Vietnam arming up to serve in US chip war on China

AsiatimesSamsung, Intel, Amkor Technology and others pouring billions into Vietnam’s chip industry as China decoupling gathers pace


NOVEMBER 16, 2022

Samsung’s plant in Thai Nguyen Province, northern Vietnam. Photo: Samsung

The CEO of Samsung Electronics met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and announced a US$850 million investment to manufacture semiconductor components in Thai Nguyen province on August 5, 2022.

The investment will make Vietnam one of only four countries – alongside South Korea, China and the United States – that produce semiconductors for the world’s largest memory chipmaker. Vietnam’s selection over more developed locations speaks volumes about the country’s rising importance in the semiconductor value chain.

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What the Biden-Xi Meeting Means for U.S.-China Relations


The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping did not resolve major disagreements, but it could start the process of building guardrails to prevent competition from turning into conflict.

U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping meet on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty summit in Bali, Indonesia.
U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping meet on the sidelines of the Group of Twenty summit in Bali, Indonesia. Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

Blog Post by David Sacks

November 15, 2022 9:17 am (EST)

On the margins of the Group of Twenty (G20) gathering in Bali, Indonesia, U.S. President Joe Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping met for the first time in person as leaders of their respective nations. Their three-and-a-half-hour meeting came against the backdrop of heightened tensions over Taiwan, unprecedented U.S. export controls on advanced technologies levied against China, ramped up North Korean missile tests, and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

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Xinjiang exports to US dip in September but still higher year on year despite forced labour law

Machinery and mechanical equipment top category of products shipped from region, whose month-on-month decline aligns with weakening in Chinese exportsUS customs chief insists ‘seeing good examples of compliance so far’ with recently implemented Uygur Forced Labour Prevention Act

Published: 2:00am, 25 Oct, 2022

Xinjiang’s exports to the United States dropped in September after soaring for two consecutive months, but were still nearly three times as high as the same month last year, according to the latest Chinese customs data – despite a Washington law that seeks to ban goods from the far-west region of China due to forced labour allegations.

The shipments from Xinjiang to the US have appeared to continue even as officials from the US customs agency insist that they have been effectively enforcing the Uygur Forced Labour Prevention Act, which kicked in on June 21.

Companies from the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region in September exported US$21.05 million worth of goods to the US, slashed by more than half compared with the figure for August, but more than double the tally in June, trade data showed.

The month-on-month decline of Xinjiang exports to the US was in line with the overall weakening of Chinese exports.

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Vietnam won’t be pressured into joining U.S.-led Cold War against China

peoplesworld – October 28, 2022 11:24 AM CDT  BY AMIAD HOROWITZ

Vietnam won’t be pressured into joining U.S.-led Cold War against China

Communist Party of Vietnam leader Nguyen Phu Trong, left, meets with China’s Communist Party leader Xi Jinping in Beijing in 2015. | Xinhua

HANOI—The Socialist Republic of Vietnam will not be coerced into joining the United States-led effort aimed at isolating China and provoking conflict as part of its Cold War 2.0 foreign policy.

That’s a major message expected to come out of the upcoming visit to China by Nguyen Phu Trong, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam. Trong will travel to China to pay an official visit to the newly re-elected Communist Party of China leader Xi Jinping. Trong will be one of the first world leaders to visit China since the closing the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, earlier this month.

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The semiconductor problem

The military relies on advanced semiconductors. The U.S. doesn’t make any.

Chips on display in Taiwan.
Chips on display in Taiwan.Credit…Ann Wang/Reuters
David Leonhardt

By David Leonhardt

NYTimes – July 14, 2022

The most advanced category of mass-produced semiconductors — used in smartphones, military technology and much more — is known as 5 nm. A single company in Taiwan, known as TSMC, makes about 90 percent of them. U.S. factories make none.

The U.S.’s struggles to keep pace in semiconductor manufacturing have already had economic downsides: Many jobs in the industry pay more than $100,000 a year, and the U.S. has lost out on them. Longer term, the situation also has the potential to cause a national security crisis: If China were to invade Taiwan and cut off exports of semiconductors, the American military would be at risk of being overmatched by its main rival for global supremacy.

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Biden’s missing trade policy

Allies and rivals are striking new deals while the U.S. loses ground.

WSJ – By The Editorial Board

Updated July 5, 2022 7:16 pm ET


Listen here

The news leaking from the White House is that President Biden may finally ease tariffs against some Chinese goods—a mere 18 months into his Administration. The extended indecision underscores that Mr. Biden essentially has no trade policy while the rest of the world moves ahead with new trade deals.

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Greenland: Đảo băng nóng bỏng

CHIÊU VĂN 26/3/2021 8:00 GMT+7

TTCT – Hồi năm 2019, khi tổng thống Mỹ lúc đó là Donald Trump hỏi mua hòn đảo khổng lồ ở Bắc Cực Greenland từ Đan Mạch, ông đã bị chê là vô duyên và lố bịch. Nhưng giờ, khi cuộc bầu cử sớm sắp diễn ra ở đấy – chính quyền Greenland sụp đổ vì tranh cãi liên quan tới tài nguyên đất hiếm – xem chừng ông Trump đã nhìn xa trông rộng.

Cuộc bầu cử ở Greenland, với tổng dân số chỉ hơn 56.000 người, dự kiến diễn ra vào ngày 6-4, và chỉ hơn một tháng sau sẽ là cột mốc trọng đại khác – 300 năm ngày vùng đất này trở thành lãnh thổ của Đan Mạch. Đầu cua tai nheo cũng là từ đó: ở đây có một phe đang đòi độc lập.

Hình ảnh này không có thuộc tính văn bản thay thế; tên tập tin là 2a5f6f07.jpg

Dân Greenland biểu tình phản đối một dự án khai khoáng. Ảnh:

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China is expanding in the Pacific while the West is distracted

Officers with the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force undergo training by members of the China Police Liaison Team in this undated photo released March 29 by the RSIPF. (AFP/Royal Solomon Islands Police Force) (Handout/AFP/Getty Images)

washingtonpost – 15-4-22 – By Josh Rogin

Over the past few weeks, the world has been understandably transfixed by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s horrific invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, though, his close ally Chinese President Xi Jinping has been quietly taking advantage of the West’s distraction by expanding China’s sphere of influence in the South Pacific. If Washington doesn’t wake up to this threat, China’s efforts to dominate the region will gain dangerous and perhaps irreversible momentum.

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How to stop China and the US going to war – podcast

Armed conflict between the world’s two superpowers, while not yet inevitable, has become a real possibility. The 2020s will be the decade of living dangerously. By Kevin Rudd

Written by Kevin Rudd, read by Paul-William Mawhinney, and produced by Jessica Beck. Executive producer is Max Sanderson

theguardian – Fri 15 Apr 2022 06.00 BST

 Illustration: Getty/Guardian Design

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PODCAST: Asia Stream: The old and new Cold War

From Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing condoning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, we investigate what went wrong in the U.S.-China relationship

Nikkei – February 25, 2022 13:08 JST

NEW YORK — Welcome to Nikkei Asia’s podcast: Asia Stream.

Every week, Asia Stream tracks and analyzes the Indo-Pacific with a mix of interviews and original reporting by our correspondents from across the globe.

New episodes are recorded weekly and available on Apple PodcastsSpotify and all other major platforms, and on our YouTube channel.


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A handshake that changed the world: 50 years after Nixon’s trip to China

U.S. President Nixon shakes hands with Chinese President Mao Zedong (Feb. 21, 1972, AP)

nikkeiFeb. 21 marks the 50th anniversary of U.S. President Richard Nixon’s trip to China, a turning point in international relations.

Washington and Beijing joined together to counter the Soviet Union, but China did not democratize as the U.S. hoped. It has now become an economic and military powerhouse under the one-party rule of the Communist Party. A half-century after the handshake that changed the world, cooperation has turned to confrontation. The U.S.-China relationship and global affairs have all undergone tumultuous change.

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CLOSING THE GAP: US-European Cooperation on China and the Indo-Pacific


byAndrew Small, Bonnie S. Glaser, Garima Mohan


The Biden administration took office with the intention of making partnership with Europe a central element of its China strategy. This paper assesses what has been achieved in the first year of these efforts, and what to expect in 2022. Despite some of points of contention, such as the disputes over the security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States (AUKUS), European and US officials ended the year in a more optimistic place on the transatlantic China and Indo-Pacific agendas than they were at the start. Over the course of 2021, the two sides put in place new structures—from the EU-US Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to the Indo-Pacific high-level consultations—that have helped to get the right issues on the table and pushed their bureaucracies to deal with each other in ways that they had not before. Instead of a thin layer of periodic dialogues on China, there is an increasingly thick web of interactions, from working-level groups in different policy areas to leader-level exchanges. The EU and the United States also removed many of the obstacles to their joining forces more effectively on economic goals, particularly with the deal on steel and aluminum tariffs. Meanwhile, without raising excessively high expectations of a new coalition government that will not depart radically from its predecessor, the change in Berlin should also provide a stronger basis for cooperation on China than was present during the final phase of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s government.

All this needs to be translated into results this year. The gap between the EU and the United States is less in their analysis of China and more in the level of urgency with which they treat the challenge. Where the United States is in the process of making China the animating factor for its grand strategy, Europe is not, and the crisis with Russia will not make it likelier in the months ahead. Yet the actor that has done most to narrow the urgency gap between Europe and the United States has been China. Much as its escalatory sanctions in 2021 derailed its contentious Comprehensive Agreement on Investment with the EU, Beijing’s treatment of Lithuania is helping to expedite European plans to address economic coercion and supply-chain risks that might otherwise have taken years.

Economic coercion is one of several issues that are a priority for EU-US cooperation this year. The transatlantic agenda on China and the Indo-Pacific is a very expansive one and, although there is value to this breadth, the two sides will need to pick a few areas that merit an additional political push. While in an ideal world these would all be positive-sum efforts, such as aligning their infrastructure finance initiatives to compete more effectively with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Europe and the United States will unavoidably have to deal with the sharp edges of Chinese power too. In all these efforts, the transatlantic agenda is only one component of a wider framework of cooperation that also involves their major partners in the Indo-Pacific. From the Quad to the TTC, one of the key goals for this year will be for these allies to stitch their efforts together with a view to driving outcomes rather than creating even more complex consultation structures.

There are also long-running goals for the United States and Europe that transcend administrations. There were striking shifts between the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations but there has been more underlying consistency in what both sides need from each other in dealing with the China challenge than in many other policy fields. Considerable long-term planning is possible regardless of the potential political oscillations in the years ahead.


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Trung Quốc thắng kiện Mỹ ở WTO, Mỹ ‘thất vọng sâu sắc, nên cải tổ WTO’

TTO – 28/01/2022 – 11:17

Ngày 26-1, Tổ chức Thương mại thế giới (WTO) cho phép Trung Quốc áp đặt mức thuế phạt 645 triệu USD với Mỹ.

Trung Quốc thắng kiện Mỹ ở WTO, Mỹ thất vọng sâu sắc, nên cải tổ WTO - Ảnh 1.
Trung Quốc thắng kiện Mỹ ở WTO – Ảnh: EXPORTSNEWS

Theo Hãng tin Reuters, đây là một chiến thắng mang tính biểu tượng khác của Bắc Kinh tại cơ quan thương mại có trụ sở tại Geneva. 

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Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với TQ về Biển Đông ngay đầu 2022

PLO 14/01/2022 – 05:42

Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với Trung Quốc về Biển Đông ngay đầu năm 2022 khi cùng lúc công bố báo cáo bác yêu sách chủ quyền của Bắc Kinh ở Biển Đông và điều hai nhóm tàu sân bay tới vùng biển này.

Mỹ đi loạt bước rắn với TQ về Biển Đông ngay đầu 2022 - ảnh 1
Báo cáo  “Limits in the Seas” (Giới hạn trên các vùng biển) của Mỹ.

Năm 2021 khép lại với sự kiện Tổng thống Mỹ Joe Biden ban hành Đạo luật Ủy quyền Quốc phòng (NDAA) vào ngày 27-12. Theo đó, Mỹ sẽ chi 770 tỉ USD cho chi tiêu quốc phòng, trong đó dành 7,1 tỉ USD cho chiến lược chống Trung Quốc ở khu vực Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương.  Có lẽ đây là bước chuẩn bị cho một năm 2022 đầy căng thẳng giữa hai siêu cường ở khu vực Ấn Độ Dương – Thái Bình Dương, mà một trong những trọng tâm là ở Biển Đông.

Chưa đầy nửa tháng đầu của năm 2022, Mỹ đã có những động thái quyết liệt thách thức yêu sách chủ quyền phi pháp của Trung Quốc ở Biển Đông.

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Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China (The Atlantic Council)

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This strategy was produced in collaboration with experts from ten leading democracies.


Following World War II, the United States and its allies and partners established a rules-based international system. While never perfect, it contributed to decades without great-power war, extraordinary economic growth, and a reduction of world poverty. But this system today faces trials ranging from a global pandemic and climate change to economic disruptions and a revival of great-power competition.

As Henry Kissinger has pointed out, world order depends on the balance of power and principles of legitimacy. The rise of Chinese power is straining both aspects of the existing rules-based system. China benefited from the system and does not seek to kick over the table as Hitler did with the 1930s international order, but China wants to use its power to change the rules and tilt the table to enhance its winnings. Beijing is directing its growing economic, diplomatic, and military heft toward revisionist geopolitical aims. While we once hoped that China would become what we considered a “responsible stakeholder” in a rules-based system, President Xi Jinping has led his country in a more confrontational direction.

Some analysts portray a new Cold War, but this historical metaphor misunderstands the nature of the new challenge. The Soviet Union was a direct military and ideological threat, and there was almost no economic or social interdependence in our relationship. With China today, we have half a trillion dollars in trade and millions of social interchanges. Moreover, with its “market-Leninist” system, China has learned to harness the creativity of markets to authoritarian Communist party control. It announced its intent to use this system to dominate ten key technologies by 2025. We and our allies are not threatened by the export of communism – few people are taking to the streets in favor of Xi Jinping thought – but by a hybrid system of interdependence. China has become the leading trading partner of more countries than the US. Partial decoupling on security issues like Huawei (discussed below) is necessary, but total decoupling from our overall economic interdependence would be extremely costly, and even impossible in the case of ecological interdependence such as climate change or future pandemics. For better and worse, we are locked in a “cooperative rivalry” in which we have to do two contradictory things at the same time.

Addressing the China challenge will require a collective effort on the part of the United States and its allies and partners, in which we leverage effectively our hard and soft power resources to defend ourselves and strengthen a rules-based system. Some pessimists look at China’s population size and economic growth rates and believe that the task is impossible. But on the contrary, if we think in terms our alliances, the combined wealth of the Western democracies – US, Europe, Japan – will far exceed that of China well into the century. A clear strategy with well-defined goals that neither under- nor over-estimates China is necessary for the current moment. Over the past two years, the Atlantic Council has convened high-level meetings of strategists and experts to produce just that.

In this paper, Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China, Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino, along with expert collaborators from ten of the world’s leading democracies, propose a logical and actionable strategy for addressing the China challenge. The strategy articulates clear long- and short-term goals and several major strategic elements to help achieve those goals.

First, the paper calls for strengthening likeminded allies and partners and the rules-based system for a new era of great-power competition. This will require, for example, prioritizing innovation, repairing infrastructure, and establishing new institutions to bolster democratic cooperation. A successful strategy begins at home.

Second, likeminded allies and partners should defend against Chinese behavior that threatens to undermine core principles of the rules-based system. Executing this element will mean prohibiting China’s engagement in economic sectors vital to national security, countering Chinese influence operations, and deterring and, if necessary, defending against, Chinese military aggression in the Indo-Pacific.

Third, the authors recognize that China also presents an opportunity, and they recommend that likeminded allies and partners engage China from a position of strength to cooperate on shared interests and, ultimately, incorporate China into a revitalized and adapted rules-based system. Thus, efforts should be made to cooperate with China on issues of shared interests, including public health, the global economy, nonproliferation, and the global environment.

They argue that the desired endpoint of the strategy is not everlasting competition or the overthrow of the Chinese Communist Party, but rather to convince Chinese leaders that their interests are better served by cooperating within, rather than challenging, a rules-based international system. They pay attention to both the rivalry and the cooperative possibilities in the relationship.

The paper presents a sound strategic framework and a comprehensive and practical plan for the US and its democratic allies to follow as they address the China challenge. I encourage experts and officials from the United States and allied nations to study this thoughtful report. Following this strategy could help leading democracies cope with the China challenge and advance a revitalized rules-based system for years to come.

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