Powers Jockey for Pacific Island Chain Influence

By: Christopher P. Cavas    February 1, 2016 Defense News

WASHINGTON — The extensive chains of Pacific islands ringing China have been described as a wall, a barrier to be breached by an attacker or strengthened by a defender. They are seen as springboards, potential bases for operations to attack or invade others in the region. In a territorial sense, they are benchmarks marking the extent of a country’s influence.

“It’s truly a case of where you stand. Perspective is shaped by one’s geographic and geostrategic position,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.

Tiếp tục đọc “Powers Jockey for Pacific Island Chain Influence”

Đón Tết văn minh chớ rinh động vật

PanNature 29/01/2021

Đại dịch Covid-19, cơn ác mộng được cho là có nguồn gốc từ động vật hoang dã vẫn tiếp tục diễn biến phức tạp và chưa có dấu hiệu dừng lại. Những ngày cận kề Tết Nguyên đán, Việt Nam ghi nhận thêm nhiều ca lây nhiễm trong cộng đồng tại nhiều tỉnh, thành trên cả nước. Để bảo vệ bản thân và xã hội trước nguy cơ bùng phát dịch bệnh trên diện rộng, mỗi chúng ta hãy nêu cao cảnh giác phòng ngừa, đặc biệt là nói “KHÔNG” với những sản phẩm có nguồn gốc từ động vật hoang dã như cao hổ cốt, sừng tê giác, ngà voi, vảy tê tê, mật gấu… Dưới đây là một vài khẩu hiệu dễ nhớ, dễ áp dụng để bạn có một Năm mới đoàn viên, ấm áp và góp phần không nhỏ vào cuộc chiến bảo vệ động vật hoang dã.

Tiếp tục đọc “Đón Tết văn minh chớ rinh động vật”

How the United States Can Effectively Contain China

| May 21, 2020

Pluralism and freedom vs. Communist autocracy

During his Senate confirmation hearing last week to be the next director of national intelligence, Texas Republican Rep. John Ratcliffe emphasized China is this country’s “greatest threat actor,” a status only confirmed by rising acrimony over Beijing’s handling of the coronavirus pandemic. But though tensions are rising in the South China Sea, where U.S. Navy missions challenge China’s unsubstantiated claims of hegemony over the region, an actual war between the two powers appears unlikely.

But are the United States and China on a path to a new Cold War?

Tiếp tục đọc “How the United States Can Effectively Contain China”

A China Strategy

CEPA

A China Strategy

Photo: The portrait of China's President Xi Jinping appears during a military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of a nation at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China on October 1, 2019. New weapons were unveiled at the largest military parade ever. ( The Yomiuri Shimbun ) Credit: REUTERS

Edward Lucas

December 7, 2020

icon-pdf

DOWNLOAD PDF

In an era of geopolitical competition, the West — the U.S.-led countries of the transatlantic alliance and their East Asian allies — lacks a strategy for dealing with its most formidable competitor: the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China). But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for dealing with the West. It involves a long-term goal of “national rejuvenation”1 — making China the world’s most powerful country by 2050 — implemented with decisive leadership; a clear-eyed appreciation of Western diplomatic, economic, political, and social weaknesses; and effective means of exploiting them. These tactics, best characterized as “sharp power,”2 include censorship and manipulation of the information system, cyber operations, divide-and-rule diplomacy, leverage of trade and investment, and propaganda, plus military bluff and intimidation.

Tiếp tục đọc “A China Strategy”

Hội Tam Hoàng và vụ xử bắn Tạ Vinh – 2 kỳ

***

Hội Tam Hoàng và vụ xử bắn Tạ Vinh:

Sự trỗi dậy của những hoàng đế không ngai

05:45 12/08/2015

Rạng sáng ngày 14/3/1966, một người Việt gốc Hoa (Triều Châu) là Tạ Vinh đã bị đưa ra pháp trường cát rồi sau đó bị xử bắn vì tội danh “lũng đoạn nền kinh tế quốc gia”. Pháp trường này nằm trước Trụ sở Hỏa xa Sài Gòn (nay là Công ty vận tải hành khách đường sắt Sài Gòn), nhìn sang bên kia chợ Bến Thành.

Tạ Vinh lúc ra tòa án quân sự mặt trận.

Mặc dù Tạ Vinh không phải là thành viên Tam hoàng nhưng ngay khi ông ta bị bắt rồi bị đưa ra xét xử trong một phiên tòa chớp nhoáng, cả Tam hoàng Chợ Lớn lẫn Tam hoàng Hồng Kông đều ra sức cứu Tạ Vinh bởi lẽ “Nếu không nhanh chóng dập đám cháy nhỏ bằng một thùng nước thì sẽ phải dập bằng cả một hồ nước”…

Tiếp tục đọc “Hội Tam Hoàng và vụ xử bắn Tạ Vinh – 2 kỳ”

Người Hoa (Việt Nam)

Bách khoa toàn thư mở Wikipedia

Người Hoa
华人
華人
Húarén
Waa4jan4

Một gia đình người Hoa tại Lào Cai, thế kỷ XVIII

Một gia đình người Hoa tại Lào Cai

Tổng số dân
749.466 @2019 [1]
Khu vực có số dân đáng kể
Thành phố Hồ Chí MinhĐồng NaiSóc TrăngKiên GiangBạc LiêuBình DươngQuảng NamĐà NẵngBắc GiangQuảng Ninh
Ngôn ngữ
Tiếng Việttiếng Quảng Đôngtiếng Triều Châutiếng Khách Giatiếng Phúc Kiếntiếng Quan thoại
Tôn giáo
Chủ yếu là Phật giáo Đại thừaĐạo giáo và Khổng giáo, thờ cúng tổ tiên. Một lượng nhỏ theo Công giáo Roma và Tin LànhĐạo Cao Đài
Sắc tộc có liên quan
Người HánHoa kiều

Tiếp tục đọc “Người Hoa (Việt Nam)”

CSBA: SEIZING ON WEAKNESS – Allied Strategy for competing with China’s globalizing military

January 4, 2021  Toshi YoshiharaJack Bianchi
Resources: Strategy & Policy

China’s military is going global. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its close allies, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters.

In this study, Senior Fellow Toshi Yoshihara and Research Fellow Jack Bianchi argue that a deep study of China’s weaknesses as they relate to its worldwide ambitions is required to formulate an effective allied response. These weaknesses offer insights into the costs that Beijing will have to pay to go global. Importantly, the United States and its close allies enjoy agency over certain Chinese weaknesses, furnishing them leverage that, if exercised, could yield strategic dividends. The report concludes with a range of allied options that exploit China’s weaknesses to constrain and complicate the PLA’s global expansion.  

AUTHORS Toshi Yoshihara Senior Fellow, Jack Blanchi, Research Fellow

DOWNLOAD PDF

Download full “Seizing on Weakness: Allied Strategy for Competing With China’s Globalizing Military” report.

READ FULL PUBLICATION

Read the full publication “Seizing on Weakness: Allied Strategy for Competing With China’s Globalizing Military” report using our online e-reader tool.

The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space

Chathamhouse.org

See full paper

Robust civic space is essential for good governance, the rule of law and for enabling citizens to shape their societies. However, civil society space around the world is under significant pressure and the COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated this situation.

The weakening of international institutions and democratic norms worldwide has resulted in fewer constraints on autocracies. Meanwhile, the rise of nationalism, populism and illiberalism is taking its toll on civil liberties.

The private sector is in a unique position to work with civil society organizations to uphold and defend civic freedoms and support sustainable and profitable business environments. Companies have the capacity, resources and expertise to enhance the protection of civic space. Tiếp tục đọc “The Role of the Private Sector in Protecting Civic Space”

Sài Gòn nhớ nhớ thương thương – 10 kỳ

Tản mạn về tiếng Việt và Hán Việt: tại sao Trung Quốc dùng danh từ khoái 筷 còn Việt Nam dùng đũa (trợ 箸)?

Ý nghĩa đôi đũa tre Việt Nam - Trung tâm Văn hoá-Phật giáo Việt nam Franken  - Chùa Vĩnh Nghiêm / CHLB Đức

Nguyễn Cung Thông 1

Phần này bàn về các danh từ gọi dụng cụ gắp cơm và đưa vào miệng (ăn cơm) như đũa hay trợ, khoái, giáp cùng các dạng âm cổ của chúng.

Các chữ viết tắt khác là Nguyễn Cung Thông (NCT), Hán Việt (HV), Việt Nam (VN), TQ (Trung Quốc), ĐNA (Đông Nam Á), HT (hài thanh), TVGT (Thuyết Văn Giải Tự/khoảng 100 SCN), NT (Ngọc Thiên/543), ĐV (Đường Vận/751), NKVT (Ngũ Kinh Văn Tự/776), LKTG (Long Kham Thủ Giám/997), QV (Quảng Vận/1008), TV (Tập Vận/1037/1067), TNAV (Trung Nguyên Âm Vận/1324), CV (Chính Vận/1375), TVi (Tự Vị/1615), VB (Vận Bổ/1100/1154), VH (Vận Hội/1297), LT (Loại Thiên/1039/1066), CTT (Chính Tự Thông/1670), TViB (Tự Vị Bổ/1666), TTTH (Tứ Thanh Thiên Hải), KH (Khang Hi/1716), VBL (tự điển Việt Bồ La/1651) ĐNQATV (Đại Nam Quấc Âm Tự Vị/1895).

Số là có anh Lưu Tiến Hiệp (< đại học Hoa Sen) hỏi về cách dùng khoái và trợ, cả hai từ HV đều chỉ chiếc đũa. Sau khi góp ý với anh Hoàng Dũng (đại học Sư Phạm Thành Phố HCM) thì bài viết nhỏ này ra đời. Tiếp tục đọc “Tản mạn về tiếng Việt và Hán Việt: tại sao Trung Quốc dùng danh từ khoái 筷 còn Việt Nam dùng đũa (trợ 箸)?”

What Is Going on With China’s Crazy Clean Energy Installation Figures?

greentechmedia.com

China says it installed more wind than the rest of the world put together last year.

Chinese government reports of 120 gigawatts of wind and solar installed last year have confounded industry analysts.

Chinese government reports of 120 gigawatts of wind and solar installed last year have confounded industry analysts.

Analysts have been left dumbfounded after China last month released official 2020 wind and solar installation figures that were seemingly too big to be true.

The Chinese National Energy Administration (NEA) “stunned the world,” according to Wood Mackenzie senior analyst Xiaoyang Li, when it announced total wind and solar capacity additions of 120 gigawatts.

Notwithstanding uncertainty over COVID-19’s impact on the supply chain, China had been expected to report big numbers for last year. The International Energy Agency, for example, had predicted the country would add around 32 GW of wind and 50 GW of solar.

But the magnitude of the official figures caught even seasoned China watchers off guard. BloombergNEF had forecast 36 GW each of new solar and wind in 2020 and the official figure for PV capacity additions was 48 GW AC.
Tiếp tục đọc “What Is Going on With China’s Crazy Clean Energy Installation Figures?”

Beyond Declining Battery Prices: 6 Ways to Evaluate Energy Storage in 2021

greentechmedia.com

Balance of systems, software, supply chain constraints, and reliability and performance guarantees all weigh on total costs.

Batteries make up only a slice of energy storage system costs. (Credit: Ameren)

Batteries make up only a slice of energy storage system costs. (Credit: Ameren)

The energy storage market in the United States is booming, with 476 megawatts of new projects installed in the third quarter of 2020 alone, up 240 percent over the second quarter, according to industry analysts at Wood Mackenzie. 2021 is expected to be another record-breaking year for storage, but with technological innovation accelerating across the market, renewable energy asset owners need to carefully select safe and reliable systems to protect their storage investments. As the market accelerates, these are a few of the essential questions asset owners should be asking.

1. Evaluate pricing beyond the cell

When analysts speak about declines in storage pricing, they are referring to battery pricing, which continues to decline every year. Bloomberg New Energy Finance’s latest report states that current lithium-ion pricing stands at about $137 per kilowatt-hour and will drop as low as $100 per kWh by 2023.

However, purchasers of energy storage systems may see substantially higher prices for their projects, depending on a range of factors. For example, the lowest pricing for lithium-ion batteries is generally available for either a major supply contract or for very large-scale deployments of 500 megawatt-hours and above. Since most projects today are not that large, that $137 per kWh figure will be closer to $150 to $170 per kWh, and perhaps as high as $200 to $210 per kWh on the battery-pack level, depending on the size of the project.
Tiếp tục đọc “Beyond Declining Battery Prices: 6 Ways to Evaluate Energy Storage in 2021”

Săn lùng những kẻ tham nhũng đào tẩu ra nước ngoài – 8 kỳ

A Lesson from Physics on Oil Prices: Revisiting the Negative WTI Oil Price Episode

While the episode of negative WTI price is still being actively debated, its proper root cause is yet to be determined. This Comment contributes to the discussion and studies the event by modifying the theory of storage for an oil market with rigid operational infrastructure, where short-term supply and demand are price inelastic. We found that such pricing anomaly can be well characterized by a simple concept borrowed from the physics of extreme events.

The future prices are modelled as a financial derivative of the storage capacity. During normal market conditions, the spread between nearby futures contract is mostly determined by the carry trade and the cost of storage. However, if either inventory or the storage capacity is no longer available, the carry trade breaks down as the futures trader is unable to make or take the delivery of physical barrels. These events are akin to defaults in financial markets and prices leading to them are characterized by the financial squeeze.

We calibrate the model to inventory data at Cushing, Oklahoma and conclude that only a small fraction of the abnormal price move could be attributed to constraints on the storage capacity. The rest of the move was caused by the financial squeeze on long futures positions held against over-the-counter products. We detail the behavior of main market participants that led to negative prices. The Comment also points to several shortcomings of the recent CFTC report on this topic and suggests additional areas where a more granular look at the data could be helpful.

This comment looks at the announcement by the Danish government on 4 December to cancel the 8th offshore licensing round and all future rounds and to phase out all production of oil and gas by 2050. It describes the industry and political background to the announcement, including the ambitious legal target of a 70% reduction in GHG emissions by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050, and the most recent official projections of offshore production. It concludes that it will shape operators’ investment and management of mature fields but its impact on Danish emissions and upstream production in 2030 and 2050 is likely to be much more modest than at first appears. However, if the reform galvanises the Danish authorities and investors to commit resources to the development of offshore COstorage in the period 2025-30, it may contribute significantly to Denmark’s climate objectives.

View full paper https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/A-Lesson-from-Physics-on-Negative-Oil-Prices.pdf

How China sees the world

How China Sees the World

And how we should see China

Illustration
Karan Singh

https://358afed383d4909496d2c7460875e850.safeframe.googlesyndication.com/safeframe/1-0-37/html/container.html

  • Link Copied

I. The Forbidden City

On November 8, 2017, Air Force One touched down in Beijing, marking the start of a state visit hosted by China’s president and Communist Party chairman, Xi Jinping. From my first day on the job as President Donald Trump’s national security adviser, China had been a top priority. The country figured prominently in what President Barack Obama had identified for his successor as the biggest immediate problem the new administration would face—what to do about North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. But many other questions about the nature and future of the relationship between China and the United States had also emerged, reflecting China’s fundamentally different perception of the world.

Tiếp tục đọc “How China sees the world”