Thẻ: China

Nuclear Power in China

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world-nuclear.org

(Updated January 2023)

  • The impetus for nuclear power in China is increasingly due to air pollution from coal-fired plants.
  • China’s policy is to have a closed nuclear fuel cycle.
  • China has become largely self-sufficient in reactor design and construction, as well as other aspects of the fuel cycle, but is making full use of western technology while adapting and improving it.
  • Relative to the rest of the world, a major strength is the nuclear supply chain.
  • China’s policy is to ‘go global’ with exporting nuclear technology including heavy components in the supply chain.

Operable Reactors : 53,150 MWe

Reactors Under Construction: 21,867 MWe

Reactors Shutdown: 0 MWe

Electricity sector

Total generation (in 2019): 7541 TWh

Generation mix: 4899 TWh (65%) coal; 1304 TWh (17%) hydro; 406 TWh (5%) wind; 348 TWh (5%) nuclear; 226 TWh (3%) natural gas; 225 TWh (3%) solar; 121 (2%) biofuels & waste.

Import/export balance: 4.4 TWh net export (17.2 TWh imports; 21.7 TWh exports)

Total consumption: 6568 TWh

Per capita consumption: c. 4700 kWh in 2019

Source: International Energy Agency and The World Bank. Data for year 2019

Most of mainland China’s electricity is produced from fossil fuels, predominantly coal – 69% in 2019. Wind and solar capacity in 2019 was 21% of total installed generating capacity, but delivering under 9% of the electricity.

Rapid growth in demand has given rise to power shortages, and the reliance on fossil fuels has led to much air pollution. The economic loss due to pollution is put by the World Bank at almost 6% of GDP,1 and the new leadership from March 2013 prioritized this.* Chronic and widespread smog in the east of the country is attributed to coal burning.

* Official measurements of fine particles in the air measuring less than 2.5 micrometres, which pose the greatest health risk, rose to a record 993 micrograms per cubic metre in Beijing on 12 January 2013, compared with World Health Organization guidelines of no higher than 25.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that since 2012, China has been the country with the largest installed power capacity, and it has increased this by 85% since then to reach 2011 GWe in 2019, about a quarter of global capacity.

In August 2013 the State Council said that China should reduce its carbon emissions by 40-45% by 2020 from 2005 levels, and would aim to boost renewable energy to 15% of its total primary energy consumption by 2020. In 2012 China was the world’s largest source of carbon emissions – 2626 MtC (9.64 Gt CO2), and its increment that year comprised about 70% of the world total increase. In March 2014 the Premier said that the government was declaring “war on pollution” and would accelerate closing coal-fired power stations.

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China’s Failed Covid Vaccine Nationalism

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Beijing rejected foreign mRNA shots, putting its citizens at greater risk.

WSJ.com

The disaster of China’s zero-Covid policy has many contributors, starting with the Communist Party’s need for political control. One of the byproducts of that control that deserves more attention is Beijing’s vaccine nationalism, and President Xi Jinping’s decision not to offer China’s 1.4 billion citizens access to Western-made mRNA Covid vaccines.

Months into the pandemic, as vaccine manufacturers around the world began their race to develop the shots, countries including Canada and the U.S. signed contracts with multiple vaccine suppliers. The fastest and best would be deployed. But China let Communist nationalism drive its procurement decisions and rejected foreign vaccines.

That decision is still haunting the Chinese public. China’s homegrown vaccines—including Sinovac and Sinopharm—are much less effective against Covid than are the mRNA shots created by Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna. Sinovac was much less effective initially against symptomatic Covid—only about 50%—compared with more than 90% for the mRNA vaccines.

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China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 

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CNN Nectar Gan, Jessie Yeung and Laura He ---------- Passengers pull suitcases at a departure lobby in the Beijing international airport on December 27, 2022. After a tumultuous end to a momentous and challenging year, China heads into 2023 with a great deal of uncertainty – and potentially a glimpse of light at the end of the pandemic tunnel.  The chaos unleashed by leader Xi Jinping’s abrupt and ill-prepared exit from zero-Covid is spilling over into the new year, as large swathes of the country face an unprecedented Covid wave.  But the haphazard reopening also offers a glimmer of hope for many: after three years of stifling Covid restrictions and self-imposed global isolation, life in China may finally return to normal as the nation joins the rest of the world in learning to live with the virus.  “We have now entered a new phase of Covid response where tough challenges remain,” Xi said in a nationally televised New Year’s Eve speech. “Everyone is holding on with great fortitude, and the light of hope is right in front of us. Let’s make an extra effort to pull through, as perseverance and solidarity mean victory.”  Tiếp tục đọc “China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 “ →

New Zealand is done with speaking softly to China

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Wellington’s shift to a firmer stance on Chinese abuses unlikely to go further

asia.nikkei.com

December 21, 2022 05:00 JST

Jacinda Ardern and Xi Jinping shake hands in Beijing in April 2019: New Zealand is finally waking up to the reality of the potential geostrategic threat posed by China.   © Reuters

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the think tank RAND Corp. in Santa Monica, California and adjunct professor in the practice of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as an intelligence adviser at the Pentagon.

During her meeting with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit last month in Bangkok, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern expressed interest in continued cooperation, but also pressed the Chinese president on controversial issues, including Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The meeting was the clearest sign yet that Wellington has adopted a harder line on Beijing. This will be good news for allies who have questioned whether New Zealand has been the weak link in collective approaches to countering China. But Wellington’s increasingly hard-line stance could antagonize Beijing, risking what has heretofore been a productive partnership.

For years, Wellington has assiduously tried to keep its political and economic interactions with Beijing separate.

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Xi Jinping Ramps Up China’s Surveillance, Harassment Deep in America

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BY DIDI KIRSTEN TATLOW ON 12/03/22 AT 4:00 AM EST

Share on FacebookShare on TwitterShare on LinkedInShare on RedditShare on FlipboardShare via EmailComments08:22

How Xi Jinping’s Chinese Spies are Striking Fear in U.S. and Beyond

NEWSCHINAUNITED STATESXI JINPINGCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

AChinese man strikes at a banner saying “Chinese Communist Party Step Down!” in New York City. He is challenged briefly, then disappears in the crowd at a Columbia University protest against China’s “Zero COVID” policy.

Another man pummels a female student after she shouts that Chinese authorities must be held accountable for the deaths of 10 people in a fire in an apartment complex under lockdown in Urumqi, sparking a rare wave of demonstrations in China. In Berkeley, California, a suspected Communist Party supporter sets ablaze a memorial placed by protesters mourning the dead in Urumqi.

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The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’

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The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’ | 101 East Documentary

Al Jazeera English – 24 thg 11, 2022

When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most foreigners and multinational companies had already packed up and left Afghanistan.

Going against the stream of foreigners fleeing the country was a group looking for “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunities: Chinese entrepreneurs.

Despite the ongoing unrest, an economic crisis and United Nations’ concerns over human rights, more Chinese citizens are joining the country’s “gold rush”. Once a small minority, Chinese nationals now make up Afghanistan’s biggest group of expatriates.

With exclusive access to leading Chinese investors, 101 East investigates their growing influence across Afghanistan’s business and media sectors.

Tự lực tự cường và chip bán dẫn

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NGUYỄN TRUNG DÂN 10/11/2022 07:49 GMT+7

TTCT – Sau gần 10 năm, cuộc đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip bán dẫn của Trung Quốc đã thành bại ra sao

Tự lực tự cường và chip bán dẫn - Ảnh 1.

Triển lãm chip của Tsinghua Unigroup. Ảnh: AFP

Sau gần 10 năm, cuộc đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip bán dẫn của Trung Quốc đã thành bại ra sao, và con đường sắp tới sẽ thế nào, khi Tổng bí thư Tập Cận Bình lại vừa kêu gọi đất nước của ông “phải giành chiến thắng trong cuộc chiến công nghệ cốt lõi”?

Năm 2020, Trung Quốc chi 350 tỉ USD cho nhập khẩu chip bán dẫn, trong khi tiền nhập dầu mỏ chỉ có 200 tỉ USD, theo số liệu hải quan. 

Việc Trung Quốc, vốn cung cấp cho thế giới hầu như tất cả các mặt hàng từ lao động thủ công rẻ tiền cho đến cả các mặt hàng công nghệ cao, là nước nhập khẩu dầu mỏ và nhiên liệu lớn nhất thế giới không có gì lạ. 

Song phải chi nhập chip nhiều hơn mua dầu thì đáng chú ý, nhất là khi tính đến 2021 các chính sách chạy đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip của nước này đã đi được hơn 7 năm.

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Anti-Xi protest spreads in China and worldwide as Chinese leader begins third term

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By CNN Staff

Updated 11:20 PM EDT, Sat October 22, 2022

Anti-Xi posters on a notice board at a university campus in London.

CNN — 

Jolie’s nerves were running high as she walked into the campus of Goldsmiths, the University of London, last Friday morning. She’d planned to arrive early enough that the campus would be deserted, but her fellow students were already beginning to filter in to start their day.

In the hallway of an academic building, Jolie, who’d worn a face mask to obscure her identity, waited for the right moment to reach into her bag for the source of her nervousness – several pieces of A4-size paper she had printed out in the small hours of the night.

Finally, when she made sure none of the students – especially those who, like Jolie, come from China – were watching, she quickly pasted one of them on a notice board.

“Life not zero-Covid policy, freedom not martial-lawish lockdown, dignity not lies, reform not cultural revolution, votes not dictatorship, citizens not slaves,” it read, in English.

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China’s corporate debts

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See more: STATE-OWNED FIRMS BEHIND CHINA’S CORPORATE DEBT

qz.com

Published October 28, 2021Last updated July 21, 2022

China has a massive amount of corporate debt. At $27 trillion, it boasts a debt-to-GDP ratio of 159%, almost 60% higher than the global rate and nearly twice that of the US, according to research published this month by S&P Global Ratings.

“China’s growth has been largely driven by two contours: One is credit, and the other is carbon,” says Eunice Tan, one of the report’s lead authors and head of credit research for S&P Global Ratings’ Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing now wants to tame both those economic engines—credit and carbon—while maintaining stability and control, and while continuing to hit GDP growth targets. On the carbon front, it has released a high-level policy framework outlining a path to peaking carbon emissions by 2030. On the credit front, the central bank has sought to tame debt in the property sector and shield banks from exposure to troubled developers.

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‘Walled-in’ China under Xi Jinping poses long-term global challenges

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Steven Jiang, Beijing Bureau Chief   ‘Walled-in’ China under Xi Jinping poses long-term global challenges     ----------
Analysis by Steven Jiang, Beijing Bureau Chief, CNN
Updated 4:54 AM EDT, Mon October 17, 2022

Xi Jinping delivers a report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) on behalf of the 19th CPC Central Committee at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, Oct. 16, 2022. The 20th CPC National Congress opened on Sunday.

Editor’s Note: A version of this story appeared in CNN’s Meanwhile in China newsletter, a three-times-a-week update exploring what you need to know about the country’s rise and how it impacts the world. Sign up here.

BeijingCNN — 

During China’s National Day holiday in early October, several expatriate friends and I took our young children – who are of mixed races and tend to stand out in a Chinese crowd – to the Great Wall on the outskirts of Beijing.

As we climbed a restored but almost deserted section of the ancient landmark, a few local families on their way down walked past us. Noticing our kids, one of their children exclaimed: “Wow foreigners! With Covid? Let’s get away from them…” The adults remained quiet as the group quickened their paces.

That moment has lingered on my mind. It feels like a snapshot that illustrates how China has changed since its strongman leader Xi Jinping took power a decade ago – it’s become an increasingly walled-in nation physically and psychologically – and such transformation will have long-term global implications.

Understanding the big picture is timely as Xi is poised to break convention to assume a third term as the head of the Chinese Communist Party – the real source of his power instead of the ceremonial presidency – at the ruling party’s twice-a-decade national congress, which opened in Beijing on Sunday.


The view of the Great Wall of China on October 7, 2022.
The view of the Great Wall of China on October 7, 2022.
Steven Jiang/CNN

The Great Wall, a top tourist attraction that normally draws throngs of visitors during holidays, stood nearly empty when we went thanks to Xi’s insistence – three years into the global pandemic – on a policy of zero tolerance for Covid infections while the rest of the world has mostly moved on and reopened.

China’s borders have remained shut for most international travelers since March 2020, while many foreigners who once called the country home have chosen to leave.
With the highly contagious Omicron variant raging through parts of the country, authorities had discouraged domestic travel ahead of National Day holiday. They are also sticking to a playbook of strict quarantine, incessant mass testing and invasive contact tracing – often locking down entire cities of millions over a handful of cases.
Unsurprisingly, holiday travel plummeted during the so-called “Golden Week” along with tourism spending, which fell to less than half of that in 2019, the last “normal” year.

And it’s not just one industry: Pessimism blankets other sectors, from automobile to real estate, as the world’s second-largest economy falters.


Children visit the Great Wall of China on October 6, 2022.
Children visit the Great Wall of China on October 6, 2022.
Steven Jiang/CNN

Xi’s biggest challenge

The Chinese economic slowdown poses a massive political challenge for Xi, whose party’s legitimacy in the past few decades has relied on rapid growth and rising incomes for 1.4 billion people. It’s also a harsh reality check for the international community: the world’s longtime growth engine is sputtering, just as the prospect of a global recession emerges.

But Xi’s costly “zero-Covid” intransigence is a natural outcome of the unprecedented amount of power he has amassed. For many Chinese officials, this policy is less about science and more about political loyalty to the country’s most powerful leader in decades.

Online videos abound of local health workers swabbing fruits, animals and even shoes for Covid testing despite the absence of sound scientific basis. China’s only Covid-related deaths in September were 27 people who were killed when their bus crashed on its way to a quarantine facility. Still, officials nationwide have doubled down on enforcing draconian rules, especially ahead of the party congress, helped by the world’s most sophisticated surveillance technologies.

China had boasted more security cameras than any other country even before Covid. Now, in the age of smartphones, mandatory apps allow the government to check people’s Covid status and track their movement in real time. Authorities can easily confine someone to their home by remotely switching the health app to code red – and they did just that on several occasions to stop potential protesters from taking to the streets.

Whether physical lockdowns or digital manipulation, these measures born out of “zero-Covid” have proven such effective means of control in a system obsessed with social stability that many worry Xi and his underlings will never ditch the policy.
A series of recent articles published by the party’s mouthpieces had reinforced such concern by stressing the policy’s “correctness” and “sustainability,” even before Xi hailed “zero-Covid” as a resounding success story in his two-hour speech Sunday. And state media fills its coverage with depictions of the “grim reality” in foreign countries where leaders supposedly turn a blind eye to mass fatalities and suffering caused by Covid – in contrast to China’s apparent triumph in saving lives with “minimal overall cost.”

For years, Xi’s cyber police have been fortifying the country’s so-called “Great Firewall” – perhaps the world’s most extensive internet filtering and censorship system that blocks and deletes anything deemed “harmful” by the party. Now supported by artificial intelligence, censors quickly scrub clean any posts seen as contradicting the party line – including on Covid.

This potent mix of propaganda and control under Xi appears to have had its desired effect on a large segment of Chinese society, creating a buffer for the leadership by convincing enough people of the superiority of China’s system even as millions of their fellow countrymen grow resentful of “zero-Covid.” But this approach, combined with prolonged border closure and escalating geopolitical tensions, also provides fertile ground for xenophobia.

The local child’s remarks on the Great Wall reflected that. But the true danger of the “blame the foreigners” sentiment comes when adults in powerful positions take advantage of it in the face of mounting pressure on the domestic front.
screengrab xi speech 2021

Here’s Xi Jinping’s vision to make China great again
03:04 – Source: CNN

Make China great again?

Since his ascent to the top in 2012, Xi’s ruling philosophy has become increasingly clear: Only he can make China great again by restoring the party’s – thus his – omnipresence and dominance, as well as the country’s rightful place on the global stage.

With China’s increasing economic and military might, coexistence with the West has given way to confrontation with the United States and its allies. Gone are the days of “hiding your strength and biding your time” – Chinese diplomats under Xi are proud warriors training fire on anyone who dares to question their government.

Underpinned by rising nationalism, China has started flexing military muscle beyond its shores. Tensions over Taiwan poses a real threat of war in Asia, as few doubt that “reunification” with the self-governed democratic island – long claimed by the Communist leadership despite having never ruled it – would be seen as the crown jewel of Xi’s legacy.

That outward power projection goes hand in hand with China’s sense of besiegement in a US-led world order, which Xi has made no secret of trying to reshape along with other autocrats like Russian President Vladimir Putin. Until that happens, though, the Chinese strongman’s instinct and demand for total control at home seem to have meant the erection of ever-higher barriers – in the real world and cyberspace – to keep out pesky outsiders, the perceived source of dangerous viruses and ideas.

A history paper released recently by a government-run research institute has gone viral as it, like Xi, upended a long-held consensus. Instead of denouncing the isolationist policy adopted by China’s last two imperial dynasties as a cause of their backward turn and eventual collapse, the authors defended its necessity to protect national sovereignty and security when faced with Western invaders.

The emperors of those dynasties, who also rebuilt parts of the Great Wall, failed to reverse their country’s decline back then. But the tools at their disposal were no match to the high-tech ones in the hands of China’s current ruler. Xi seems confident that his “walls” – among other things – will help him realize his oft-cited ultimate goal: the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Whether or not he succeeds, the world will feel the impact for years to come.

The Emperor is Wearing No Clothes: Beyond Hydrocarbons in the South China Sea

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asiapacific.ca

Published:October 3, 2022 – Author: Tabitha Grace Mallory

Feature Map: Biodiversity in the South China Sea

Read the full report

We need only call to mind the first half of 2022 for an array of the extreme, energy-related global challenges we all face. Around the world, local versions of climate change effects—the temperatures, wildfires, droughts, storms, flooding—underscore how important it is for us to transition away from our overdependence on fossil fuels. And our energy sources don’t just have environmental implications but security ones as well. The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the latest rendition of the resource curse. At the heart of it all, fossil fuels are what enabled and amplified the murderous narcissism we see in Vladimir Putin and created a country with an unbalanced and unhealthy domestic economy able to profoundly destabilize energy flows and prices around the world.

The South China Sea (SCS) brings together its own assortment of these complex challenges and factors. Competing security concerns, resource needs, and nationalisms shape the motivations of the claimants. Much of the attention and conflict has centred on the oil and gas in the seabed. Estimates of SCS hydrocarbon volumes vary; only some of these resources are proven reserves that have been confirmed and measured, and are actually recoverable. But even in more generous assessments, the SCS only provides us with a small percentage of the global total of oil and gas reserves, and even less of the overall energy mix if we include non-fossil-fuel energy sources.

Beyond hydrocarbons, in a two-way tie with the adjacent Coral Triangle, the SCS has the highest level of marine biodiversity in the world. SCS fisheries feed and employ millions of people in the region. It’s true that conflict over these living marine resources also drives the territorial disputes in the region, and a wide variety of human activity degrades the SCS ecosystem. Yet drilling for hydrocarbons in the SCS threatens this vulnerable marine habitat even more, while also clearly contributing to geopolitical and security tensions in the region—and to climate change.

Given how destabilizing oil and gas pursuits have been for the SCS since the 1970s, we might ask ourselves whether we want to keep drilling for fossil fuels there. Do the costs and risks outweigh the benefits?

Download this 21-page report (button above) from Dr. Tabitha Grace Mallory, an inaugural John H. McArthur Research Fellow, an initiative of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, and the Founder of China Ocean Institute and Affiliate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington.

Below, explore the rich marine biodiversity of the South China Sea, one of the most hotly-contested maritime jurisdictions on the planet, in this original map created by the author and APF Canada graphic designer Chloe Fenemore, based on historical and contemporary maps cited in the full report.

Feature Map: Biodiversity in the South China Sea

https://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/default/files/Map%20of%20Biodiversity%20in%20the%20SCS.svg

Tabitha Grace Mallory

Tabitha Grace Mallory is the Founder of China Ocean Institute and Affiliate Professor, Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington. Dr. Mallory specializes in Chinese foreign and environmental policy. She conducts research on China and global ocean governance and has published work on China’s fisheries and oceans policy.

Dr. Mallory is an inaugural John H. McArthur Research Fellow, an initiative of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada launched in 2021 to provide research opportunities for exceptional, mid-career scholars who are working on programs and research areas with direct relevance to Canada and Canada’s interests in Asia.

Professor accused of selling secrets to China sues the U.S. government

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USnews.com

Temple Prof Seeks Reinstatement of Damage Claims Against FBI

A Temple University physicist who was charged with sharing scientific technology with China only for the case to collapse before trial and be dismissed by the Justice Department is asking a federal appeals court to reinstate his claims for damages against the FBI agent who investigated him.

By Associated Press

The Associated Press

FILE – An American flag flies outside the Department of Justice in Washington, March 22, 2019. A Temple University physicist who was charged with sharing scientific technology with China only for the case to collapse before trial and be dismissed by the Justice Department is asking a federal appeals court to reinstate his lawsuit against the FBI agent who investigated him. Lawyers for Xiaoxing Xi and his wife say in a brief filed Monday with a Philadelphia-based appeals court that a judge erred last year when he dismissed their claims for damages. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik, File) THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

By ERIC TUCKER, Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) — A Temple University physics professor who was charged with sharing scientific technology with China only for the case to collapse before trial and be dismissed by the Justice Department asked a federal appeals court on Monday to reinstate his clams for damages against the U.S. government.

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China to Latin America: All your fish belong to us

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The Manila Times

The Manila Times

Opinion by Ben Kritz – Monday

React381 Comments|942

AS if communist China was not already doing enough to degrade the rest of the world’s quality of life for its own gain, recent news from South and Central America further reinforces the impression that its rapaciousness knows no bounds. China’s Southeast Asian neighbors, particularly the Philippines, are already familiar with the Red Menace’s greediness when it comes to marine resources, but on the other side of the world, a massive, well-organized, industrial-scale effort to carry out illegal fishing on both sides of Latin America is threatening to wipe out fish stocks for a dozen countries.

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US inspectors arrive in PwC, KPMG offices in Hong Kong to review Chinese companies’ audit records, sources say

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scmp.com

Teams of inspectors arrived this morning at the Central offices of PwC and KPMG to start reviewing the audit records of US-listed, China-based companies
The PCAOB has high standards and will perform a ‘very detailed’ inspection, which will take ‘as long as needed’, former SFC chairman says
The Hong Kong island skyline, showing the Central business district, pictured on June 6, 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE

The Hong Kong island skyline, showing the Central business district, pictured on June 6, 2022. Photo: EPA-EFE

Teams of US audit inspectors arrived at the Central offices of accounting firms PwC and KPMG this morning to begin a historic review of the audit records of US-listed, China-based companies, two sources told the South China Morning Post.

The inspectors from the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) arrived in Central on Monday morning to work at the Hong Kong offices of PwC in the Prince’s Building and Edinburgh Tower as well as KPMG’s office in the Prince’s Building, the sources said.

Both accounting firms have reserved rooms for the inspectors to perform their review. The two firms have also already prepared the paper and electronic audit materials of the selected clients named by the PCAOB.

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China’s power crisis adds to headaches ahead of the 20th Party Congress

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này
Wendy Wu, SCMP <wendy.wu@e.scmp.com> Unsubscribe   Was this newsletter forwarded to you? Sign up here First China’s zero-Covid policy, then property woes, now a power crisis tests Beijing ahead of key event Andrew MullenDeputy Editor, Political Economy  10 September 2022 Welcome to our 869 newly joined SCMP Global Impact readers who signed up in the past week. Dear Global Impact Readers, The adage goes “with great power comes great responsibility”, but who is responsible when the great power needed to light up and drive the world’s most populous nation runs out? At the moment, Mother Nature is the main suspect behind China’s second power crisis in less than a year, having hit the southwestern Chinese province of Sichuan in July and August after drought wreaked havoc on the hydropower-reliant region. In this issue, Wendy Wu, the Post’s economy editor, looks back at the latest crisis and asks what is next for China as it seeks energy security. In other news, we will be taking a break from our regular schedule in the coming weeks as China’s 20th party congress looms into view. Given the magnitude of the five-yearly event where major leadership changes are announced, and where Xi Jinping is expected this year to secure a third term as party’s leader, we will be focusing the coming issues on the key event that gets under way in Beijing from October 16. As the Post always looks to provide our readers with a window into China, given the 20th party congress will take up so much of the view over the next couple of months, we felt it only right we devote our flagship newsletter to such a key event to bring the latest news and analysis from our team of reporters in China and around the world straight into your inbox each week. Andrew Mullen Deputy Editor, Political Economy

Challenges ahead for China

When the Baihetan Dam, the world’s second-largest hydropower plant, located in the southwestern Chinese province of Sichuan, became fully operational in July and began sending electricity more than 2,000km across China – eastward to Jiangsu province via a newly established ultra-high-voltage grid – few could have foreseen that a drought-induced power crisis was looming on the horizon. Tiếp tục đọc “China’s power crisis adds to headaches ahead of the 20th Party Congress” →