Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với TQ về Biển Đông ngay đầu 2022

PLO 14/01/2022 – 05:42

Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với Trung Quốc về Biển Đông ngay đầu năm 2022 khi cùng lúc công bố báo cáo bác yêu sách chủ quyền của Bắc Kinh ở Biển Đông và điều hai nhóm tàu sân bay tới vùng biển này.

Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với TQ về Biển Đông ngay đầu 2022 - ảnh 1
Báo cáo  “Limits in the Seas” (Giới hạn trên các vùng biển) của Mỹ.

Năm 2021 khép lại với sự kiện Tổng thống Mỹ Joe Biden ban hành Đạo luật Ủy quyền Quốc phòng (NDAA) vào ngày 27-12. Theo đó, Mỹ sẽ chi 770 tỉ USD cho chi tiêu quốc phòng, trong đó dành 7,1 tỉ USD cho chiến lược chống Trung Quốc ở khu vực Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương.  Có lẽ đây là bước chuẩn bị cho một năm 2022 đầy căng thẳng giữa hai siêu cường ở khu vực Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương, mà một trong những trọng tâm là ở Biển Đông.

Chưa đầy nửa tháng đầu của năm 2022, Mỹ đã có những động thái quyết liệt thách thức yêu sách chủ quyền phi pháp của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông.

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Has Washington’s Policy Toward Taiwan Crossed the Rubicon?

December 10, 2021  by Paul Heer, The National Interest

Testimony from officials in the State Department and Defense Department this week included subtle but important shifts in the U.S. policy toward Taiwan

The ground shifted under Washington’s policy toward Taiwan on December 8, a shift no less seismic for being subtle and semantic. During a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs Ely Ratner asserted that Taiwan is “a critical node within the first island chain (in the Western Pacific), anchoring a network of U.S. allies and partners … that is critical to the region’s security and critical to the defense of vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.”

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Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China (The Atlantic Council)

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This strategy was produced in collaboration with experts from ten leading democracies.


Following World War II, the United States and its allies and partners established a rules-based international system. While never perfect, it contributed to decades without great-power war, extraordinary economic growth, and a reduction of world poverty. But this system today faces trials ranging from a global pandemic and climate change to economic disruptions and a revival of great-power competition.

As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, world order depends on the balance of power and principles of legitimacy. The rise of Chinese power is straining both aspects of the existing rules-based system. China benefited from the system and does not seek to kick over the table as Hitler did with the 1930s international order, but China wants to use its power to change the rules and tilt the table to enhance its winnings. Beijing is directing its growing economic, diplomatic, and military heft toward revisionist geopolitical aims. While we once hoped that China would become what we considered a “responsible stakeholder” in a rules-based system, President Xi Jinping has led his country in a more confrontational direction.

Some analysts portray a new Cold War, but this historical metaphor misunderstands the nature of the new challenge. The Soviet Union was a direct military and ideological threat, and there was almost no economic or social interdependence in our relationship. With China today, we have half a trillion dollars in trade and millions of social interchanges. Moreover, with its “market-Leninist” system, China has learned to harness the creativity of markets to authoritarian Communist party control. It announced its intent to use this system to dominate ten key technologies by 2025. We and our allies are not threatened by the export of communism – few people are taking to the streets in favor of Xi Jinping thought – but by a hybrid system of interdependence. China has become the leading trading partner of more countries than the US. Partial decoupling on security issues like Huawei (discussed below) is necessary, but total decoupling from our overall economic interdependence would be extremely costly, and even impossible in the case of ecological interdependence such as climate change or future pandemics. For better and worse, we are locked in a “cooperative rivalry” in which we have to do two contradictory things at the same time.

Addressing the China challenge will require a collective effort on the part of the United States and its allies and partners, in which we leverage effectively our hard and soft power resources to defend ourselves and strengthen a rules-based system. Some pessimists look at China’s population size and economic growth rates and believe that the task is impossible. But on the contrary, if we think in terms our alliances, the combined wealth of the Western democracies – US, Europe, Japan – will far exceed that of China well into the century. A clear strategy with well-defined goals that neither under- nor over-estimates China is necessary for the current moment. Over the past two years, the Atlantic Council has convened high-level meetings of strategists and experts to produce just that.

In this paper, Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China, Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino, along with expert collaborators from ten of the world’s leading democracies, propose a logical and actionable strategy for addressing the China challenge. The strategy articulates clear long- and short-term goals and several major strategic elements to help achieve those goals.

First, the paper calls for strengthening likeminded allies and partners and the rules-based system for a new era of great-power competition. This will require, for example, prioritizing innovation, repairing infrastructure, and establishing new institutions to bolster democratic cooperation. A successful strategy begins at home.

Second, likeminded allies and partners should defend against Chinese behavior that threatens to undermine core principles of the rules-based system. Executing this element will mean prohibiting China’s engagement in economic sectors vital to national security, countering Chinese influence operations, and deterring and, if necessary, defending against, Chinese military aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Third, the authors recognize that China also presents an opportunity, and they recommend that likeminded allies and partners engage China from a position of strength to cooperate on shared interests and, ultimately, incorporate China into a revitalized and adapted rules-based system. Thus, efforts should be made to cooperate with China on issues of shared interests, including public health, the global economy, nonproliferation, and the global environment.

They argue that the desired endpoint of the strategy is not everlasting competition or the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party, but rather to convince Chinese leaders that their interests are better served by cooperating within, rather than challenging, a rules-based international system. They pay attention to both the rivalry and the cooperative possibilities in the relationship.

The paper presents a sound strategic framework and a comprehensive and practical plan for the US and its democratic allies to follow as they address the China challenge. I encourage experts and officials from the United States and allied nations to study this thoughtful report. Following this strategy could help leading democracies cope with the China challenge and advance a revitalized rules-based system for years to come.

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U.S., China accuse each other of “bullying” nation

By Nandita Bose and James Pearson, Reuters

HANOI, Aug 25 (Reuters) – U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris on Wednesday again charged China with bullying its Southeast Asian neighbours, the second time in two days she has attacked Beijing during a regional visit, as Washington tries to rally regional partners to take on China’s growing economic and military influence.

The Chinese foreign ministry shot back on Wednesday and accused the U.S. of meddling in regional affairs and disrupting peace. Earlier in the day, Chinese state media accused Harris of seeking to drive a wedge between China and Southeast Asian nations with comments in Singapore that Beijing used coercion and intimidation to back its unlawful South China Sea claims.

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Mỹ rút quân khỏi Iraq: Lịch sử sang trang, Washington dồn toàn lực cho một “NATO ở châu Á”

Đại sứ Nguyễn Quang Khai | 07/08/2021 19:10

Mỹ rút quân khỏi Iraq: Lịch sử sang trang, Washington dồn toàn lực cho một "NATO ở châu Á"
Ảnh: AP

SHRút quân khỏi Iraq tiếp sau Afghanistan, Washington đang điều chỉnh lại chiến lược toàn cầu, tập trung đối đầu với Trung Quốc và Nga.

Ngày 27/7/2021, tại Washington, Tổng thống Mỹ Joe Biden và Thủ tướng Iraq Mustafa Al-Kadhimi đã ký Thỏa thuận về việc chấm dứt nhiệm vụ chiến đấu của quân đội Mỹ tại Iraq vào cuối năm nay.

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G7 approves B3W plan to push back China’s one belt one road

giThe adoption of the US-inspired “Build Back Better World” (B3W) project came after President Joe Biden and leaders met to address “strategic competition with China, the White House said.

By Feeds -13/06/2021165

PC L Aqeel Ahmed

G7 leaders on Saturday adopted a rival plan to oppose China’s Belt and Road Initiative by helping build infrastructure in poorer nations in a “values-driven, high-standard and transparent” partnership.

The adoption of the US-inspired “Build Back Better World” (B3W) project came after President Joe Biden and leaders met to address “strategic competition with China and commit to concrete actions to help meet the tremendous infrastructure need in low- and middle-income countries”, the White House said.

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Biển Đông: Từ nắn gân đến hạ nhiệt

DANH ĐỨC 26/4/2021 9:00 GMT+7

TTCTCăng thẳng trên Biển Đông với những vụ dàn hàng trăm “tàu cá” ở bãi Ba Đầu dẫn đến phản kháng từ các nước liên quan, điều động lực lượng phòng vệ, rồi những vụ đeo bám giữa các nhóm tàu sân bay Mỹ – Trung, những phi vụ đông đến hai tá máy bay hướng về Đài Loan…

Liệu đó có phải là một màn nắn gân tân Tổng thống Mỹ Joe Biden? Và nó cũng sắp hạ màn?

Ai ép ai?

Ngay khi chính quyền Biden còn chưa yên vị, hôm 9-2, Reuters đưa tin hai nhóm tác chiến tàu sân bay USS Theodore Roosevelt và USS Nimitz của Mỹ đã bắt đầu tập trận chung ở Biển Đông. 

Từ trái sang: các tàu sân bay USS Nimitz, USS Theodore Roosevelt và USS Ronald Reagan ở Tây Thái Bình Dương. Mỹ là quốc gia duy nhất có năng lực triển khai cùng lúc nhiều nhóm tàu sân bay. -Ảnh: Wikimedia Commons

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Biển Đông – Thông điệp ngầm của Mỹ

NLD – Mỹ tăng cường tập trận với các nước đồng minh ở khu vực Ấn Độ-Thái Bình Dương từ đầu năm đến nay trong bối cảnh Trung Quốc có hàng loạt động thái gây căng thẳng trong khu vực


[eMagazine] Thông điệp ngầm của Mỹ trên biển Đông - Ảnh 1.

hông báo trên trang Twitter hôm 8-4, Bộ Tư lệnh Ấn Độ -Thái Bình Dương cho biết các thủy thủ trên tàu USS Makin Island (Mỹ) đã tiến hành một cuộc diễn tập bắn đạn thật với lời kêu gọi đảm bảo “một khu vực Ấn Độ -Thái Bình Dương tự do và mở”. 

Trước đó, tàu sân bay USS Theodore Roosevelt của Mỹ đã tiến hành tập trận cùng với Malaysia trong hai ngày 6 và 7-4. Đây là lần thứ hai nhóm tác chiến tàu sân bay Theodore Roosevelt tiến vào biển Đông để thực hiện nhiệm vụ trong năm 2021, lần đầu diễn ra hồi cuối tháng 1.

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Chinese Assessment of New U.S. Naval Strategy

February 19, 2021 10:28 AM USNI News

The following is a translation of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies assessment of the recently released U.S. maritime strategy, Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. The China Maritime Studies Institute at the U.S. Naval War College made the translation.

The Prelude to All-Encompassing Maritime Competition Between China and the U.S. is about to Begin—An Appraisal of America’s Newest Maritime Strategy

By Shi Xiaoqin and Liu Xiaobo

On December 17, 2020, the U.S. Navy (USN), U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) jointly issued a new maritime strategy entitled Advantage at Sea: Prevailing with Integrated All-Domain Naval Power. This tri-service strategy is a follow-on to A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, which the three services jointly issued in 2007 and 2015. Two characteristics of the document deserve attention: one, it directly regards China as an opponent and two, it simultaneously classifies China and Russia as opponents. Compared with the U.S. maritime strategy issued at the height of the Cold War in 1982, this document might be regarded as the first maritime strategy document issued after the inauguration of Sino-U.S. strategic competition.

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China’s Global Media Footprint – Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence


The Sharp Power and Democratic Resilience series aims to contextualize the nature of sharp power, inventory key authoritarian efforts and domains, and illuminate ideas for non-governmental action that are essential to strengthening democratic resilience.



Sarah Cook is research director for China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan at Freedom House. She directs the China Media Bulletin, a monthly digest providing news and analysis on media freedom developments related to China. Cook is the author of several Asian country reports for Freedom House’s annual publications, as well as four special reports about China.

This report describes the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) sharp power efforts to shape media content around the world. It also documents how nongovernmental actors contribute to a growing accumulation of activities aimed at countering Beijing’s media influence while protecting democratic institutions.

Leveraging propaganda, disinformation, censorship, and influence over key nodes in the information flow, Beijing’s expanding efforts to shape global narratives go beyond simply “telling China’s story.” Their sharper edge undermines democratic norms, erodes national sovereignty, weakens the financial sustainability of independent media, and violates local laws. An acknowledgment and understanding of the challenges that China’s party-state and related actors pose to media freedom globally—not only by China experts, but by the full array of nongovernmental actors engaged in the media, news, and technology sectors—must be central to a comprehensive response.

It is imperative that anyone engaged in the media space—be they journalists, regulators, technology firms, press freedom groups, or even news consumers—acknowledge the influence exerted by China’s authoritarian regime on the news and information circulating in their print publications, radio broadcasts, television programs, and social media feeds.


  • Investigation and research: Academic institutions, think tanks, research entities, and donors should continue existing work and ensure resources are available to monitor and expose CCP media influence activities in a credible, professional, and sustained way in the coming years.
  • Action by media outlets: Local media should improve their awareness of the potential journalistic and political pitfalls of accepting Chinese state or proxy investment, paid supplements, or coproduction deals.
  • Civil society advocacy: International and local press freedom groups should consider whether and how to incorporate a CCP media influence dimension into current or future projects, with support from donors. Such initiatives could support internal capacity building, journalism trainings and education, media literacy, policy advocacy, and information sharing and coordination.
  • Technology sector collaboration: Technology firms should seek further opportunities to work with researchers and civil society in identifying emerging threats and problematic accounts tied to the Chinese party-state. They must also ensure that independent voices, activists, and content producers who are critical of the Chinese government have a clear avenue for appeal if they encounter problems on the companies’ platforms.

The report also highlights specific actions taken by media outlets and civil society to counter the CCP’s expanding global footprint. Categorized by sector, these responses illustrate ways for media, civil society, think tanks, and the technology sector to build resilience to sharp power across the information ecosystem.


China’s Global Media Footprint: Democratic Responses to Expanding Authoritarian Influence [PDF]

The Second Island Cloud: A Deeper and Broader Concept for American Presence in the Pacific Islands

By Andrew Rhodes Joint Force Quarterly 959PRINT  |  E-MAIL Nov. 18, 2019 — Washington Headquarters Services

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Andrew Rhodes wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Naval War College. It won the Strategic Research Paper category of the 2019 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategic Essay Competition.

In the early 20th century, the visionary Marine officer Earl “Pete” Ellis compiled remarkable studies of islands in the Western Pacific and considered the practical means for the seizure or defense of advanced bases. A century after Ellis’s work, China presents new strategic and operational challenges to the U.S. position in Asia, and it is time for Washington to develop a coherent strategy, one that will last another 100 years, for the islands of the Western Pacific. It has become common to consider the second island chain as a defining feature of Pacific geography, but when Ellis mastered its geography, he saw not a “chain,” but a “cloud.” He wrote in 1921 that the “Marshall, Caroline, and Pelew Islands form a ‘cloud’ of islands stretching east and west.” His apt description of these archipelagoes serves well for a broader conception of the islands in, and adjacent to, traditional definitions of the second island chain. A new U.S. strategy should abandon the narrow lens of the “chain” and emphasize a broader second island cloud that highlights the U.S. regional role and invests in a resilient, distributed, and enduring presence in the Pacific.

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Powers Jockey for Pacific Island Chain Influence

By: Christopher P. Cavas    February 1, 2016 Defense News

WASHINGTON — The extensive chains of Pacific islands ringing China have been described as a wall, a barrier to be breached by an attacker or strengthened by a defender. They are seen as springboards, potential bases for operations to attack or invade others in the region. In a territorial sense, they are benchmarks marking the extent of a country’s influence.

“It’s truly a case of where you stand. Perspective is shaped by one’s geographic and geostrategic position,” said Andrew Erickson, a professor with the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.

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A China Strategy


A China Strategy

Photo: The portrait of China's President Xi Jinping appears during a military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the founding of a nation at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China on October 1, 2019. New weapons were unveiled at the largest military parade ever. ( The Yomiuri Shimbun ) Credit: REUTERS

Edward Lucas

December 7, 2020



In an era of geopolitical competition, the West — the U.S.-led countries of the transatlantic alliance and their East Asian allies — lacks a strategy for dealing with its most formidable competitor: the People’s Republic of China (henceforth China). But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a strategy for dealing with the West. It involves a long-term goal of “national rejuvenation”1 — making China the world’s most powerful country by 2050 — implemented with decisive leadership; a clear-eyed appreciation of Western diplomatic, economic, political, and social weaknesses; and effective means of exploiting them. These tactics, best characterized as “sharp power,”2 include censorship and manipulation of the information system, cyber operations, divide-and-rule diplomacy, leverage of trade and investment, and propaganda, plus military bluff and intimidation.

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CSBA: SEIZING ON WEAKNESS – Allied Strategy for competing with China’s globalizing military

January 4, 2021  Toshi YoshiharaJack Bianchi
Resources: Strategy & Policy

China’s military is going global. In the coming decade, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could be well-positioned to influence events and conduct a wide range of missions, including limited warfighting, beyond the Western Pacific. The United States and its close allies, who have enjoyed largely unobstructed access to the world’s oceans for the last three decades, will need to adjust to new military realities as the PLA makes its presence felt in faraway theaters.

In this study, Senior Fellow Toshi Yoshihara and Research Fellow Jack Bianchi argue that a deep study of China’s weaknesses as they relate to its worldwide ambitions is required to formulate an effective allied response. These weaknesses offer insights into the costs that Beijing will have to pay to go global. Importantly, the United States and its close allies enjoy agency over certain Chinese weaknesses, furnishing them leverage that, if exercised, could yield strategic dividends. The report concludes with a range of allied options that exploit China’s weaknesses to constrain and complicate the PLA’s global expansion.  

AUTHORS Toshi Yoshihara Senior Fellow, Jack Blanchi, Research Fellow


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