Conversations on Vietnam Development
May 26, 2022
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The Latest on Southeast Asia
In Tokyo on May 23, President Biden announced the formation of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). The framework will bring together the United States and a dozen other Indo-Pacific countries. The agreement will cover both traditional and digital trade standards, decarbonization and infrastructure, supply chain resiliency, taxation, and anti-corruption.
September 28, 2021
In common parlance today, the word “tragedy” is used to describe any ill fortune that befalls a person or group: a destructive earthquake, a fatal shooting, the death of a family member from disease. But to the ancient Greeks, tragedy involved an element of human error (hamartia), not just external circumstance. On this measure, the saga of the United States and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) would have given Sophocles enough material for an epic to rival Oedipus Rex.
From the start, TPP was marked by tragic irony—with China always in a supporting role. The George W. Bush administration notified Congress of its intent to negotiate a high-standard trade agreement with Asia-Pacific partners on September 22, 2008—one week into a global financial crisis that would severely undermine U.S. economic leadership and embolden Beijing. While quick to embrace TPP and successful in concluding an agreement among the parties, President Barack Obama fatally delayed pushing for trade promotion authority from Congress in 2014—choosing instead to name the chairman of the relevant Senate committee, Max Baucus, as his ambassador to China. And in one of his first, catastrophic acts as president, Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the unratified TPP—not understanding that it was one of the most powerful tools he had to compete with his nemesis, China.
Tiếp tục đọc “Overcoming the Tragedy of TPP”by Rachel Posner Ross and Evan Scandling
Introduction
At a time when Vietnam’s electricity demand is surging in response to commercial, industrial, and population growth, a common concern has emerged that rising economic activity will shift carbon emissions from China and other manufacturing hubs to Vietnam. However, our experience through the Clean Energy Investment Accelerator (CEIA) initiative in Vietnam indicates that private-sector demand for renewables has the potential to overcome policy barriers and catalyze significant scaling up of clean energy deployment in emerging markets. Vietnam’s 2019-2020 rooftop solar boom and anticipated surge in wind and solar virtual power purchase agreements for corporate offtakers in 2020 and beyond are the results of public-private collaboration on issues that simultaneously advance government and private-sector interests, offering important lessons for other markets in pursuit of sustainable development.
Background
Vietnam is a developing economy with a population of nearly 100 million and annual GDP growth of 6 to 7 percent, making it one of Asia’s fastest-growing economies, which has been true for decades. Foreign direct investment (FDI) was close to $18 billion in 2018, which accounted for approximately 24 percent of total investment in the economy.1 More than 10,000 foreign companies are estimated to operate or have supply chain manufacturing in Vietnam, including many of the world’s largest companies from a variety of sectors.2 For decades, Vietnam has been home to labor-intensive industries such as apparel and footwear production. Many of the world’s
This report is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved
For several weeks starting in late December, Indonesian media was dominated by reports of a flotilla of Chinese fishing and coast guard vessels operating without permission in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The situation strained bilateral relations, presented President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo with the first foreign policy crisis of his second term, and forced Indonesia to confront the uncomfortable fact that it is a party to the South China Sea disputes even if it does not claim any contested islands or reefs. But the public reporting from Indonesian officials was also contradictory and incomplete, leaving the scale and timeline of the standoff unclear.
Tiếp tục đọc “GONE FISHING: TRACKING CHINA’S FLOTILLA FROM BRUNEI TO INDONESIA”
January 14, 2020
In this two-part series, Dr. Amy Searight, senior adviser and director of the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, previews five key issues to watch in Southeast Asia in 2020. This installment addresses U.S.-ASEAN relations, climate change and the imperiled Mekong, and domestic politics. The next installment will cover economic trends and developments in the digital space.
Can Trump Reset U.S.-ASEAN Relations?
Disappointingly, 2019 was a pretty bad year for U.S.-ASEAN relations. Trump had a promising start in his first year in office, hosting four Southeast Asian leaders in the White House, traveling to Vietnam and the Philippines to unveil his “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” vision, and holding a U.S.-ASEAN summit. But Trump’s interest in Southeast Asia has since appeared to wane considerably. Although Trump traveled to Vietnam in February for a second summit with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, he later called Vietnam the “single worst abuser” in trade relations with the United States. In November, President Trump skipped the East Asian Summit (EAS) for the third straight year, sending National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien instead. Trump’s absence in Bangkok and the historically low level of diplomatic representation at the summit ruffled a lot of feathers within ASEAN and led most of the Southeast Asian leaders to snub the U.S.-ASEAN summit held on the sidelines of the EAS (only Thailand, Vietnam, and Laos attended at the leader level). ASEAN’s disenchantment with the level of U.S. engagement came just as China was gaining new traction in the region, with a revamped Belt and Road Initiative that appeared to address regional concerns and progress toward launching the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a trade agreement between ASEAN, China, and four other regional trade partners.
Tiếp tục đọc “Southeast Asia in 2020: Issues to Watch, Part 1”
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“Trump will leave tariffs on $200 billion worth of Chinese imports at 10 percent at the beginning of the new year, agreeing to not raise them to 25 percent ‘at this time’, the White House said in a statement.” Tiếp tục đọc ““U.S., China agree on trade war ceasefire after Trump, Xi summit””
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China unveiled the concept for the Twenty-First Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) in 2013 as a development strategy to boost infrastructure connectivity throughout Southeast Asia, Oceania, the Indian Ocean, and East Africa. The MSR is the maritime complement to the Silk Road Economic Belt, which focuses on infrastructure development across Central Asia. Together these initiatives form the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative designed to enhance China’s influence across Asia. Tiếp tục đọc “China’s Maritime Silk Road: Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region”
WASHINGTON: While attention in Asia has been distracted by the North Korean nuclear crisis in the past year, China has continued to install high-frequency radar and other facilities that can be used for military purposes on its man-made islands in the South China Sea, a US think tank said on Thursday (Dec 14).
Chinese activity has involved work on facilities covering 29 hectares of the Spratly and Paracel islands, territory contested with several other Asian nations, according to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative of Washington’s Center for Strategic and International Studies. The report cited satellite images. Tiếp tục đọc “While focus is on North Korea, China continues South China Sea buildup: Think tank”
First posted on: June 3, 2014, UNCLOSForum.wordpress.com
Hội thảo về An ninh Hàng Hải ở Biển Đông do Trung tâm nghiên cứu Chiến lược Quốc tế (CSIS) tổ chức ở thủ đô Washington đã kết thúc hôm thứ Ba, 21 tháng Sáu. Trong phần trao đổi khá sôi nổi vào lúc cuối ngày, một số câu hỏi đã được nêu lên với các diễn giả chính, kể cả những thắc mắc về bản đồ hình chữ U, vẽ vùng biển mà Trung Quốc đòi chủ quyền; và vì sao Hà nội không phản đối Bắc Kinh hồi năm 1974, khi Trung Quốc chiếm một phần quần đảo Hoàng Sa sau một cuộc chiến ngắn với hải quân Việt Nam Cộng hòa.
Phần thuyết trình của Tiến sĩ Trần Trường Thủy, Giám Đốc Trung Tâm Nghiên cứu các vấn đề Biển Đông thuộc Học Viện Ngoại giao Việt Nam, ngày 20 tháng 6, 2011
24.06.2011
Hầu hết những người phát biểu, ngoại trừ các đại diện của Trung Quốc, đều cho rằng những lập luận được dùng làm cơ sở cho đòi hỏi chủ quyền của Trung Quốc trên phần lớn diện tích Biển Đông, không có tính thuyết phục. Tiếp tục đọc “Hội Thảo An Ninh Biển Đông: Những Điểm Tranh Luận”
Read map at Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative
It is our pleasure to send you the December edition of the ChinaPower Newsletter. The China Power Project at CSIS centers on ChinaPower–a website that provides an in-depth understanding of the evolving nature of Chinese power relative to other countries. The Newsletter highlights the new and updated content on the website, as well as featured events and publications. We hope this newsletter provides you with a snapshot of the work we are doing to help our users better understand the complexity of China’s rise. Tiếp tục đọc “CSIS – ChinaPower December Newsletter”
It is our pleasure to send you the November edition of the ChinaPower Newsletter, the monthly newsletter of the CSIS China Power Project. The China Power Project centers on ChinaPower–a website that provides an in-depth understanding of the evolving nature of Chinese power relative to other countries. The ChinaPower Newsletter highlights the new and updated content on the website, as well as featured events and publications. We hope this newsletter provides you with a snapshot of the work we are doing to help our users better understand the complexity of China’s rise. Tiếp tục đọc “CSIS – ChinaPower November 2016 Newsletter”
The challenges and opportunities presented by China’s rise are hotly contested. To help make sense of the issue, ChinaPower hosted its inaugural conference on November 29, 2016. The conference featured a series of debates between leading experts on the nature of Chinese power. The audience was polled for their opinion both before and after each debate. Polling results, debate descriptions, and conference video are posted below.
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