Chuyên mục: ASIA

Green energy statecraft and Australia’s clean industry future

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

lowyinstitute.org Elizabeth Thurbon Oliver Yates

A new policy model that removes the risk in clean commodity innovation will put Australia ahead of the pack.

Australia will need to lead as global supply chains pivot towards low-emissions production (Getty Images)

Australia will need to lead as global supply chains pivot towards low-emissions production (Getty Images)

Published 9 Jul 2025  Australia Australian trade, investment & economy

As global supply chains pivot towards low-emissions production, Australia will need to lead, or risk being left behind. The country’s challenge is not a lack of technology, capital, or ambition. It’s a gap in policy architecture. Without bankable demand, Australia’s most promising clean commodity projects – green iron, sustainable aviation fuel, and clean ammonia – remain stuck at the starting line.

To meet that challenge, we propose a new demand-side policy model: the Clean Commodities Trading Initiative (CCTI) – a flagship example of green energy statecraft. At its heart is a new tool for national transformation: Clean Commodity Credits that reward innovation and emissions savings.

A market-friendly mechanism to kickstart large-scale clean production.

Green energy statecraft is a strategic approach to governance that uses the clean energy transition to simultaneously advance a nation’s economic, environmental, social, and geostrategic goals. Unlike conventional industry policy, which focuses on domestic market corrections, statecraft treats clean energy as key to national security and prosperity – used to build alliances, secure supply chains, boost productivity, and shape global rules.

The European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea are all pursuing variations of green energy statecraft. Australia must do the same – on its own terms, with tools suited to its advantages, institutions, and budget.

Tiếp tục đọc “Green energy statecraft and Australia’s clean industry future” →

Sào huyệt lừa đảo ở Đông Nam Á: Tội phạm Trung Quốc thống trị, gây thiệt hại hàng tỷ USD

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

vietnamfinance.com – 21/02/2025 08:30 (GMT+7)

(VNF) – Trong những năm gần đây, các hoạt động lừa đảo xuyên biên giới tại khu vực Đông Nam Á đã gia tăng mạnh mẽ, đặc biệt là những tổ chức lừa đảo có sự tham gia của các nhóm tội phạm Trung Quốc. Những tổ chức này không chỉ gây thiệt hại tài chính mà còn ảnh hưởng nghiêm trọng đến an ninh và trật tự xã hội của các quốc gia trong khu vực.

Các chiến dịch quốc tế nhằm đối phó với tình trạng này, bao gồm việc hồi hương hàng chục nghìn tội phạm lừa đảo về Trung Quốc, đã cho thấy sự tham gia của tội phạm nước này trong các vụ lừa đảo tại Đông Nam Á là rất lớn.

Theo một báo cáo mới đây của Trung tâm nghiên cứu chiến lược và quốc tế (CSIS, Mỹ), những hang ổ lừa đảo cắm rễ sau sự xuống dốc của lĩnh vực kinh doanh cờ bạc tại Đông Nam Á và gắn liền với các băng nhóm tội phạm người Trung Quốc.

Sau phong tỏa trong đại dịch Covid-19, nhiều khu casino và khách sạn bỏ trống đã biến thành các trung tâm lừa đảo qua mạng, nơi các nạn nhân buôn người bị chúng dụ dỗ và cưỡng ép đã lừa hàng tỷ USD từ nhiều người.

Các nghi phạm bị dẫn giải từ Myanmar về Trung Quốc tại cửa khẩu Mạnh Liên ở Vân Nam (Ảnh: XINHUA)

Tiếp tục đọc “Sào huyệt lừa đảo ở Đông Nam Á: Tội phạm Trung Quốc thống trị, gây thiệt hại hàng tỷ USD” →

How Southeast Asia Became Scam Hub For China-Linked Syndicates

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

There is a human trafficking crisis in Southeast Asia. The UN estimates that 120,000 people have been trafficked to scam centres in Myanmar and another 100,000 in Cambodia. Many of them are brought through the border with Thailand. The victims are often forced to work as scammers, defrauding billions of dollars from unsuspecting targets across the world. These scam syndicates have been linked to the Chinese mafia as well as local rebels in Myanmar.

How do these scam centres operate? Who are the trafficking victims and how did they end up in this predicament? How is Thailand’s economy suffering from these trafficking networks, and what is being done to stamp them out? Insight investigates.

00:00 Introduction

01:22 Chinese victim in Myanmar’s scam factory

03:34 Why Southeast Asia is breeding ground for scams

06:23 High-profile kidnap of Chinese actor

07:52 Why war-torn Myanmar attracts scam kingpins

13:26 Changing demographic of trafficked victims 15:23 What happens inside scam centres

23:47 The voluntary scammers

25:21 How scams work

29:34 Romance gone wrong

34:49 China’s role in scam crackdown

37:21 What’s Thailand doing to fight scammers

China is Southeast Asia’s biggest public funder of clean energy with US$2.7bn in investment

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

eco-business.com

Indonesia received the most funding from China over the last decade, according to a new report by Zero Carbon Analytics. But uncertainties caused by US-driven tariff plans could see Southeast Asian countries retract green investments, said an analyst.

Cirata floating solar Indonesia
China’s PowerChina Huadong Engineering Corporation Limited constructed the Cirata floating solar plant in West Java, Indonesia. Image: PLN Nusantara

By Hannah Alcoseba Fernande June 4, 2025

China is the leading source of public clean energy investments in Southeast Asia over the last decade, channeling over US$ 2.7 billion into projects across the region, according to a report by international research organisation Zero Carbon Analytics.

Tiếp tục đọc “China is Southeast Asia’s biggest public funder of clean energy with US$2.7bn in investment” →

Crimes Associated with Critical Minerals in Southeast Asia

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

UNICRI – United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

NEW UNICRI Report: Crimes Associated with Critical Minerals in Southeast Asia

As Southeast Asia’s role in global critical mineral supply chains grows, so does its exposure to criminal threats like environmental crimes, corruption, and illicit financial flows.

UNICRI’s latest publication analyzes how various actors exploit legal and enforcement gaps across the mineral value chain. It includes case studies on unlawful extraction, smuggling, and corruption-linked offenses.

🔍 Key criminal patterns identified:

  • Illegal mining operations
  • Corruption in licensing and environmental compliance
  • Smuggling and laundering of proceeds
  • Lack of supply chain transparency

🛡️ Recommendations to strengthen regional responses:

  • Enhance financial investigation and AML cooperation
  • Develop traceability tools and leverage complementary technologies such as satellite monitoring
  • Build enforcement capacity on mining-related crime
  • Promote inter-agency coordination
  • Empower Indigenous and local communities through strengthened FPIC implementation
  • Advance research on criminal methodologies in mineral supply chains

UNICRI supports collaboration among Member States and relevant stakeholders to promote secure, transparent, and sustainable mineral supply chains.​

📥 Read the report: https://bit.ly/4lHUBf3

May be a graphic of text

Why work-life balance is a struggle in Asia

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

South China Morning Post – 28-2-2025

The Tokyo government is set to introduce a four-day work week for its employees starting in April 2025, following a similar move made by Singapore in December. Governments and companies in Asia have generally been slower than their Western counterparts in taking steps to adopt a healthy work-life balance. For decades, Japan’s work culture has been synonymous with gruelling hours and self-sacrifice. Is Tokyo’s introduction of a four-day work week the start of a shift away from a culture of overwork in Japan and across the region, or is it just a pipe dream for Asia?

Why China fears an Indo-Pacific alliance

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

South China Morning Post – 10-7-2024

Japan and the Philippines have signed a historic defence agreement, allowing both countries to station troops on each other’s soil. The pact is the first of its kind for Japan in the region. At the same time, Tokyo and Manila have been strengthening their alliances with the US and its allies in the region, including South Korea, India and Australia. China, which seeks to extend and maintain its influence in the region, has denounced any alliance-building. Why has the latest agreement sounded alarm bells in Beijing?

Getting Them On Board: Partners and Avenues for European Engagement in Indo-Pacific Maritime Security

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies

January 30, 2024 Download PDF

How should Europe strengthen its engagement with the Indo-Pacific? While the continent is highly dependent on trade from the region, it has limited capabilities to protect its interests in the face of growing Sino-American competition. This new HCSS report by Paul van Hooft, Benedetta Girardi and Alisa Hoenig examines how European states can engage in the Indo-Pacific by deepening cooperation with regional powers.

The Indo-Pacific comprises many actors, which are positioned along key chokepoints and share geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in protecting crucial sea lines of communication with Europe. This report does two things to establish pathways for deeper European engagement with Indo-Pacific states:

  • Based on relevance for maritime security and political affinity with European countries, it assesses the suitability of regional states as partners. Besides the usual suspects Australia, Japan and South Korea, it identifies an “inbetweener” group of countries, with whom cooperation can be fruitful but is not guaranteed, and states with whom engagement is unlikely to yield beneficial results.
  • It then zooms in on the “inbetweeners” to determine pathways for deepening ties. By comparing bilateral relations between different European and Indo-Pacific states along security, trade and investment, and capacity-building and infrastructure, the authors identify relative strengths and weaknesses of European states. Finally, they also contrast Europe’s involvement with that of China and the United States.

Based on the analysis, the report recommends to strengthen European collaboration with more ambivalent Indo-Pacific states, with a focus on trade and investment and capacity-building in the short- to medium-term.

This report is published by the HCSS Europe and the Indo-Pacific Hub (EIPH), and part of the series Guarding the Maritime Commons.

Authors: Benedetta Girardi, Paul van Hooft and Alisa Hoenig. Contributors: Giovanni Cisco.

The research for and production of this report has been conducted within the PROGRESS research framework agreement. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed, rests solely with the authors and does not constitute, nor should be construed as, an endorsement by the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

No piracy report in Asian seas but ship robberies increase by 19 per cent in Southeast Asian waters: Report

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

telegraphindia.com

Though the 100 incidents in 2023 increased by 19 per cent over 2022, these were small-time robberies, with theft of items such as nominal value wires, brass ship products, engine spares and scraps, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery, says executive director

PTI Singapore Published 09.01.24, 06:06 PM

Representational picture.

Representational picture.File picture

No report of piracy incidents occurred on the Asian high seas but 99 actual incidents and one attempted armed robbery against ships occurred in Southeast Asian waters in 2023, a Singapore based maritime organisation reported said on Tuesday.

Though the 100 incidents in 2023 increased by 19 per cent over 2022, these were small-time robberies, with theft of items such as nominal value wires, brass ship products, engine spares and scraps, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) executive director Krishnaswamy Natarajan said at the annual press conference.

Such incidents were five in India in 2023, the same as those in 2022, while Bangladesh and Malaysia reported one incident each, compared to five and two incidents in 2022, respectively.

Reviewing the year, Natarajan pointed out that the increase in incidents occurred in Indonesia, the Philippines, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), Thailand and Vietnam.

Of concern was the occurrence of incidents in SOMS with 63 incidents compared to 55 incidents in 2022, said the former Director General of Indian Coast Guard.

In the Sulu-Celebes Seas, there was no report of the abduction of crew for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was achieved through the concerted efforts of the Philippine and Malaysian authorities, he highlighted.

As part of the Centre’s continuous efforts to ensure that the evolving needs of the shipping industry are met, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) launched various initiatives in 2023, to keep the shipping community abreast of the latest piracy and ARAS situation in Asia and to facilitate ship masters in the timely reporting of incidents to the nearest coastal State.

The initiatives include the launch of the ReCAAP Data Visualisation Map and Panel (Re-VAMP) — an interactive dashboard to enable the viewing and analytics of past and current incidents of piracy and ARAS in Asia.

The initiative also includes the production of a poster containing the guidelines and updated contact details of law enforcement agencies of the littoral States of the SOMS; and engagement of the shipping industry through various events including conferences, forums and shipping dialogue sessions, he elaborated.

Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by The Telegraph Online staff and has been published from a syndicated feed.

Vietnam 2023 economic growth slows to 5.05% as exports fall

~ Thiều Linh ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

By Khanh Vu

December 29, 20237:59 AM GMT Updated 7 days ago

A man paints steel structures of a new factory in Hanoi

HANOI, Dec 29 (Reuters) – Vietnam’s economic growth slowed to 5.05% this year from an expansion of 8.02% last year, official data showed on Friday, weighed by weak global demand while public investment stalled amid an intensified anti-graft crackdown.

This year’s gross domestic product (GDP) growth was below a government target of 6.5% and lower than average growth of 5.87% during the previous decade, according to data released by the government’s General Statistics Office (GSO).

Vietnam is a regional manufacturing hub that relies heavily on trade. Exports in 2023 fell 4.4% from last year to $355.5 billion, with shipments of smartphones, its largest foreign currency earner, dropping 8.3%, the GSO said in its report.

Tiếp tục đọc “Vietnam 2023 economic growth slows to 5.05% as exports fall” →

Phản ứng của các nước Đông Nam Á trước xung đột Israel-Hamas

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Nghiên cứu Quốc tế – 03/01/2024

Một cuộc chiến xa xôi lại có sức ảnh hưởng mạnh mẽ đến một khu vực thường bị chia rẽ bởi tôn giáo.

Nguồn: Joseph Rachman, “Gaza Is a Burning Topic for Southeast Asia’s Domestic Politics,” Foreign Policy, 29/12/2023

Biên dịch: Nguyễn Thị Kim Phụng

Tại Indonesia, một ứng viên tổng thống và bộ trưởng ngoại giao đã phát biểu về cuộc chiến ở Gaza trước hàng trăm nghìn người biểu tình. Tại Malaysia, thủ tướng, đội khăn keffiyeh của người Palestine, đã dẫn đầu cuộc biểu tình của riêng mình, mô tả tình hình Gaza là “điên rồ” và “đỉnh cao của sự man rợ.” Còn tại Singapore, chính phủ cấm treo cờ của hai bên tham chiến.

Tại Thái Lan và Philippines, sự cảm thông dành cho các nạn nhân dân thường người Palestine đi kèm với sự tức giận trước việc nhiều công dân Thái Lan và Philippines đã bị Hamas giết hoặc bắt làm con tin. Trong khi tại Việt Nam, Lào, và Campuchia, các chính phủ đã thận trọng đưa ra những tuyên bố trung lập về Gaza – dù ký ức về trải nghiệm bị ném bom của các quốc gia này đang dần nổi lên.

Tiếp tục đọc “Phản ứng của các nước Đông Nam Á trước xung đột Israel-Hamas” →

Southeast Asia’s Clean Energy Transition: A Role for nuclear Power?

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Edited by David Santoro & Carl Baker

Read & Download >>

TABLE OF CONTENTS


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
David Santoro & Carl Baker 1
1 INDONESIA POWER SECTOR
Elrika Hamdi 5
2 MALAYSIA ENERGY LANDSCAPE AND REQUIREMENTS 2022-2050
Sabar Hashim 19
3 MYANMAR’S ENERGY LANDSCAPE
Shwe Yee Oo 39
4 RE-ENERGIZING THE PHILIPPINES’ NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM: OPPORTUNITIES
AND CHALLENGES
Julius Cesar Trajano 59
5 SINGAPORE’S ENERGY JOURNEY: NET-ZERO, NEW PERSPECTIVES & NUCLEAR?
Denise Cheong & Victor Nian 75
6 THAILAND’S ENERGY LANDSCAPE AND THE POTENTIAL ROLE AND PLACE OF
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY
Doongnyapong Wongsawaeng 93
7 ENERGY LANDSCAPE AND REQUIREMENTS OF VIETNAM
Nguyen Nhi Dien 107
ABOUT THE AUTHORS 127

Read & Download >>

Singapore energy appetite fuels ASEAN’s renewable power grid

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

asia.nikkei.com

Network taps Laos hydropower, solar and wind energy from Indonesia and Vietnam

Wind farms in southern Vietnam have the potential to generate 600 gigawatts of power, according to one estimate. (Photo obtained by Nikkei)

YUJI NITTA, Nikkei staff writerSeptember 20, 2023 06:02 JST

HANOI — A web of international renewable energy deals is spreading across Southeast Asia as the region works to transition away from fossil fuels, with electricity-hungry Singapore as a driving force.

The city-state, where natural gas makes up around 95% of the energy mix, aims to import 4 gigawatts of low-carbon electricity by 2035, equivalent to 30% of its supply. This ambitious plan, in turn, is creating an opportunity for neighboring nations that are expanding power generation from renewable sources.

Imports kicked off in 2022 with the start of hydropower transmission from Laos via Thailand and Malaysia, totaling 100 megawatts over two years. Regulators have approved plans to bring in 2 GW from five solar projects in Indonesia, and the country will also buy power from a floating solar farm off Indonesia’s coast.

Tiếp tục đọc “Singapore energy appetite fuels ASEAN’s renewable power grid” →

Regional Overview: Building Partnerships Amidst Major Power Competition

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

 May — Aug 2023

 Download Article as PDF

By Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman

Published September 2023 in Comparative Connections · Volume 25, Issue 2 (This article is extracted from Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal of Bilateral Relations in the Indo-Pacific, Vol. 25, No. 2, September 2023. Preferred citation: Ralph A. Cossa and Brad Glosserman, “Regional Overview: Building Partnerships Amidst Major Power Competition,” Comparative Connections, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp 1-24.)

CONNECT WITH THE AUTHORS

Ralph A. Cossa

Pacific Forum

Brad Glosserman

Tama University CRS/Pacific Forum

Major power competition was the primary topic du jure at virtually all of this trimester’s major multilateral gatherings, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continuing to serve as a litmus test—a test many participants struggled to avoid taking. It was clear which side of the fence the G7 leaders stood on; Putin’s invasion was soundly condemned and Sino-centric warning bells were again gently sounded. At the BRICS Summit and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (sans the US), those alarms were clearly muted, as they were at the ASEAN Regional Forum, at which foreign ministers from all three were present. Headlines from the IISS Shangri-la Dialogue focused on the meeting that did not occur, as China’s defense minister pointedly refused to meet with his US counterpart. At the ASEAN-ISIS’ Asia-Pacific Roundtable, participants lamented the impact of major power tensions on ASEAN unity, even though ASEAN’s main challenges are internal ones that predate the downturn in China-US relations. Meanwhile, Beijing and Washington both expended considerable effort at these and other events throughout the reporting period fortifying and expanding their partnerships, even as many neighbors struggled not to choose sides or to keep a foot in both camps.

Tiếp tục đọc “Regional Overview: Building Partnerships Amidst Major Power Competition” →

Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – 2 part

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Japan And China: Competition Or Cooperation In Southeast Asia? | Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – Part 1

Japan is investing in a series of infrastructure and supply chain resilience projects in ASEAN. It’s all part of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific plan launched by the Japanese government. Is this an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative? What is the current state of relations between Japan & China? Will the two Asian giants cooperate or compete?

***

How Will Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Impact Southeast Asia? | Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – Part 2

Japan is investing in infrastructure to alleviate the economic bottlenecks in ASEAN countries. In Indonesia, it’s building the country’s first MRT project. In Vietnam, it has invested in a network of roads, rail, ports and energy infrastructure. And in the Philippines, it’s investing in a flood mitigation project. What do these projects have in common? And why has Japan chosen to invest in them?