(VNF) – Trong những năm gần đây, các hoạt động lừa đảo xuyên biên giới tại khu vực Đông Nam Á đã gia tăng mạnh mẽ, đặc biệt là những tổ chức lừa đảo có sự tham gia của các nhóm tội phạm Trung Quốc. Những tổ chức này không chỉ gây thiệt hại tài chính mà còn ảnh hưởng nghiêm trọng đến an ninh và trật tự xã hội của các quốc gia trong khu vực.
Các chiến dịch quốc tế nhằm đối phó với tình trạng này, bao gồm việc hồi hương hàng chục nghìn tội phạm lừa đảo về Trung Quốc, đã cho thấy sự tham gia của tội phạm nước này trong các vụ lừa đảo tại Đông Nam Á là rất lớn.
Theo một báo cáo mới đây của Trung tâm nghiên cứu chiến lược và quốc tế (CSIS, Mỹ), những hang ổ lừa đảo cắm rễ sau sự xuống dốc của lĩnh vực kinh doanh cờ bạc tại Đông Nam Á và gắn liền với các băng nhóm tội phạm người Trung Quốc.
Sau phong tỏa trong đại dịch Covid-19, nhiều khu casino và khách sạn bỏ trống đã biến thành các trung tâm lừa đảo qua mạng, nơi các nạn nhân buôn người bị chúng dụ dỗ và cưỡng ép đã lừa hàng tỷ USD từ nhiều người.
Các nghi phạm bị dẫn giải từ Myanmar về Trung Quốc tại cửa khẩu Mạnh Liên ở Vân Nam (Ảnh: XINHUA)
There is a human trafficking crisis in Southeast Asia. The UN estimates that 120,000 people have been trafficked to scam centres in Myanmar and another 100,000 in Cambodia. Many of them are brought through the border with Thailand. The victims are often forced to work as scammers, defrauding billions of dollars from unsuspecting targets across the world. These scam syndicates have been linked to the Chinese mafia as well as local rebels in Myanmar.
How do these scam centres operate? Who are the trafficking victims and how did they end up in this predicament? How is Thailand’s economy suffering from these trafficking networks, and what is being done to stamp them out? Insight investigates.
Item 1 of 4 United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a media display in Pansang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar, October 4, 2016. Picture taken on October 4, 2016. REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun/File Photo
[1/4]United Wa State Army (UWSA) soldiers march during a media display in Pansang, Wa territory in northeast Myanmar, October 4, 2016. Picture taken on October 4, 2016. REUTERS/Soe Zeya Tun/File Photo Purchase Licensing Rights, opens new tab
Summary
Beijing-backed UWSA protecting new rare earth mines in Shan state, sources say
Mines being run by Chinese-speaking operators
China relies on Myanmar for rare earth imports but had recently faced some supply challenges
Rare earths offer Beijing leverage in trade war with Washington
BANGKOK, June 12 (Reuters) – A Chinese-backed militia is protecting new rare earth mines in eastern Myanmar, according to four people familiar with the matter, as Beijing moves to secure control of the minerals it is wielding as a bargaining chip in its trade war with Washington.
China has a near-monopoly over the processing of heavy rare earths into magnets that power critical goods like wind turbines, medical devices and electric vehicles. But Beijing is heavily reliant on Myanmar for the rare earth metals and oxides needed to produce them: the war-torn country was the source of nearly half those imports in the first four months of this year, Chinese customs data show.
Indonesia received the most funding from China over the last decade, according to a new report by Zero Carbon Analytics. But uncertainties caused by US-driven tariff plans could see Southeast Asian countries retract green investments, said an analyst.
China’s PowerChina Huadong Engineering Corporation Limited constructed the Cirata floating solar plant in West Java, Indonesia. Image: PLN Nusantara
China is the leading source of public clean energy investments in Southeast Asia over the last decade, channeling over US$ 2.7 billion into projects across the region, according to a report by international research organisation Zero Carbon Analytics.
China has set its sights on the Global South, and on ASEAN – the Association of Southeast Asia Nations – one of the fastest growing regions in the world.
ASEAN’s fastest growing economy is now facing serious headwinds from Trump tariffs. As Vietnam sent a team to Washington to negotiate, China stepped up its diplomatic efforts here. Trade and investment between the 2 countries had been steadily growing despite differences in the South China Sea. Is this a new chapter in complex Vietnam-China relations? Tiếp tục đọc “Will Vietnam deepen ties with China because of Trump tariffs?”→
Tibetan spiritual leader says in a new book that his people’s aspiration for freedom cannot be indefinitely delayed.
The Dalai Lama offers blessings to his followers at his Himalayan residence in the northern hill town of Dharamshala, India, on December 20, 2024 [Priyanshu Singh/Reuters]
Published On 11 Mar 202511 Mar 2025
The Dalai Lama has said that his successor will be born in the “free world” outside of China.
In a new book released on Tuesday, the 89-year-old spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism says that he will be reincarnated outside of Tibet, which is an autonomous region of China.
“Since the purpose of a reincarnation is to carry on the work of the predecessor, the new Dalai Lama will be born in the free world so that the traditional mission of the Dalai Lama – that is, to be the voice for universal compassion, the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, and the symbol of Tibet embodying the aspirations of the Tibetan people – will continue,” the Dalai Lama, who fled Tibet for India in 1959, writes in Voice for the Voiceless.
China considers Tibet, which has alternated between independence and Chinese control over the centuries, as an integral part of the country and views movements advocating greater autonomy or independence as threats to its national sovereignty.
Beijing has labelled the current Dalai Lama, who was identified as the reincarnation of his predecessor at two years old, a “separatist” and insisted on the right to appoint his successor after his death.
The Dalai Lama, who stepped down as the political leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile in 2011 to focus on his spiritual role, has denied advocating Tibetan independence and argued for a “Middle Way” approach, which would grant the mainly Buddhist territory greater autonomy.
In his book, the Dalai Lama writes that he has received numerous petitions from people in and outside Tibet asking him to ensure that his lineage continues, and says that Tibetan people’s aspirations for freedom cannot be denied indefinitely.
“One clear lesson we know from history is this: If you keep people permanently unhappy, you cannot have a stable society,” he writes.
PHNOM PENH, Cambodia (AP): Cambodia and China have signed a US$1.2 billion deal to finance an ambitious canal project that aims to boost trade efficiency by linking a branch of the Mekong River near Phnom Penh to a port on the Gulf of Thailand, the Cambodian government agency heading the project has announced,
The deal to fund the Funan Techo Canal was signed Thursday during the state visit to Cambodia of Chinese President Xi Jinping, the agency said in a news release. Xi returned home Friday after a three-nation Southeast Asian tour that also included Vietnam and Malaysia.
Author Mehebub SahanaLeverhulme Early Career Fellow, Geography, University of Manchester
China recently approved the construction of the world’s largest hydropower dam, across the Yarlung Tsangpo river in Tibet. When fully up and running, it will be the world’s largest power plant – by some distance.
Yet many are worried the dam will displace local people and cause huge environmental disruption. This is particularly the case in the downstream nations of India and Bangladesh, where that same river is known as the Brahmaputra.
The proposed dam highlights some of the geopolitical issues raised by rivers that cross international borders. Who owns the river itself, and who has the right to use its water? Do countries have obligations not to pollute shared rivers, or to keep their shipping lanes open? And when a drop of rain falls on a mountain, do farmers in a different country thousands of miles downstream have a claim to use it? Ultimately, we still don’t know enough about these questions of river rights and ownership to settle disputes easily.
The Yarlung Tsangpo begins on the Tibetan Plateau, in a region sometimes referred to as the world’s third pole as its glaciers contain the largest stores of ice outside of the Arctic and Antarctica. A series of huge rivers tumble down from the plateau and spread across south and south-east Asia. Well over a billion people depend on them, from Pakistan to Vietnam.
Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình thăm cấp Nhà nước tới Việt Nam từ ngày 14/4
11/04/2025 | 09:22
TPO – Nhận lời mời của Tổng Bí thư Tô Lâm, Chủ tịch nước Lương Cường, Tổng Bí thư, Chủ tịch nước Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình sẽ thăm cấp Nhà nước tới Việt Nam từ ngày 14 đến 15/4, Bộ Ngoại giao thông báo.
Chuyến thăm diễn ra vào thời điểm Việt Nam và Trung Quốc kỷ niệm 75 năm thiết lập quan hệ ngoại giao (18/1/1950 – 18/1/2025).
Trung Quốc hôm nay cho biết nước này sẵn sàng đàm phán với Mỹ, nhưng cũng không sợ hãi nếu Mỹ tiếp tục đe dọa áp thuế.
Cờ Mỹ và Trung Quốc. Ảnh: Reuters
Ngày 10/4, khi được hỏi về việc liệu Mỹ và Trung Quốc đã bắt đầu đàm phán thuế nhập khẩu hay chưa, người phát ngôn Bộ Thương mại Trung Quốc He Yongqian cho biết nước này sẵn sàng đàm phán với Mỹ, nhưng phải trên cơ sở bình đẳng và tôn trọng lẫn nhau. Ông khẳng định “việc gây sức ép, đe dọa, bắt nạt” không phải là cách hành xử đúng với Trung Quốc.
The South China Sea is one of the most contested waterways in the world.
Hundreds of kilometres from its mainland, China appears to be increasingly asserting its dominance in this strategically important maritime trade route.
Many of the maritime disputes involve areas claimed by both the Philippines and Beijing.
Flashpoints are becoming more frequent, including collisions between coastguard boats and other vessels.
101 East joins the Philippine coastguard and witnesses firsthand skirmishes with the Chinese navy in the disputed waters.
US President Donald Trump has made South America a priority for his administration, citing concerns about China’s growing influence in the region. Through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative, China has invested heavily in major projects in the region, particularly related to lithium reserves, transport and energy infrastructure. As a result, China has replaced the US as South America’s main trading partner over the past two decades. Early into his second term, Trump attempted to strong-arm control back in the US’ favour by threatening to seize the Panama Canal away from China’s growing influence. However, experts suggest his methods will not be enough to turn the momentum, as China’s flexible business approach and significant investments have reshaped the continent’s landscape.
Vietnam is stepping up inspections of a line of children’s toys over concerns that imagery on the face of one product resembles a map China uses to stake its claim to disputed areas in the South China Sea. The investigation was launched after local media reported that a version of widely sold Baby Three toys, many of which are made in China, featured a design that was viewed as similar to Beijing’s maritime map.
Trump’s rent-seeking foreign policy pertaining to energy and critical minerals will force Southeast Asian countries to do what they least desire: making a choice between China and the US.
The Trump administration’s insular and rent-seeking foreign policy will significantly alter the geopolitics of energy transition in Southeast Asia. This will manifest in two ways. First, the potential cessation of US involvement in the region’s energy sector will heighten fears of China’s dominance in energy infrastructure projects — including the ASEAN Power Grid (APG). Second, Trump’s intentions of using critical minerals as a bargaining chip for providing military assistance, if applied to the ASEAN region, will impact the regional vision for sustainable mineral development.
The shutting down of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), an important player in the energy sector, will intensify existing fears of China’s dominance in electricity transmission and generation. As shown in Table 1, China provided approximately US$534 million in aid to the region’s energy sector in 2022, accounting for more than a quarter of the total share. Comparatively, the US provided only US$23.7 million, or 1 per cent of total energy-related aid to Southeast Asia. In addition, the China Southern Power Grid Company and State Grid Corporation of China own and operate significant portions of the national grids in Laos and the Philippines, respectively.
China Leads in Energy Aid
Table 1 Energy-related aid to Southeast Asia 2022 (excerpt) (USD, in %)
Donor
Amount
Contribution
China
534 million
26
ADB
368 million
18
Germany
274 million
13
Canada
231 million
11
South Korea
211 million
10
Japan
167 million
8
World Bank
90.0 million
4
EU Institutions
42.3 million
2
France
42.2 million
2
AIIB
34.8 million
2
United States
23.7 million
1
The table is modified from Lowy Institute’s (2024) Southeast Asia Aid Map.