Red Sea, Black Sea and Panama Canal: UNCTAD raises alarm on global trade disruptions

UNCTAD.org 26 January 2024

The organization warns that escalating attacks on ships in the Red Sea are adding strain to shipping routes already hit by conflict and climate change.

© Shutterstock/byvalet | A large container ship passes through the Suez canal.

The UN’s trade and development body, UNCTAD, has raised profound concerns over escalating disruptions to global trade.

It says that recent attacks on ships in the Red Sea, combined with geopolitical tensions affecting shipping in the Black Sea and the impacts of climate change on the Panama Canal, have given rise to a complex crisis affecting key trade routes.

UNCTAD’s head of trade logistics, Jan Hoffmann, outlined the organization’s detailed analysis of the situation at the UN’s daily press briefing on 26 January. He underlined maritime transport’s critical role in international trade, noting that it is responsible for approximately 80% of the global movement of goods.

Disruptions in the Black Sea and Panama and Suez Canals

The Suez Canal, a critical waterway connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, handled approximately 12% to 15% of global trade in 2023. UNCTAD estimates that the trade volume going through the Suez Canal decreased by 42% over the last two months.

Red Sea crisis: Suez Canal traffic plummets

Suez Danal, daily transits, 28-day rolling average, 2016–23 January 2024, Index, Average=100201620172018201920202021202220232024020406080100120140160180200

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The ongoing conflict in Ukraine has also triggered substantial shifts in oil and grain trades, reshaping established trade patterns.

Meanwhile, the Panama Canal, another key artery for global trade, is grappling with a severe drought that has diminished water levels, resulting in a staggering 36% reduction in total transits over the past month compared to a year ago.

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New International Maritime Bureau report reveals concerning rise in maritime piracy incidents in 2023

  • 11 January 2024

Released today, the annual Piracy and Armed Robbery Report of the ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) raises concern over the first successful Somali based hijacking since 2017.

The IMB annual report recorded 120 incidents of maritime piracy and armed robbery against ships in 2023 compared to 115 in 2022. It reveals that 105 vessels were boarded, nine attempted attacks, four vessels hijacked and two fired upon.  

Where the number of 2023 reported incidents has slightly increased compared to 2022, the IMB urges caution for crew safety as the number of crew taken hostage and kidnapped increased from 41 to 73 and from two to 14 in 2022 and 2023 respectively. A further 10 crew were threatened, four injured and one assaulted in 2023. 

Alarming first successful hijacking off Somalia since 2017 

On 14 December 2023, the report recorded the first successful hijacking of a vessel off the coast of Somalia since 2017.  

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No piracy report in Asian seas but ship robberies increase by 19 per cent in Southeast Asian waters: Report

telegraphindia.com

Though the 100 incidents in 2023 increased by 19 per cent over 2022, these were small-time robberies, with theft of items such as nominal value wires, brass ship products, engine spares and scraps, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery, says executive director

PTI Singapore Published 09.01.24, 06:06 PM

Representational picture.

Representational picture.File picture

No report of piracy incidents occurred on the Asian high seas but 99 actual incidents and one attempted armed robbery against ships occurred in Southeast Asian waters in 2023, a Singapore based maritime organisation reported said on Tuesday.

Though the 100 incidents in 2023 increased by 19 per cent over 2022, these were small-time robberies, with theft of items such as nominal value wires, brass ship products, engine spares and scraps, Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery (ReCAAP) executive director Krishnaswamy Natarajan said at the annual press conference.

Such incidents were five in India in 2023, the same as those in 2022, while Bangladesh and Malaysia reported one incident each, compared to five and two incidents in 2022, respectively.

Reviewing the year, Natarajan pointed out that the increase in incidents occurred in Indonesia, the Philippines, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS), Thailand and Vietnam.

Of concern was the occurrence of incidents in SOMS with 63 incidents compared to 55 incidents in 2022, said the former Director General of Indian Coast Guard.

In the Sulu-Celebes Seas, there was no report of the abduction of crew for ransom by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which was achieved through the concerted efforts of the Philippine and Malaysian authorities, he highlighted.

As part of the Centre’s continuous efforts to ensure that the evolving needs of the shipping industry are met, the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre (ISC) launched various initiatives in 2023, to keep the shipping community abreast of the latest piracy and ARAS situation in Asia and to facilitate ship masters in the timely reporting of incidents to the nearest coastal State.

The initiatives include the launch of the ReCAAP Data Visualisation Map and Panel (Re-VAMP) — an interactive dashboard to enable the viewing and analytics of past and current incidents of piracy and ARAS in Asia.

The initiative also includes the production of a poster containing the guidelines and updated contact details of law enforcement agencies of the littoral States of the SOMS; and engagement of the shipping industry through various events including conferences, forums and shipping dialogue sessions, he elaborated.

Except for the headline, this story has not been edited by The Telegraph Online staff and has been published from a syndicated feed.

More than 100 container ships rerouted from Suez canal to avoid Houthi attacks

theguardian.com

Cape of Good Hope diversion adds 6,000 nautical miles and three or four weeks to delivery times and has driven up oil prices

Jasper Jolly @jjpjollyWed 20 Dec 2023 14.24 GMT

More than 100 container ships have been rerouted around southern Africa to avoid the Suez canal, in a sign of the disruption to global trade caused by Houthi rebels attacking vessels on the western coast of Yemen.

The shipping company Kuehne and Nagel said it had identified 103 ships that had already changed course, with more expected to go around South Africa’s Cape of Good Hope.

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How—and Why—Yemen’s Houthi Rebels Are Poised to Seriously Disrupt the Global Economy

time.com

Loaded containers stacked on top of a cargo ship sailing in a canal, Suez Canal, Red sea, Egypt
Loaded containers stacked on top of a cargo ship sailing in the Suez Canal.Camille Delbos—Art In All of Us/Corbis/Getty Images

BY GREGORY BREW

DECEMBER 19, 2023 12:00 AM EST

Gregory Brew is a historian of international energy, U.S. foreign policy, the Cold War, U.S.-Iranian relations, and modern Iran. He is currently an Analyst at Eurasia Group.

After two months, the crisis in the Middle East is poised to seriously disrupt the global economy as well as regional stability—thanks to the Houthis, a rebel Shi’a group in Yemen, and their successful effort to disrupt shipping through the Red Sea.

While attacks by the Houthis on commercial shipping began on November 19, they escalated last week, with the Yemeni rebels firing anti-ship ballistic missiles at several passing ships and hitting one (the first time such a weapon has ever been used successfully). As none of the ships were bound for Israel or owned by Israeli companies, the attacks signaled the Houthis were stepping up their efforts to pressure local commerce as a way to force Israel to suspend its campaign in Gaza.

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Shipping companies got the message. Five of the largest shipping firms announced they would redirect their container ships away from the Bab al Mandab strait, the strategic waterway through which ships must pass on their way to the Suez Canal and which handles over 10% of global commerce.

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‘Everything indicates’ Chinese ship damaged Baltic pipeline on purpose, Finland says

politico.eu

‘I would think that you would notice that you’re dragging an anchor behind you for hundreds of kilometers,’ says minister.

FINLAND-GAS-PIPELINE-BALTICCONNECTOR
Finland and Estonia have since been in touch with Chinese authorities seeking their cooperation with the investigation | Heikki Saukkomaa/Lehtikuva/AFP via Getty Images

BY CLAUDIA CHIAPPA AND PIERRE EMMANUEL NGENDAKUMANA

DECEMBER 1, 2023 4:32 PM CET

BRUSSELS — As the investigation into damage to Baltic Sea critical infrastructure continues, Finland’s Minister of European Affairs Anders Adlercreutz said it’s hard to believe sabotage to the undersea gas pipeline was accidental — or that it happened without Beijing’s knowledge.

“I’m not the sea captain. But I would think that you would notice that you’re dragging an anchor behind you for hundreds of kilometers,” Adlercreutz said in an interview Thursday in Brussels. “I think everything indicates that it was intentional. But of course, so far, nobody has admitted to it.”

Finland and Estonia have been investigating the rupture of the Balticconnector, a 77-kilometer-long gas pipeline that connects the two NATO members beneath the Baltic Sea. The pipeline was damaged around October 7-8, along with two telecoms cables connecting Estonia to Finland and Sweden.

An investigation by Finnish authorities identified as the main suspect Chinese container ship Newnew Polar Bear, which is believed to have dragged its anchor across the Baltic Sea seabed, cutting through the cables and gas lines. The anchor — which weighs 6,000 kilograms — was retrieved a few meters from the site of the damage.

Finland and Estonia have since been in touch with Chinese authorities seeking their cooperation with the investigation. The Baltic Times reported earlier this week that the two European countries have asked to send representatives to Beijing to investigate the vessel, which is currently en route to a Chinese port.

Adlercreutz said he can’t speculate on whether the action was approved by the Chinese government. But the vessel’s imminent return to China raises some questions, he said.

“If I as a captain would have done something that the Chinese government wouldn’t approve of, then I would be concerned about returning with my boat to China,” he said.

Estonian Defense Minister Hanno Pevkur expressed similar sentiment in an interview with Swedish public broadcaster SVT last month, saying the captain of the ship surely “understood that there was something wrong” after dragging an anchor for over 180 kilometers.

Coming more than a year after the Nord Stream gas pipelines connecting Russia to Germany were damaged by several explosions, the Balticconnector incident raises more concerns over the safety of undersea critical infrastructure and possible measures to protect them from external sabotage. No culprit has been identified for the Nord Stream attack despite an international investigation.

Adlercreutz said there should be “more protection” of these types of infrastructure, for example in terms of better surveillance of suspicious ships. But there are limitations to what can be done, he added.

CONCEPTUALIZATION OF “MARITIME SECURITY” IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE


PUBLISHED: DECEMBER 15, 2021 CSIS

“Maritime Security” has emerged as a central concept in Southeast Asia’s policy lexicon. However, as is the case in much of the world, the term’s precise meaning is not consistently clear. Which challenges and state activities should be categorized as maritime security and which should be considered elements of another domain is generally ambiguous. This ambiguity can be useful to leaders seeking to build unity of action among government agencies with overlapping maritime policy mandates and to diplomats seeking to rely on euphemistic qualities to support flexible political narratives that minimize the risks associated with security dilemmas.  However such linguistic polysemy only works for so long and introduces risk. Left unclarified, terms will develop assumed meanings. For example, many Southeast Asians regard contemporary American talk about maritime security as a thin veil for something better understood as “Great Power Competition at Sea.” Therefore, even the most benign initiatives are factored into regional calculations aimed at balancing between external powers. Within the region, it is also possible for lexical disconnects to lead to problematic misinterpretations of policy intent and diplomatic signals.

Recognizing that understanding the varied conceptualizations of maritime security is an academic puzzle with real-world practical implications in Southeast Asia, the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies convened a roundtable of experts to take stock of regional maritime security definitions. These specialists surveyed national policy documents and policymaker discourse to assess how maritime security is defined, used, and conceptualized in seven key Southeast Asian coastal states (the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand), ASEAN as a multinational institution, and the Quad members (Australia, Japan, India, and the United States). This stocktaking enabled the team to identify and discuss the significance of the convergences and divergences. Noting the transnational nature of discourse, the phrase “Southeast Asian conceptualizations” was adopted as a shorthand.  This does not specifically mean usage by Southeast Asian individuals or the region’s national governments but refers to the security-related discourse taking place in the region.  While the primary goal of the project was to improve communication by providing common reference points, the project also discovered findings of practical policy importance.

Discussions of each country’s conceptualization of maritime security and the implications of the term’s varying definitions across the region are available in the following 14 article series:

Evolving Conceptualizations of Maritime Security in Southeast Asia by John Bradford

The Philippines’ Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Jay Batongbacal

Vietnam’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Nguyen Nam Duong

Brunei Darussalam’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Asyura Salleh

Malaysia’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Tharishini Krishnan

Indonesia’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Gilang Kembara

Singapore’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by YingHui Lee

Thailand’s Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Somjade Kongrawd

ASEAN Conceptualizations of Maritime Security by Dita Liliansa

Australia’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by David Letts

India’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Prakash Gopal

Japan’s Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Kentaro Furuya

The United States’ Conceptualization of Maritime Security by Blake Herzinger

Maritime Security Conceptualizations in Southeast Asia: The Implications of Convergence and Divergence by John Bradford