euractive.com 26 Jan 2024 (updated: 26 Jan 2024)
President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko attends the CSTO Collective Security Council meeting in Minsk, Belarus, 23 November 2023. [EPA-EFE/SERGY GUNEEV / KREMLIN / POOL]
Belarusian propaganda positions the EU as its main enemy, but several other features make it a unique case among its European neighbours.
*The author of this text remains anonymous due to fear of repercussions in their home country.
The most important and, at the same time, the most destructive peculiarity of disinformation in Belarus is strong Russian influence, which has deep historical roots and covers various spheres, from economy and culture to the military sector.
However, nowadays, Russian propaganda is helped by Belarusian colleagues who work to follow the same narrative.
This narrative includes turning EU countries into an economically and politically unstable military threat in the eyes of Belarusians while ignoring benefits and positives.
These circumstances are directly related to the political regime of President Alexander Lukashenko, a reliable ally of Russia.
Lukashenko is not only the beneficiary of disinformation, but he is also a leading contributor, as his statements often become the soil for Belarusian state-controlled media and its journalists.
At the beginning of the 2010s, Russian media actively attacked Lukashenko’s regime, making a documentary series about him and his family and broadcasting it on public TV channels.
These attacks were accompanied by public statements from Russian officials, who criticised Belarusian authorities for “anti-Russian” views, including for non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
After that, it was followed by a thaw period in Belarus-EU relations in the second half of the 2010s, when it was challenging to find an article with strong criticism of the EU or European integration in national public media.
However, the propaganda significantly changed after the presidential elections in 2020.
The widely reported falsifications of election results and police violence against protesters faced strong EU condemnation and led to new sanctions against Belarus.
Since then, the anti-EU rhetoric increased and become dominant.
Belarus’ propaganda machine unequivocally and definitively turned to the pro-Russian side. It covers both its interests, for example, regarding the migration crisis on the Belarus-EU border and the interests of the Eastern ally. For example, with Russia’s war on Ukraine, it calls Ukrainian shelling terrorist attacks, while Russian ones are almost totally ignored.
It also labels the EU as the provoker and “the NATO economic department”.
While much of the propaganda is clear misinformation, anti-EU propaganda is more nuanced.
Firstly, the EU no longer provides financial assistance to official Minsk, focusing its efforts on supporting the Belarusian democratic movement, including the opposition that works from abroad.
Nowadays, Lukashenko’s regime entirely relies on Russian support and, in return, backs Russia in the confrontation with the EU.
Together with Belarusian officials, the propaganda positions Belarus as “the last stronghold of Slavic civilisation” and the protector of Russia from EU countries, Poland and Lithuania in particular.
Targeting not only the EU as a whole but its members separately is another important aspect of Belarusian disinformation work. It has a direct connection with the attitude of these countries to the Belarusian regime.
While Hungary, which demonstrates the readiness to build relationships with Lukashenko, receives positive media coverage, Poland and Lithuania are constantly mentioned in a negative context, as these two countries remain the main lobbyists of sanctions against Belarus.
Their sanctions, together with the EU measures, put pressure on Lukashenka’s regime but also hit the Belarusian economy and pushed the country to deeper cooperation with Russia. This is a sore point for the Belarusian government, both economically and politically.
By disseminating disinformation on the EU, Belarus also tries to solve a growing demographical problem. Political repressions after 2020, low incomes, the economic downturn, and the involvement of Belarus in Russia’s war on Ukraine led to a significant wave of migration.
According to BEROC, a think tank, only in 2021-2022, more than 140,000 Belarusians moved to the EU. The exodus influenced crucial spheres like medicine, where Belarus lacked experts even before the 2020 events.
For this reason, the propaganda attempts to persuade Belarusians that the neighbouring EU countries, which are also their main immigrant destinations, face significant economic problems while staying silent about issues within the country.
According to a Chatham House survey made this November, despite polarisation in Belarusian society and non-acceptance of active Belarusian involvement in Russia’s war on Ukraine, only 13% prefer the alliance with the EU, while the share of supporters of the alliance with Russia increased from 27% in 2020 to 41% in 2023.
It will be difficult for the EU to change this situation, as its levers of influence on the Belarusian government are very limited.
However, enhancing the support of Belarusian independent media, which provides an alternative view on the EU, and timely reaction to controversial migration practices of some EU countries against Belarusians may help tip the scales in the EU’s favour.
[Edited by Alexandra Brzozowski/ Alice Taylor]
This article is part of the FREIHEIT media project on Europe’s Neighbourhood, funded by the European Media and Information Fund (EMIF).
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