Conversations on Vietnam Development
Wednesday, 19 August 2020 brusselstimes
US President Donald Trump told reporters on Tuesday that he had called off US – China trade deal negotiations.
“I don’t want to talk to them now,” Trump said. “If you know what they’ve done to this country and the world, I don’t want to talk to China just yet. So yes, I canceled the talks.”
Tiếp tục đọc “Trump cancels US-China trade negotiations”sciencemag.org By Dennis NormileJul. 23, 2020 , 2:00 PM
A mushroom cloud hangs over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. An estimated 90,000 to 120,000 people died that day or soon after; many others developed cancer later.
HIROSHIMA—Kunihiko Iida wants the world to know that the atomic bombs the United States dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki 75 years ago next month are still claiming lives and causing suffering.
Iida was 3 years old in August 1945. His father had died in battle; he was living with his mother and her parents in a house 900 meters from Hiroshima’s hypocenter, the spot right beneath the detonation. The blast crumpled the house. The family fled the city, but Iida’s mother and older sister soon died from their injuries, a fact the little boy didn’t grasp. “Until I entered elementary school, I thought they were living and that we would meet someday,” he says.
His injuries left him bedridden for years, and he has suffered debilitating illnesses ever since. Childhood anemia caused him to collapse at school. He’s had ulcers and asthma, underwent two surgeries to remove brain tumors, and now has thyroid growths. “There has never been a break in these illnesses,” he says. Tiếp tục đọc “How atomic bomb survivors have transformed our understanding of radiation’s impacts”
Bloomberg News August 17, 2020, 4:00 AM GMT+7 Updated on
The almost daily drumbeat of tensions between the U.S. and China shows little sign of letting up, while touching on everything from the coronavirus to trade to defense issues to monetary policy.
President Donald Trump has made his tough positions on China a key element in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election, now less than three months away, and he seems intent on keeping the pressure on.
Tiếp tục đọc “Fraying U.S.-China Relations Tested by Trump Ahead of Election”The hawks in Donald Trump’s administration are on the ascent. Do not expect the US to u-turn on this march towards a harsher stance on China, say Steven R Okun and James Green.
By Steven R Okun By James Green14 Aug 2020 06:00AM(Updated: 14 Aug 2020 08:07AM) CNA
SINGAPORE: Last week’s suite of actions by the United States against WeChat and TikTok were among the most significant developments since March 2018 when US President Donald took formal action in retaliation for China’s unfair trade practices.
Tiếp tục đọc “WeChat ban a formidable weapon in US-China trade war”Chia sẻ | FaceBookTwitter Email Copy LinkInterested114/08/2020 08:27 GMT+7
August 10, 2020 5:30 PM GMT+7
What a difference two months can make. In May, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co. (TSMC), the world’s largest chipmaker, lost the business of Huawei Technologies—its biggest Chinese customer and the source of 13% of its revenue—as a casualty of geopolitical jockeying between superpowers. But TSMC shareholders took the loss in stride. And by late July, after a stumble by rival Intel, TSMC’s stock had risen almost 50% since May, making it one of the world’s 10 most valuable companies.
May’s low and July’s high have something in common: They both reflect TSMC’s distinctive role in the global tech economy. Although far from a household name, TSMC controls roughly half of the world’s contract chip manufacturing. Brand-name companies that design their own chips—most notably Apple—rely on TSMC’s world-class production so they don’t have to spend tens of billions to build their own factories. Crack open your iPhone and you’ll find a chip from TSMC. If you could crack open an American guided missile, you’d likely find one there too. Its prowess has elevated TSMC to No. 362 on the Global 500, with $35 billion in revenue. Today it gets 60% of sales from the U.S. and about 20% from mainland China.
Techno-nationalism: The US-China tech innovation race
New challenges for markets, business and academia
BY ALEX CAPRI
RESEARCH FELLOW, HINRICH FOUNDATION, 20202
Published 03 August 2020
The US-China tech innovation race is challenging the laissez-faire economic model. State interventionism, techno-nationalism and US tech funding initiatives are increasing. This paper outlines the implications for markets, academia, research organizations, and governments of the US-China competition to achieve innovation advantage.
A US-China tech innovation race has sparked a paradigm shift in global trade and commerce that is challenging the long-standing primacy of the world’s open trading system.
Current thinking is tilting towards increased state activism and interventionism, not only in the technology landscape but in many of the industries of the future.
Listen to a discussion with Alex Capri related to this report.
Driving this change is techno-nationalism: a mercantilist-like behavior that links tech innovation and enterprise directly to the national security, economic prosperity and social stability of a nation.
In response to decades of Beijing’s innovation-mercantilism, the US has embarked on its own innovation offensive. Washington’s future tech funding initiatives could surpass the scale of the “moonshot” projects last seen during the space race with the former Soviet Union.
Download “Techno-nationalism: The US-China tech innovation race” by Alex Capri
Andrew Staples and Alex Capri from the Hinrich Foundation discuss why US tech funding initiatives could surpass the scale of the “moonshot” projects.
Share this video on Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook.
The innovation race involves a broad range of emerging and foundational technologies that will define the industries of the future, including:
As Washington and its allies ramp up techno-nationalist initiatives, core themes will drive the paradigm shift.
The report comprises three sections:
This section examines trends for public-spending in R&D and innovation and reviews a series of techno-nationalist funding initiatives from the US government.
It analyzes state activism in free markets and why governments are uniquely qualified to promote innovation and “blue-sky” technologies in ways that the private sector cannot.
Finally, Section I spotlights a historic example of techno-nationalism: SEMATECH and the US semiconductor public-private partnership, which led to a technological leapfrog by the US semiconductor industry, past Japan, in the 1990s.
Section II focuses on non-state actors and their increasingly complex role in public-private partnerships. It explores the tensions between open market forces, multinational companies, and techno-nationalist state activism.
To highlight these tensions, the report analyzes Facebook’s “Libra initiative and Beijing’s efforts to reduce dependency on the US dollar via the digital Yuan, and the challenges those create for MNEs. A US semiconductor sector case study illustrates how state activism can have detrimental effects on markets and backfire on the very parties it is looking to protect.
Section II concludes with an analysis of how open-sourced innovation could be a game-changer in the US-China technology war, particularly regarding future 5G wireless competition.
Universities, research organizations and academia have become hot zones in the US-China innovation race. Human capital development is key to conducting leading-edge R&D and driving innovation.
Section III looks at how US export controls are affecting R&D activities at universities. It highlights the rules-based frameworks that universities must build to handle increasing government funding into academia.
The section showcases China’s Thousand Talents program and highlights its challenges for public-private partnerships involving academia. It also discusses why the US, in particular, should keep its human capital and innovation pipeline open as it pertains to foreign students, fundamental research programs and, ultimately, why an open system (despite China’s exploitation of it) is better than a closed one.
Finally, section III looks at how some inevitable strategic decoupling between Chinese and US entities will result in the ring-fencing of more “sensitive” R&D activities within the US defense establishment.
Listen to a summary of the report in this podcast featuring Alex Capri and Andrew Staples, Director of Research and Outreach.
Share this podcast Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook.
***
This report is part of a series of Hinrich Foundation papers, authored by Alex Capri, that review the implications of rising US-China techno-nationalism for global trade and international businesses. The two papers focused on Semiconductors at the heart of the US-China tech war and Strategic US-China decoupling in the tech sector.SHARE
AUTHOR
FOLLOW
Alex Capri is a Research Fellow at the Hinrich Foundation with over 20 years of experience in value chains, logistics and global trade management, both as an academic and a professional consultant.
By Satu Limaye, East West Center
HONOLULU (29 July 2020)—In recent years, relations with Southeast Asia have emerged as an important pillar of US engagement with the Indo-Pacific region. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is central to US foreign policy in the region, with a growing focus on the five countries bound together by the Mekong River—Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.
As they emerge from a tumultuous history, these countries must confront new elements of great-power competition even as their youthful populations push for economic growth and integration into the wider region and the world. Among other impacts, urbanization, infrastructure expansion, and climate change all affect the Mekong River, the natural resources along its banks, and the 240 million people who live in the region.
Tiếp tục đọc “THE US AND THE MEKONG REGION: COOPERATION FOR SUSTAINABLE AND INCLUSIVE ECONOMIC GROWTH”07/08/2020 09:03 GMT+7 vietnamnet
Bắt cóc con tin chớp nhoáng tại PhápPhilippines thành vùng dịch Covid-19 lớn nhất Đông Nam ÁTrung Quốc sẽ ra sao nếu thảm họa ập xuống sông Dương Tử?
Theo hãng tin Reuters, thông tin trên được Lầu Năm Góc công bố hôm 6/8. Đây là cuộc điện đàm đầu tiên giữa ông Esper và Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng Trung Quốc Ngụy Phượng Hòa kể từ tháng 3 tới nay. Cuộc điện đàm diễn ra trong lúc quan hệ hai bên đang ở mức thấp nhất trong hàng chục năm qua.
Tiếp tục đọc “Mỹ quan ngại hoạt động ‘gây bất ổn’ của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông”Aug 6, 2020,09:51pm EDT
Jack Brewster Forbes Staff Business I’m a news reporter for Forbes.
Updated Aug 6, 2020, 10:33pm EDT
President Trump signed an executive order on Thursday that will prohibit Americans from doing business with ByteDance, the company that owns TikTok, and a similar order that bans transactions involving WeChat, a social messaging app, with its owner, Tencent, beginning September 20, in an effort to bar the China-owned social media platforms from the U.S. due to national security concerns.
Tiếp tục đọc “Trump Issues Executive Orders Against Chinese Owners Of TikTok And WeChat”Prime minister also says stronger Indo-Pacific alliance with like-minded nations is a ‘critical priority’ for Australia.
![Australia's Scott Morrison, standing, walks past China's Xi Jinping during the G20 leaders' meeting in Japan last year [File: Lukas Coch via EPA]](https://www.aljazeera.com/mritems/imagecache/mbdxxlarge/mritems/Images/2020/8/5/abeee44e48264f8a84ffe7b27ef8499c_18.jpg "Australia's Morrison says US-China war no longer inconceivable")
Australia’s Prime Minister Scott Morrison has said his government held a less dramatic view of US-China strategic tensions than a predecessor who warned of a potential “hot war” before US presidential elections in November, but added that a conflict is no longer inconceivable.
Tiếp tục đọc “Australia’s Morrison says US-China war no longer inconceivable”By Tony Czuczka August 2, 2020, 10:14 PM GMT+7 Updated on Bloomberg
The Trump administration will announce measures shortly against “a broad array” of Chinese-owned software deemed to pose national-security risks, U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo said.
The comments suggest a possible widening of U.S. measures beyond TikTok, the popular music-video app owned by ByteDance Ltd., one of China’s biggest tech companies. President Donald Trump told reporters Friday that he plans to ban TikTok from the U.S., but his decision hasn’t been announced. Pompeo signaled he expects a Trump announcement “shortly.” Chinese newspapers slammed a potential ban on TikTok.
Tiếp tục đọc “U.S. to Act on China Software Beyond TikTok, Pompeo Says”
Lee Hsien Loong at the G20 on Dec. 1, 2018
The relationship between Washington and Beijing has sunk to such a “very dangerous” level with no sign of tensions easing after the next U.S. presidential election, the prime minister of Singapore said Tuesday. Tiếp tục đọc “Singapore PM: U.S.-Chinese Relations at ‘Very Dangerous’ Level”
The United States has ramped up its aerial reconnaissance of the Chinese coast and the
South China Sea to record levels, according to a Beijing-based think tank. In the past week alone, US air force E-8C surveillance planes were spotted closer than 100 nautical miles to the southeast coast of Guangdong province on four separate occasions, the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) said. Tiếp tục đọc “US puts record number of eyes in the skies off China coast in July”
Jarrett Stepman / @JarrettStepman / July 26, 2020 / Daily Signal
Activists burn U.S. flags at Black Lives Matter Plaza near the White House on July 4 in Washington, D.C. (Photo: Alex Wong/Getty Images)
Jarrett Stepman@JarrettStepman
Jarrett Stepman is a contributor to The Daily Signal and co-host of The Right Side of History podcast. Send an email to Jarrett. He is also the author of the new book, “The War on History: The Conspiracy to Rewrite America’s Past.”
Were the Founding Fathers heroes or villains?
While this dichotomy perhaps oversimplifies our attitude toward the founding generation, one would imagine that most Americans think that their country’s origin is fundamentally good.
Tiếp tục đọc “America Both in Crisis and on Trial”
CVD 