By Michael J. Green, the CEO of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and Paul Haenle, the director of Carnegie China.
As U.S.-China relations transition from an era of engagement to one of strategic competition, some in the Biden and former Trump administrations have claimed to be abandoning four decades of naive American assumptions about Beijing. Past U.S. policy, they say, was based on a futile view that engagement would lead to a democratic and cooperative China. This, however, is not only a misreading of past U.S. policies but also dangerous analytical ground upon which to build a new national security strategy.
The fact is that no administration since that of Richard Nixon has made U.S. security dependent on Chinese democratization. Every administration has combined engagement with strategies to counterbalance China through alliances, trade agreements, and U.S. military power. Throwing out all previous U.S. approaches to China would mean throwing out some of the most important tools the current administration relies on to compete with China. And the Biden administration will not get its China strategy right until it is clear about what has worked in the past.
Good morning everyone. Thank you, Suzanne, for that introduction, and thank you to the team at Brookings for organizing today’s discussion.
You know, when we first talked about doing an event tied to your Global China program, the topic was, in a sense, evergreen. We could have planned this conversation virtually anytime.
The People’s Republic of China, the challenges it poses, the stakes for global norms and values, the strategies and policy choices demanded from the United States and our partners — these questions have stood front and center from the moment President Biden took office.
[1/4] A woman works at a yarn weaving plant in Ha Nam province, outside Hanoi, Vietnam October 7, 2015. REUTERS/Kham/File
HANOI, Feb 14 (Reuters) – Concerned Vietnam-based exporters are seeking to ensure they comply with a U.S. ban on imported products using raw materials from China’s Xinjiang as lucrative trade in goods like garments and solar panels comes under closer scrutiny in Washington.
As U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai visits Vietnam this week, executives and other people familiar with the situation said some industries in Vietnam may be importing, sometimes unwittingly, raw material from Xinjiang – or might find it hard to prove they were not doing so.
On Saturday afternoon, a U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jet fired one missile into a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon, sending it plunging into the Atlantic Ocean and capping a stretch where the world’s most important bilateral relationship was dominated by a slowly moving object crossing the United States.
The incident raises questions about the extent to which China has been employing these balloons – and in the process violating U.S. territorial airspace and sovereignty – and why it has been doing so when its satellites could glean this information. Far more important, however, is what this says about the ability, or more accurately inability, of Washington and Beijing to manage a future crisis.
China now is attempting to expand its control to the southernmost extent of its nine-dash-line claim in the South China Sea, in waters ever closer to Indonesian and Malaysian shores. This area of the South China Sea, spanning from Indonesia’s Natuna Islands to the South Luconia Shoals, has greater strategic importance than the Spratly or Paracel Island chains farther to the north. Whereas the Spratlys have for centuries been regarded as “dangerous ground” and commercial mariners have avoided them, the vital sea lines of communication (SLOCs) connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans flow through this part of the southern South China Sea. Therefore, these areas are far more vital to international commerce and navigation than the dangerous grounds closer to China’s Spratly Islands outposts.
Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
China Maritime Studies, China, South China Sea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Expansion
Bentley, Scott, “The Maritime Fulcrum of the Indo-Pacific: Indonesia and Malaysia Respond to China’s Creeping Expansion in the South China Sea” (2023). CMSI Red Books, Study No. 17.
Samsung’s plant in Thai Nguyen Province, northern Vietnam. Photo: Samsung
The CEO of Samsung Electronics met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and announced a US$850 million investment to manufacture semiconductor components in Thai Nguyen province on August 5, 2022.
The investment will make Vietnam one of only four countries – alongside South Korea, China and the United States – that produce semiconductors for the world’s largest memory chipmaker. Vietnam’s selection over more developed locations speaks volumes about the country’s rising importance in the semiconductor value chain.
The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping did not resolve major disagreements, but it could start the process of building guardrails to prevent competition from turning into conflict.
On the margins of the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering in Bali, Indonesia, U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met for the first time in person as leaders of their respective nations. Their three-and-a-half-hour meeting came against the backdrop of heightened tensions over Taiwan, unprecedented U.S. export controls on advanced technologies levied against China, ramped up North Korean missile tests, and the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Machinery and mechanical equipment top category of products shipped from region, whose month-on-month decline aligns with weakening in Chinese exportsUS customs chief insists ‘seeing good examples of compliance so far’ with recently implemented Uygur Forced Labour Prevention Act
Published: 2:00am, 25 Oct, 2022
Xinjiang’s exports to the United States dropped in September after soaring for two consecutive months, but were still nearly three times as high as the same month last year, according to the latest Chinese customs data – despite a Washington law that seeks to ban goods from the far-west region of China due to forced labour allegations.
The shipments from Xinjiang to the US have appeared to continue even as officials from the US customs agency insist that they have been effectively enforcing the Uygur Forced Labour Prevention Act, which kicked in on June 21.
Companies from the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region in September exported US$21.05 million worth of goods to the US, slashed by more than half compared with the figure for August, but more than double the tally in June, trade data showed.
The month-on-month decline of Xinjiang exports to the US was in line with the overall weakening of Chinese exports.
Communist Party of Vietnam leader Nguyen Phu Trong, left, meets with China’s Communist Party leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2015. | Xinhua
HANOI—The Socialist Republic of Vietnam will not be coerced into joining the United States-led effort aimed at isolating China and provoking conflict as part of its Cold War 2.0 foreign policy.
That’s a major message expected to come out of the upcoming visit to China by Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Trong will travel to China to pay an official visit to the newly re-elected Communist Party of China leader Xi Jinping. Trong will be one of the first world leaders to visit China since the closing the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, earlier this month.
Hours before the new restrictions took effect, South Korean memory chipmaker SK Hynix said the US had granted it authorisation to receive goods for its chip production facilities in China without additional licensing imposed by the new rules.
The most advanced category of mass-produced semiconductors — used in smartphones, military technology and much more — is known as 5 nm. A single company in Taiwan, known as TSMC, makes about 90 percent of them. U.S. factories make none.
The U.S.’s struggles to keep pace in semiconductor manufacturing have already had economic downsides: Many jobs in the industry pay more than $100,000 a year, and the U.S. has lost out on them. Longer term, the situation also has the potential to cause a national security crisis: If China were to invade Taiwan and cut off exports of semiconductors, the American military would be at risk of being overmatched by its main rival for global supremacy.
The news leaking from the White House is that President Biden may finally ease tariffs against some Chinese goods—a mere 18 months into his Administration. The extended indecision underscores that Mr. Biden essentially has no trade policy while the rest of the world moves ahead with new trade deals.
TTCT – Hồi năm 2019, khi tổng thống Mỹ lúc đó là Donald Trump hỏi mua hòn đảo khổng lồ ở Bắc Cực Greenland từ Đan Mạch, ông đã bị chê là vô duyên và lố bịch. Nhưng giờ, khi cuộc bầu cử sớm sắp diễn ra ở đấy – chính quyền Greenland sụp đổ vì tranh cãi liên quan tới tài nguyên đất hiếm – xem chừng ông Trump đã nhìn xa trông rộng.
Cuộc bầu cử ở Greenland, với tổng dân số chỉ hơn 56.000 người, dự kiến diễn ra vào ngày 6-4, và chỉ hơn một tháng sau sẽ là cột mốc trọng đại khác – 300 năm ngày vùng đất này trở thành lãnh thổ của Đan Mạch. Đầu cua tai nheo cũng là từ đó: ở đây có một phe đang đòi độc lập.
Dân Greenland biểu tình phản đối một dự án khai khoáng. Ảnh: ejatlas.org