China is bad. At least, that’s what even a glance of U.S. reporting on China tells us. It’s a way of reporting that follows a long history of constructing the Chinese — in news, popular culture and the halls of DC — as a threat. In the first episode of Backspace, a new media critique series from AJ+, Sana Saeed explores what China and the Chinese have looked like in the American imagination, how that impacts and is impacted by U.S. immigration and foreign policies, and ways we can retell that story.
China’s People’s Liberation Army celebrates its centenary in 2027, what are its goals for this date? The PLA is already the largest army in the world with over 2 million soldiers. It also has the biggest number of warships. But China’s defense budget is still climbing amidst increasing geopolitical tensions. How exactly is the PLA “preparing for Dangerous Storms” as tasked by President Xi?
The new strategic partnership agreement opens the door to closer diplomatic, economic and technological cooperation with former foe — and China’s neighbor — Hanoi.
The deal adds to President Joe Biden’s string of successful diplomatic initiatives aimed to reassert U.S. influence in Asia in the face of China’s growing economic, diplomatic and military muscle in the region. | Alex Brandon/AP Photo
President Joe Biden will chalk up a fresh victory in his campaign to boost U.S. influence in the Indo-Pacific by sealing a deal with Vietnam next month aimed to draw Hanoi closer to Washington at a time of rising tensions with Beijing.
Biden will sign a strategic partnership agreement with Vietnam during a state visit to the Southeast Asian country in mid-September, according to three people with knowledge of the deal’s planning. They were granted anonymity because they weren’t authorized to speak on the record about the agreement.
The agreement will allow for new bilateral collaboration that will boost Vietnam’s efforts to develop its high technology sector in areas including semiconductor production and artificial intelligence.
NEW YORK; August 1, 2023, Asia Society – A new Task Force on U.S.-China Policy report, Prioritizing Southeast Asia in American China Policy, lays out reasons why Southeast Asia is a critically important but under-appreciated region when it comes to U.S. interests and U.S. competition with China, and recommends actions for the U.S. government, in the face of China’s growing influence in the region.
Sau 5 năm dài vắng bóng, Mỹ đã chính thức tái gia nhập Tổ chức Văn hóa, Khoa học và Giáo dục của Liên Hợp Quốc (UNESCO) vào ngày 30/6.
Trong một phiên họp bất thường hôm 30/6, 193 quốc gia thành viên của UNESCO đã phê duyệt đề xuất tái gia nhập tổ chức của Mỹ với 132 phiếu thuận và 10 phiếu chống.
Mỹ đã rút khỏi UNESCO vào năm 1984, dưới thời chính quyền Tổng thống Ronald Reagan, sau đó quay trở lại vào năm 2004.
Tuy nhiên, mối quan hệ của chính phủ Mỹ với UNESCO này trở nên căng thẳng vào tháng 10/2011, khi các thành viên của cơ quan này bỏ phiếu chấp nhận Palestine là thành viên của tổ chức.
Động thái này đã khiến Hoa Kỳ và đồng minh thân cận Israel tức giận, đồng thời buộc chính quyền của Barack Obama phải ngừng tài trợ cho cơ quan này. Năm 2017, Tổng thống Donald Trump tuyên bố, đất nước của ông sẽ rời khỏi UNESCO hoàn toàn với cáo buộc tổ chức này thiên vị và chống lại Israel. Mỹ và Israel sau đó đã chính thức rời UNESCO vào cuối năm 2018.
By Michael J. Green, the CEO of the United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney, and Paul Haenle, the director of Carnegie China.
As U.S.-China relations transition from an era of engagement to one of strategic competition, some in the Biden and former Trump administrations have claimed to be abandoning four decades of naive American assumptions about Beijing. Past U.S. policy, they say, was based on a futile view that engagement would lead to a democratic and cooperative China. This, however, is not only a misreading of past U.S. policies but also dangerous analytical ground upon which to build a new national security strategy.
The fact is that no administration since that of Richard Nixon has made U.S. security dependent on Chinese democratization. Every administration has combined engagement with strategies to counterbalance China through alliances, trade agreements, and U.S. military power. Throwing out all previous U.S. approaches to China would mean throwing out some of the most important tools the current administration relies on to compete with China. And the Biden administration will not get its China strategy right until it is clear about what has worked in the past.
This paper examines recent writings from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in order to highlight major themes and evolution in concepts of deterrence, strategic stability, and escalation control, particularly between 2017 and 2022.
PRC writings during this period display growing concern that innovations in military technology over the past several decades undermine strategic stability. Many PRC authors argue that the balance of military capabilities that enabled China to maintain a fairly small nuclear deterrent is becoming more fragile, and that as a result, Beijing can no longer be confident in its ability to deter other countries from attacking China with nuclear or other strategic weapons.
This paper provides a baseline for understanding, from a conceptual perspective, how PRC authors frame the challenges that these dynamics pose to China’s strategic deterrent and to strategic stability, and the implications they may have for Beijing’s approach to strategic capabilities.
KEY FINDINGS
STRATEGIC STABILITY, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
PRC writings link the concepts of strategic stability, strategic deterrence, and strategic capabilities. Although PRC authors do not explicitly employ an ends-ways-means construct, based on their discussions we may think of strategic stability as the ends, strategic deterrence as the ways, and strategic capabilities as the means.
In his first appearance before Congress on Thursday, TikTok CEO Shou Chew was grilled by lawmakers who expressed deep skepticism about his company’s attempts to protect US user data and ease concerns about its ties to China.
It was a rare chance for the public to hear from the Chew, who offers very few interviews. Yet his company’s app is among the most popular in America, with more than 150 million active users.
Here are the biggest takeaways from Thursday’s hearing.
Washington has already made up its mind about TikTok
The hearing, which lasted for more than five hours, kicked off with calls from a lawmaker to ban the app in the United States and remained combative throughout. It offered a vivid display of the bipartisan push to crack down on the popular short-form video app and the company’s uphill battle to improve relations with Washington.
Washington Republican Rep. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, the chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, opened Thursday’s hearing by telling Shou: “Your platform should be banned.”
Chew used his testimony to stress TikTok’s independence from China and play up its US ties. “TikTok itself is not available in mainland China, we’re headquartered in Los Angeles and Singapore, and we have 7,000 employees in the U.S. today,” he said in his opening remarks.
“Still, we have heard important concerns about the potential for unwanted foreign access to US data and potential manipulation of the TikTok US ecosystem,” Chew said. “Our approach has never been to dismiss or trivialize any of these concerns. We have addressed them with real action.”
There is a growing acceptance among countries in the Indo-Pacific region that strategic competition between the United States and China is changing perceptions about security and the adequacy of the existing security architecture. While some have characterized the competition between the two as a new Cold War, it is clear that what is happening in the region is far more complex than the competition that characterized the original Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. First, the economic integration that has taken place since the early 1990s makes it much more difficult to draw bright ideological lines between the two sides. Further, the Asian context of the emerging competition is one where the two competitors have grown to share power. As the dominant military power, the United States has been the primary security guarantor in Asia and beyond. China, on the other hand, has emerged over the past decades as the primary economic catalyst in Asia and beyond. Currently, each side seems increasingly unwilling to accept that arrangement.
Good morning everyone. Thank you, Suzanne, for that introduction, and thank you to the team at Brookings for organizing today’s discussion.
You know, when we first talked about doing an event tied to your Global China program, the topic was, in a sense, evergreen. We could have planned this conversation virtually anytime.
The People’s Republic of China, the challenges it poses, the stakes for global norms and values, the strategies and policy choices demanded from the United States and our partners — these questions have stood front and center from the moment President Biden took office.
[1/4] A woman works at a yarn weaving plant in Ha Nam province, outside Hanoi, Vietnam October 7, 2015. REUTERS/Kham/File
HANOI, Feb 14 (Reuters) – Concerned Vietnam-based exporters are seeking to ensure they comply with a U.S. ban on imported products using raw materials from China’s Xinjiang as lucrative trade in goods like garments and solar panels comes under closer scrutiny in Washington.
As U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai visits Vietnam this week, executives and other people familiar with the situation said some industries in Vietnam may be importing, sometimes unwittingly, raw material from Xinjiang – or might find it hard to prove they were not doing so.
Neither the United States nor China is prepared for a serious crisis.
The suspected Chinese spy balloon drifts to the ocean after being shot down off the coast in Surfside Beach, South Carolina, U.S. February 4, 2023. Randall Hill/Reuters
On Saturday afternoon, a U.S. Air Force F-22 fighter jet fired one missile into a high-altitude Chinese surveillance balloon, sending it plunging into the Atlantic Ocean and capping a stretch where the world’s most important bilateral relationship was dominated by a slowly moving object crossing the United States.
The incident raises questions about the extent to which China has been employing these balloons – and in the process violating U.S. territorial airspace and sovereignty – and why it has been doing so when its satellites could glean this information. Far more important, however, is what this says about the ability, or more accurately inability, of Washington and Beijing to manage a future crisis.
CVD 