CSIS
Indonesia, this year’s Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair, held a flurry of ministerial meetings earlier this month. From July 11-12, it hosted the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Jakarta. Timor Leste, which became an ASEAN observer state last year, sent a delegation for the first time. Chief among the ministers’ conversation topics was the ongoing civil war in Myanmar; moreover, ministers shared their continued concerns regarding aggressive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea. On July 13, ASEAN foreign ministers, joined by their counterparts from Japan, China, and South Korea, met for the 24th ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Lastly, Indonesia hosted the ASEAN Regional Forum on July 14, setting the stage for ASEAN partners such as the United States, Russia, and China, to meet on the sidelines.
Ahead of these meetings, Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi maintained that ASEAN credibility is only possible through maintaining ASEAN unity and centrality. Myanmar remains a divisive issue among ASEAN partners, testing the bloc’s ability to reach a consensus. Myanmar could not send a delegation due to the junta’s refusal to abide by the five-point consensus. Disagreements on content and language delayed the ministers’ communique on Myanmar. These disagreements ride on the coattails of ongoing quarrels between ASEAN member states, which have different stances on addressing the situation in Myanmar. Last month, Thailand invited ASEAN officials to meet with chief junta members. ASEAN members largely snubbed the controversial meeting. Cambodia sent a junior diplomat; meanwhile, other countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, did not send a delegation at all.
The South China Sea was another key topic during the ministerial meetings. ASEAN ministers continued to express their concern over land reclamation, military activities, and ongoing incidents in the South China Sea that contribute to marine environment degradation and increased tensions in the region. In their discussions, China and ASEAN nations agreed to “accelerate” negotiations on the long-sought code of conduct for the South China Sea. China’s foreign affairs chief Wang Yi recommended they conclude talks in three years. This has been met with skepticism since he set the same three-year goal in 2018. Even if a code is reached, it is unlikely to contain the kind of details and enforceability that would curb China’s aggressive behavior at sea.
The ASEAN Regional Forum also provided an opportunity for great power dialogue—Russia, China, and the United States sent delegations. Conversations between the U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken and Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov were generally unproductive. Blinken also met with Wang Yi for another round of talks intended to steer how the two powers could navigate the increasingly complicated state of U.S.-China competition.
This update was compiled by Japhet Quitzon. For more political, economic, and security analysis on the region, check out our blog series, The Latest on Southeast Asia. To hear the latest news on the region and hear from Southeast Asia experts, listen and subscribe to the Southeast Asia Radio podcast on any streaming platform.
Spotlight: Thailand
by Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Southeast Asia Program
On July 19, Thailand’s parliament voted against the renomination of Move Forward Party leader Pita Limjaroenrat for the position of prime minister, despite the party securing the most seats in the May 2023 election. This decision came after Pita was blocked from assuming the prime minister’s office during the first round of voting on July 13. Parliament’s rejection of the renomination officially has ruled out Pita’s possibility of becoming Thailand’s next prime minister.
Simultaneously, Thailand’s Constitutional Court suspended Pita from working as a member of parliament due to an ongoing ruling examining his eligibility to run in the election. The case alleges that Pita’s ownership of shares in a now-defunct media company violated Thailand’s electoral rules.
Adding to Pita’s case, the court accepted a petition that accuses the Move Forward Party of attempting to overthrow the country’s democratic system with the king as the head of state by proposing to amend section 112 of Thailand’s criminal code, known as the lèse-majesté law. Should the court rule in favor, the party might face dissolution, and its executive committee members, including Pita, could be barred from politics for up to 10 years, similar to what its predecessor, the Future Forward Party, experienced.
The schedule for the third round of voting and the subsequent nominee remains uncertain. However, there is a high possibility that Srettha Thavisin, a candidate from the Pheu Thai Party, which secured the second most seats, will be nominated. Yet, the future of the Move Forward Party within a new Pheu Thai-led coalition remains uncertain. Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of the Bhumjaithai Party and Thailand’s current minister of public health, has already indicated that his party will not support any prime minister candidate as long as the Move Forward Party remains in the coalition.
Thailand held a general election on May 14, 2023, in which the Move Forward Party emerged with the most seats in the parliament. However, according to the country’s constitution, the prime minister must be elected by the parliament, consisting of 500 elected members of the House of Representatives and 250 military-appointed senators. These latest developments in Thai politics reveal how the establishment can intervene to shape the country’s direction.
Pongkwan Sawasdipakdi is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Spotlight: Malaysia
by Sophie Lemière, Adjunct Fellow (Non-resident), Southeast Asia Program
Malaysian state elections in Penang, Kedah, Kelantan, Terengganu, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan will be held on August 12, 2023. A total of 245 seats will be contested by 9.77 million eligible voters, of which a little over 50 percent are women. Among eligible voters, 28.9 percent are between the ages of 18-29 years old, and 51.1 percent are aged 18-39. The highest numbers of young voters are in Selangor, Kedah, and Kelantan.
While the election outcomes will not directly cause a change in government, the optics of inroads made by the opposition in territories traditionally held by Pakatan Harapan (PH) would further challenge the ruling coalition. The alliance between PH and Barisan Nasional (BN) to form government in November 2022 has revealed itself to be a fragile formula. And the resistance of United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) supporters to reconcile with the fact that their long-term enemy, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP), is now their coalition partner is at the source of disbelief and frustration about the nature of this alliance. The cohesion of the PH election machine is rendered extremely complex by the abyssal differences of political cultures and electoral practices that exist between the two coalitions.
While the campaign will only officially start on July 29, attacks have launched across the political spectrum. Anwar’s attempts to promote his economic policies and to legitimize his “principled” UMNO partner seem unconvincing to the Malay heartlands. The opposition Perikatan Nasional (PN), which is led by Bersatu and includes Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS), continues to fire at Anwar’s alleged homosexuality. While the prime minister is not directly affected by the opposition’s bad faith attacks, the LGBTQI+ community is collateral damage of this political game and suffers from increased social and legal prejudice. PN appeals to the Malay majority though its Malay-ethnocentrism, annihilating all chances for non-Malays to consider supporting one of its member parties. PN’s recent alliance with former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad has added fuel to an already ultra-Malay discourse, intensifying narratives on the victimization of the Malay majority and teasing the fire of ethno-religious divisions.
While the northern states are expected to remain with the opposition, the challenge for PH will be to minimize opposition gains in its strongholds of Penang and Selangor. Meanwhile, Negeri Sembilan’s unique matriarchal lineage system might be the best rampart against what has been described as “the green wave” of support for the Islamist PAS. To Khairy Jamaluddin, the UMNO superstar turned radio DJ now courted by the PN opposition for his political weight, the “green wave” is instead a tsunami of discontent over a lack of economic direction.
Recent charges held against Kedah chief minister and opposition leader Muhammad Sanusi Md Nor for a political speech are seen as a desperate attempt to silence a popular PN leader. On July 18, Sanusi was charged on two counts of sedition for his statements criticizing the government’s attempts to legitimize the PH-UMNO “unity” alliance, labeling it as the king’s choice. Former law minister Zaid Ibrahim, former Bar Council president and founder of electoral watchdog Bersih Ambiga Sreenevasan, and several NGOs, including Lawyers for Liberty, are challenging Anwar’s past promises to never use against his opponents the draconian laws previously used against him, including the sedition law. This political move will certainly cost Anwar more animosity from Malay voters who, despite the depth of their cultural reverence for the king, will only throw more support to Sanusi, now a political “martyr.”
In the light of these elections, the Anwar government’s reforms have stuttered, and while promising announcements have been made, they have yet to translate into effective policies. These elections are a plebiscite for Anwar’s controversial mandate, and their outcomes could set a new tone in Malaysian politics for years to come.
Sophie Lemière is an adjunct fellow (non-resident) with the Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.
Podcast Episode: South China Sea Updates with Natalie Sambhi and Harrison Prétat
Greg and Elina, joined by Natalie Sambhi and Harrison Prétat, give an update on the state of play in the South China Sea. Japhet is joined by Ramil Mercado, Intern with the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS, to cover the latest from the region.
Listen to the episode here, and join us for Southeast Asia Radio every other Thursday, wherever you get your podcasts.
Commentary: Where Is Vietnam on the Sino-U.S. Spectrum?
July 2023 marks two decades of Vietnam’s grand strategic adjustment (a change within a grand strategy) of cooperation and struggle, which was expected to position the country equidistantly between China and the United States. Like other Southeast Asian capitals, Hanoi does not want to choose a side. However, even after 20 years of implementing the 2003 adjustment, Vietnam remains closer to the Chinese side of the Sino-U.S. spectrum.
Read the latest by Bich Tran (Adjunct Fellow, Non-resident, Southeast Asia Program) here.
Commentary: Remembering Myanmar’s Miserable May
This May marked the 15th anniversary of two tragic events in Myanmar. The first tragedy was the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis, a Category 4 storm that swept through central Myanmar on May 2, 2008. The second tragedy was the decision by the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the ruling military junta at the time, to hold a referendum in May 2008 on a new constitution for the nation. While the tragic consequences of Cyclone Nargis were immediately apparent, the damage done by the SPDC’s new constitution took more time to be revealed.
Read the latest by Michael Martin (Adjunct Fellow, Non-resident, Southeast Asia Program) here.
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