The Japan Coast Guard’s role in realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific



By Kentaro Furuya
Capt. Kentaro Furuya (JCG) (k-furuya@grips.ac.jp) is an adjunct professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) and professor at the Japan Coast Guard Academy.This PacNet was developed as a part of a workshop on potential cooperation among Quad coast guards to implement the FOIP vision organized by YCAPS. The papers were edited by John Bradford (RSIS) and Blake Herzinger (AEI). For the first in the series, click here.

Originally responsible primarily for maintaining good order and the safety of life at sea in domestic waters, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) has expanded its commitment to international duties to cultivate external relationships and much-needed capacity building in neighboring states. While they began in the 1970s, these international activities have, in recent years, become essential functions in realizing Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). The JCG’s broad spectrum of capabilities and engagements makes it indispensable across all elements of Tokyo’s broader regional strategy, and its deepening partnership with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) is amplifying its impact.
Tiếp tục đọc “The Japan Coast Guard’s role in realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific”

Japan Bets Big on Bringing Semiconductor Manufacturing Home

An ambitious state-backed industrial plan targets both growth and China.

By William Sposato, a Tokyo-based journalist.

A semiconductor manufacturing plant is seen in Japan.
A semiconductor manufacturing plant is seen in Japan.

foreignpolicy.com

JANUARY 9, 2023, 12:28 PM

TOKYO—To get back some of the high-tech mojo that made it an economic powerhouse, Japan is launching an ambitious program to bring back cutting-edge semiconductor manufacturing, a field it ceded to Taiwan, South Korea, and China nearly 20 years ago. But will this new campaign at state-backed industrial policy succeed, and more importantly, is it even the right goal?

Tiếp tục đọc “Japan Bets Big on Bringing Semiconductor Manufacturing Home”

Inside China’s crackdown on tattoo culture

An arm bearing a tattoo.
CNN
“My behavior encroached on the physical and mental health of minors,” read a court-ordered apology issued by a tattoo artist in China’s Shaanxi province in September. “I am deeply aware of my mistakes,” he added. 

The man, who had admitted giving tattoos to 43 minors, became one of the first people charged under a new age restriction law, which came into effect in June. But while many countries enforce similar rules banning young people from getting inked, Chinese state media coverage suggested that protecting minors was as much about ideology as medical welfare. 

At the time, tabloid newspaper Global Times argued that tattoos are “driving minors away from establishing socialist core values,” as they can convey “harmful ideas” such as “feudal superstition,” “gang culture” and “overseas culture.”

An op-ed in Beijing Youth Daily meanwhile said that tattoo subculture “clashes” with the mainstream. The legislation, which bans people from even encouraging those aged under 18 to get tattoos, is just the latest move in an expanding crackdown on body art in China. 
Tiếp tục đọc “Inside China’s crackdown on tattoo culture”

Joint Declaration on EU-NATO Cooperation

by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

  • 10 Jan. 2023 – NATO
  • Last updated: 09 Jan. 2023 17:25

  1. The NATO-EU strategic partnership is founded on our shared values, our determination to tackle common challenges and our unequivocal commitment to promote and safeguard peace, freedom and prosperity in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
  2. Today, we are faced with the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine violates international law and the principles of the UN Charter. It undermines European and global security and stability. Russia’s war has exacerbated a food and energy crisis affecting billions of people around the world.
  3. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia’s aggression. Russia must immediately stop this war and withdraw from Ukraine. We express our full solidarity with Ukraine and reiterate our unwavering and continued support for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders. We fully support Ukraine’s inherent right to self-defence and to choose its own destiny
  4. Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic principles using multiple means – political, economic, technological and military.
  5. We live in an era of growing strategic competition. China’s growing assertiveness and policies present challenges that we need to address.
  6. Persistent conflict, fragility and instability in our European neighbourhood undermine our security and provide fertile ground for strategic competitors, as well as terrorist groups, to gain influence, destabilise societies and pose a threat to our security.
  7. As underlined by both the NATO Strategic Concept and the EU Strategic Compass, this is a key juncture for Euro-Atlantic security and stability, more than ever demonstrating the importance of the transatlantic bond, calling for closer EU-NATO cooperation.
  8. NATO remains the foundation of collective defence for its Allies and essential for Euro Atlantic security. We recognise the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO.
  9. Our mutually reinforcing strategic partnership contributes to strengthening security in Europe and beyond. NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. We will further mobilize the combined set of instruments at our disposal, be they political, economic or military, to pursue our common objectives to the benefit of our one billion citizens.
  10. Building on the 2016 Warsaw Joint Declaration and the 2018 Brussels Joint Declaration, which significantly expanded the breadth and depth of our partnership established more than twenty years ago, we have achieved unprecedented progress across all areas of cooperation.
  11. We have reached tangible results in countering hybrid and cyber threats, operational cooperation including maritime issues, military mobility, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, exercises, counter terrorism, and capacity-building of partners.
  12. As the security threats and challenges we are confronted with are evolving in scope and magnitude, we will take our partnership to the next level on the basis of our long-standing cooperation. We will further strengthen our cooperation in existing areas, and expand and deepen our cooperation to address in particular the growing geostrategic competition, resilience issues, protection of critical infrastructures, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, the security implications of climate change, as well as foreign information manipulation and interference.
  13. In signing this declaration we will take the NATO-EU partnership forward in close consultation and cooperation with all NATO Allies and EU Member States, in the spirit of full mutual openness and in compliance with the decision-making autonomy of our respective organisations and without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any of our members. In this context, we view transparency as crucial. We encourage the fullest possible involvement of the NATO Allies that are not members of the EU in its initiatives. We encourage the fullest possible involvement of the EU members that are not part of the Alliance in its initiatives.
  14. We will assess progress on a regular basis.

Signed at Brussels on 10 January 2023 in triplicate.

Charles Michel
President of the European Council

Ursula von der Leyen
President of the European Commission

Jens Stoltenberg
Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Council on Foreign Relations – Daily news brief Jan. 10, 2023

Top of the Agenda

Leaders of U.S., Canada, Mexico Meet 

U.S. President Joe Biden, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, and Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador are meeting in Mexico City (AP) for the North American Leaders’ Summit. Their discussions are expected to produce agreements (Reuters) on migration, semiconductors, climate change, and antidrug cooperation.
In a meeting between López Obrador and Biden yesterday, the two presidents pledged to step up cooperation (Reuters) on curbing fentanyl trafficking to the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. business leaders have voiced concern over López Obrador’s policies favoring state control in the economy. U.S.-Mexico trade increased by 19 percent (WaPo) in the first eleven months of 2022 as U.S. companies moved business away from China.
Tiếp tục đọc “Council on Foreign Relations – Daily news brief Jan. 10, 2023”

Counci on Foreign Relations – Daily news brief Jan. 9, 2023

Daily News BriefJanuary 9, 2023
Top of the Agenda

Bolsonaro Supporters Attack Government Buildings in Brazil

Brazilian police arrested at least three hundred people after thousands of supporters of former President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalized (AP) Brazil’s Congress, Supreme Court, and presidential palace yesterday in scenes reminiscent of the January 6, 2021, attack on the U.S. Capitol. The rioters protested the results of last year’s presidential election, which Bolsonaro lost to left-wing former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Bolsonaro has for years pushed false claims about the credibility of Brazil’s election system, and many of his supporters say the 2022 election was stolen from him.
Multiple world leaders condemned the events (NYT) and voiced support for Lula, who said there was “incompetence or bad faith” on behalf of police who allowed the events to unfold. Bolsonaro, believed to be in Florida, tweeted a condemnation (NYT) of the attack several hours after it began.
Tiếp tục đọc “Counci on Foreign Relations – Daily news brief Jan. 9, 2023”

Taking the US-India relationship to the next level

By David Santoro and Akhil Ramesh

David Santoro (david@pacforum.org) is President and CEO of the Pacific Forum. Follow him on Twitter @DavidSantoro1
Akhil Ramesh (akhil@pacforum.org) is Senior Resident Fellow at Pacific Forum.

The relationship with India is “the most important for the United States in the 21st century,” said Kurt Campbell, the Biden administration’s National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific, last month. President Biden made similar comments earlier in 2022, and the recently published US strategic reviews also talk about the importance of India. The US National Security Strategy, for instance, states that, “As India is the world’s largest democracy and a Major Defense Partner, the United States and India will work together, bilaterally and multilaterally, to support our shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific.”
 
Numerous reasons explain this enthusiasm for US-India rapprochement. Even though differences between the two countries are many (notably development level), similarities also abound. Both are big countries with a large and diverse population, both are democracies and both have vibrant civil societies and incredibly innovative communities, especially in technology.
  Tiếp tục đọc “Taking the US-India relationship to the next level”

10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is still reverberating around the world—and setting the stage for more large-scale violence to come.

JANUARY 1, 2023, 7:00 AM Foreign Policy

Ukrainian soldiers fire toward Russian positions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.
Ukrainian soldiers fire toward Russian positions in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine.

By Comfort Ero, the president and CEO of the International Crisis Group, and Richard Atwood, executive vice president of the International Crisis Group.

Will he, or won’t he? This time last year, that was the question. Russian President Vladimir Putin had massed almost two hundred thousand troops on Ukraine’s borders. U.S. intelligence warned that Russia was preparing for all-out war. All the signs pointed to an assault, bar one: It seemed unthinkable.

True, Russia had attacked Ukraine in 2014, and in the spring of 2021 had staged a dress rehearsal for an invasion, building up forces on the frontier before sending them home. Putin seemed ever angrier at Kyiv’s refusal to bow to his will. He openly derided Ukrainian national identity and sovereignty. Still, it was shocking, when Russian forces did roll in, that a nuclear-armed power in 2022 would seek to conquer a neighbor in an act of unprovoked aggression.

Tiếp tục đọc “10 Conflicts to Watch in 2023”

The Consequences of Divided Government for U.S. Foreign Policy

The Water’s Edge January 4, 2023, Council on Foreign Relations

by James M. Lindsay


President Joe Biden delivers his first State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress in March 2022.
Chip Somodevilla/REUTERS


Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street – New York, NY 10065  |  |  |  |  Forward This Email Manage Your Email Preferences

Divided government is back! After two years of Democratic control of the presidency and both houses of Congress—just barely in the case of the Senate—the 118th Congress that opened yesterday puts Republicans in charge of the U.S. House of Representatives. A single party has controlled the White House and Congress only three times in the last three decades.

So what will divided government mean for U.S. foreign policy? Here are three things to watch. Tiếp tục đọc “The Consequences of Divided Government for U.S. Foreign Policy”

Council on Foreign Relations – Daily News Brief Jan. 3, 2023

Top of the Agenda

IMF Director Warns One-Third of World Could Face Recession This Year

For most of the global economy, 2023 will be “tougher than the year we leave behind,” International Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva said in a CBS interview. She said the economies of the United States, China, and the European Union (EU) are all slowing down. While Georgieva said the United States “may avoid a recession,” the Wall Street Journal found that more than two-thirds of economists at twenty-three large financial institutions are projecting a U.S. recession this year. Georgieva also said that the war in Ukraine and COVID-19 will continue to strain the economies of the EU and China, respectively. She added that countries should work to secure their supply chains but warned that dividing the global economy into U.S. and Chinese blocs could “chop $1.5 trillion” from global gross domestic product (GDP) each year. 
Tiếp tục đọc “Council on Foreign Relations – Daily News Brief Jan. 3, 2023”

China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 

CNN Nectar Gan, Jessie Yeung and Laura He ---------- Passengers pull suitcases at a departure lobby in the Beijing international airport on December 27, 2022. After a tumultuous end to a momentous and challenging year, China heads into 2023 with a great deal of uncertainty – and potentially a glimpse of light at the end of the pandemic tunnel.  The chaos unleashed by leader Xi Jinping’s abrupt and ill-prepared exit from zero-Covid is spilling over into the new year, as large swathes of the country face an unprecedented Covid wave.  But the haphazard reopening also offers a glimmer of hope for many: after three years of stifling Covid restrictions and self-imposed global isolation, life in China may finally return to normal as the nation joins the rest of the world in learning to live with the virus.  “We have now entered a new phase of Covid response where tough challenges remain,” Xi said in a nationally televised New Year’s Eve speech. “Everyone is holding on with great fortitude, and the light of hope is right in front of us. Let’s make an extra effort to pull through, as perseverance and solidarity mean victory.”  Tiếp tục đọc “China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 “

A/77/494: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human right in Myanmar

PUBLISHED

03 October 2022

UN SYMBOL

A/77/494

FOCUS

Myanmar

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_________________

SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN MYANMAR

A former member of the US Congress from Maine, Tom Andrews is a Robina Senior Human Rights Fellow at Yale University Law School, an Associate of Harvard University’s Asia Center and has a Washington DC based consulting practice, Andrews Strategic Services. He has worked with the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs and parliamentarians, NGOs and political parties in several countries including Cambodia, Indonesia, Algeria, Croatia, Serbia, Ukraine and Yemen.

Andrews served as General Secretary of “The Nobel Peace Laureate Campaign for Aung San Suu Kyi and the People of Burma” in 2001 and was a consultant for the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and the Euro-Burma Network. He has run advocacy NGOs including Win Without War and United to End Genocide, led an education institute at the University of Maine and served in the Maine House of Representatives and the Maine Senate. He lives with his wife and son in Fairfax, Virginia outside of Washington DC.

The mandate of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar was first established in 1992 under the Commission on Human Rights Resolution 58 and extended annually. Human Rights Resolution 25/26 adopted 15 April 2014 broadened the mandate to report on the progress in the electoral process and reform in the run-up to the 2015 election. Human Rights Resolution 31/24 adopted 24 March 2016 broadened the mandate to include identifying benchmarks for progress and priority areas for technical assistance and capacity-building. 

_____________

In July 2022, the military junta of Myanmar executed four political prisoners, including a prominent pro – democracy activist and a former member of parliament.

These unconscionable acts are consistent with the junta’s unflinching embrace of violence against the people of Myanmar. In recent months, military forces have systematically bombed and burned villages and massacred innocent civilians, including 11 children in Sagaing Region who were shot and killed when junta forces attacked their school in September. The forces have killed thousands and displaced nearly 1 million people since the coup. Many of the more than 12,000 political prisoners have been tortured and an unknown number have died in custody.

In the midst of this darkness, however, civil society in Myanmar is a shining light and inspiration. Activists, human rights defenders, aid workers, community leaders, journalists, health – care professionals and educators are among those who are taking great personal risks to document atrocities, deliver humanitarian assistance and respond to the needs of displaced and traumatized communities. Human rights organizations, women’s associations, professional networks, trade unions and labour activists, and grass – roots groups are adopting strategies to remain safe and effective in a deadly environment. In many cases, individuals and organizations are operating with little international support and few opportunities to communicate with the outside world.

In the present report, the Special Rapporteur outlines the human rights and humanitarian catastrophe in Myanmar. He also describes the essential and aweinspiring work being done by Myanmar civil society in the most challenging of circumstances. He calls on the international community to view civil society in Myanmar as a vital partner in addressing the crisis in the country, working with grassroots networks to deliver aid and increasing financial and technical support to civil society organizations.

The fate of Myanmar depends on the activists, organizations and networks that have risen to defy military rule, defend human rights and prepare for a free and democratic future. They need and deserve a significant increase in support from the international community.

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Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar

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General Assembly, Seventy-seventh session

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Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar

Vietnam rings in 2023

By Staff reporters       DEC. 31, 2022

As the clock struck midnight, crowds across the country burst out in cheers, applauses and exchanged hugs as the fireworks exploded to welcome the new year.

Bangkok, Hanoi, Jakarta (GMT+7)

OldestLatest

  • 00h10Fireworks explode in Saigon
    z4004356181122-cc457fd3bda10cb-6527-5247Fireworks explode over the Saigon River. Photo by Quynh Tranz4004356195860-9c38aa1af747923-3377-9391Fireworks explode over the Saigon River. Photo by Quynh Tranz4004328932520-42748386b323e18-4654-6186People capture photos of exploding fireworks in HCMC. Photo by Thanh TungA girl sits on her parent's neck to watch the fireworks. Photo by Thanh TungA girl sits on her parent’s neck to watch the fireworks. Photo by Thanh Tung
  • Tiếp tục đọc “Vietnam rings in 2023”

2022 PacNet Commentary Index



2022 PacNet Commentary Index

The comprehensive 2022 index includes each PacNet commentary below.  Pacific Forum will continue to publish timely insight and analysis in 2023.
1. The limits of a securitized Japanese FOIP Vision by Stephen Nagy
2. Balancing accessibility and quality in Blue Dot Network infrastructure finance by John Taishu Pitt
3. Abe was key to the Indo-Pacific’s evolution by Brad Glosserman
4. Comparative Connections Summary: January 2022
5. AUKUS’ opportunities and risks for India by Manpreet Sethi
6. What happens in Ukraine will not stay in Ukraine by Sergiy Korsunsky
7. China’s growing confidence in drone warfare by Loro Horta
8. Back to the past: The significance of Russia and China’s joint statement by Yu Bin
9. Biden struggles as China advances in Southeast Asia by Robert Sutter
10. Is the US capable of shaping a rules-based international order?’ by Robert A. Manning
11. Nuclear submarines for our Pacific allies: When to say yes by Henry Sokolski
12. Ukraine: China’s latest strategic blunder by Ralph A. Cossa
13.What the Indo-Pacific sees in Ukraine by Stephen Nagy
134. What the war in Ukraine means for Taiwan by Denny Roy
15.Ukraine: A turning point in Japanese foreign policy? by Kristi Govella
16. South Korea’s presidential election aftermath: Ukraine as test for a “global pivotal state” by Mason Richey
17. Ukraine: After invasion, what? by David Santoro
18. Ukraine and the decoupling of space cooperation with Russia by Philip Citowicki
19. Myanmar: Words like “genocide” have consequences by David I. Steinberg
20. After Ukraine – Enacting a realistic Japanese diplomatic security policy by Hideshi Futori
21. India’s strategic autonomy: A lesson for Japan by Tomoko Kiyota
22. Feminist foreign policy and Ukraine: For now, Japan leads the way by Hannah Cole, Maryruth Belsey-Priebe and Tevvi Bullock
23. May is a major opportunity for US relations with Asia—especially economically by James A. Kelly
24. Why it’s so hard to quit Chinese steel by Akash Sahu
25. A Black Sea humanitarian food corridor to Odessa by Charles E. Morrison
26. Why South Koreans see little difference in Biden’s North Korea policy by Timothy S. Rich, Ian Milden and Mallory Hardesty
27. What Yoon Suk Yeol’s election means for minority rights in South Korea by Eun A Jo
28. Comparative Connections Summary: May 2022
29. Hints of a new North Korea nuclear strategy by Brad Glosserman
30. Australia’s election: Quad continuity and climate alignment, with nuclear disagreements by Graeme Dobell
31. Should the United States acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China? by David Santoro
32. Scholarships in the Pacific Islands are an urgent US national security issue by Kimery Lynch
33. China cannot hinder international navigation through Taiwan Strait by Tran Đinh Hoanh
34. Why ASEAN should heed the distant tolling of bells by Patrick O’Connor
35. Abe Shinzo and the Japan-South Korea relationship: Near- and long-term legacies by Jada Fraser
36. Post-Abe Indo-Pacific regional dynamics: A legacy beyond the man by Stephen Nagy
37. Abe’s death creates a void in Japan by Brad Glosserman
38. China’s “containment” policy against America by Denny Roy
39. Abe Shinzo’s legacy in Southeast Asia by Kei Koga
40. Abe Shinzo: How to handle an unpredictable America by Rob York
41. Another “hotline” with China isn’t the answer by Lyle J. Morris and Colonel Kyle Macrum
42. Their money our way: Influencing highly capable allies and partners by Lieutenant Colonel Jason Kim
43. Post-Abe India-Japan ties: Does Kishida have what it takes? by Jagannath Panda
44. “Hybrid multilateralism” and the Yoon pursuit of middle power strategy by Shin-wha Lee
45. The prescience of Abe’s vision for Taiwan by Shihoko Goto
46. Correcting the Narrative on China’s “New Era-gance”: Taipei, Washington, and many are angry at Beijing’s bullying by Shirley Kan
47. Time for difficult choices on Myanmar by Gregory B. Poling
48. Are small modular reactors the solution to growing energy and climate problems? by David Santoro
49. Continued evolutions in the regional architecture of the Indo-Pacific by Thomas Wilkins
50. China’s new (old) Taiwan white paper: What’s the point? by Jake Steiner
51. Five years after the Rohingya exodus, no significant development by Mufassir Rashid
52.The first year of Japan’s Digital Agency: In pursuit of coherence and identity by Raymond Yamamoto
53. How the United States can build a chip alliance in Northeast Asia without decoupling by Major Jessica Taylor and Jonathan Corrado
54. Comparative Connections Summary: September 2022
55. Understanding Japan’s defense debate by Brad Glosserman
56. Employing “smart power” to counter PRC efforts in Oceania by Peter C. Oleson
57. What Indo-Pacific countries should do about Taiwan by Huynh Tam Sang
58. The strategic importance of the Pacific Islands to Taiwan by Michael Walsh and John Hemmings
59. How the new National Security Strategy transforms US China policy by Brad Glosserman
60.The Myth of Taiwan as a Pacific Nation by Michael Walsh, Wen-Chi Yang, Adam Morrow
61.The new National Security Strategy in the context of an unstated “cold war” by John Hemmings
62. Myanmar’s emerging national identity could change everything by Wayland Blue
63. AUKUS: Stepping boldly into space by Philip Citowicki
64. The Biden-Xi summit: Not revolutionary, but still necessary by Daniel R. DePetris
65. To change Taiwan’s conscription system, change the culture by Claire Tiunn (Chang)
66. Finally at the table, not on the menu: Canada launches its Indo-Pacific strategy by Stephen Nagy
67. After Ukraine, the need for a collectively framed new order by Ron Huisken
68. South Korea’s role in a Taiwan contingency: Indirect but essential by Sungmin Cho

PacNet commentaries and responses represent the views of the respective authors. Alternative viewpoints are always welcomed and encouraged. Click here to request a PacNet subscription.ShareTweetForward

Browse through the September 2022 issue of Comparative Connections.