne Moore, Information Officer (+31 (0)70 302 2337)
Mr. Avo Sevag Garabet, Associate Information Officer (+31 (0)70 302 2394)
Ms Genoveva Madurga, Administrative Assistant (+31 (0)70 302 2396)

___________________

INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
Peace Palace, Carnegieplein 2, 2517 KJ The Hague, Netherlands
Tel.: +31 (0)70 302 2323 Fax: +31 (0)70 364 9928

Press Release
Unofficial
No. 2022/34
9 September 2022

Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation)

The Kingdom of Sweden files a declaration of intervention in the
proceedings under Article 63 of the Statute

THE HAGUE, 9 September 2022. Today, the Kingdom of Sweden, invoking Article 63 of the Statute of the Court, filed in the Registry of the Court a declaration of intervention in the case concerning Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation).

Tiếp tục đọc “ICJ: Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v. Russian Federation) – Declarations of Intervention by United States and Sweden”