TTCT – Nếu như Trung Quốc có bao giờ thực hiện thành công một cuộc Đại nhảy vọt, thì đó chính là ở Thâm Quyến. Và lý do cơ bản của thành công này là vì thành phố này được phân quyền một cách đích thực.
Tôi vẫn còn nhớ cách đây khoảng 10 năm, một người bạn Hong Kong dẫn tôi tới dải đất sát bờ biển Hong Kong, chỉ vào một dãy nhà cao tầng san sát ở bờ bên kia và nói đó là thành phố Thâm Quyến.
Anh kể trước đây rất nhiều người Trung Quốc đại lục bị hấp dẫn bởi Hong Kong phồn hoa đã bơi từ Trung Quốc đại lục để vượt biên, nhập cảnh trái phép vào Hong Kong. Tôi bèn hỏi vui: “Bây giờ còn không anh?”. Anh trả lời rất nhanh: “Bên đó bây giờ thậm chí còn giàu hơn bên đây thì vượt biên làm gì”.
Một góc Thâm Quyến nhìn từ trên cao. Ảnh: Tân Hoa xã (chụp ngày 13-8-2020).
Anh bạn Hong Kong không quá lời. Giờ đây, GDP của Thâm Quyến đã vượt Hong Kong. Thành phố đại lục này cũng đi trước Hong Kong về đổi mới công nghệ và là nơi có nhiều công ty nằm trong top 500 công ty thành công nhất thế giới. Năm 2019, Liên đoàn Công nghiệp và Thương mại toàn Trung Quốc đã thực hiện cuộc khảo sát cho thấy Thâm Quyến được coi là thành phố kinh doanh số 1 Trung Quốc. Tiếp tục đọc “Thâm Quyến: Trao quyền phải trao cho tới”→
China’s EU envoy, Fu Cong, says Beijing respects the territorial integrity of all countries and stands for peace.
Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the EU and former head of the arms control department of the Chinese foreign ministry, speaks at a news conference in Beijing [File Photo: Shubing Wang/Reuters]
Brussels, Belgium – China’s envoy to the European Union has suggested that Beijing could back Ukraine’s aims of reclaiming its 1991 territorial integrity, which includes Crimea – the peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014.
In a recent interview with Al Jazeera and two other media outlets, when Fu Cong was asked about supporting Kyiv’s goals, which includes reclaiming other Ukrainian regions now occupied by Russia, the senior Chinese diplomat said: “I don’t see why not.
China’s economy showed further signs of weakness in May. Industrial output and retail sales both missed forecasts. Beijing is expected to increase its efforts to boost the economy to try to shore up its post-COVID-19 recovery.
Al Jazeera’s Katrina Yu reports from Beijing, China.
An opinion piece in Bloomberg titled ‘Trying to Replace China’s Supply Chains? Don’t Bother?’, published March 1, 2023, claims that ‘Vietnamese factories were supposed to save globalization’ but that they cannot. This is incorrect and here’s why, writes Dezan Shira and Associates, Head of Business Intelligence, Pritesh Samuel.
Vietnam’s factories were never supposed to save globalization. They offer businesses an alternate location for manufacturing – in line with a China+1 strategy that myriad companies now pursue due to rising costs in China.
Globalization is shaped by several factors, including geopolitics, national interests of governments, regional trade and investment initiatives, public policymaking directives by key trade bodies, and so on. It cannot be trivialized into the assumption that a single country can save it.
China’s advanced supply chain and supplier network, driven by the government’s long-term national policies, make it a manufacturing giant. At present, no single country, including Vietnam, can fully replace China’s manufacturing capacity.
China is on track to massively expand its nuclear arsenal, just as Russia suspends the last major arms control treaty. It augurs a new world in which Beijing, Moscow and Washington will likely be atomic peers.
By David E. Sanger, William J. Broad and Chris Buckley David E. Sanger and William J. Broad have covered nuclear weapons for The Times for four decades. Chris Buckley reports on China’s military from Taiwan.
WASHINGTON — On the Chinese coast, just 135 miles from Taiwan, Beijing is preparing to start a new reactor the Pentagon sees as delivering fuel for a vast expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, potentially making it an atomic peer of the United States and Russia. The reactor, known as a fast breeder, excels at making plutonium, a top fuel of atom bombs.
The nuclear material for the reactor is being supplied by Russia, whose Rosatom nuclear giant has in the past few months completed the delivery of 25 tons of highly enriched uranium to get production started. That deal means that Russia and China are now cooperating on a project that will aid their own nuclear modernizations and, by the Pentagon’s estimates, produce arsenals whose combined size could dwarf that of the United States.
This new reality is prompting a broad rethinking of American nuclear strategy that few anticipated a dozen years ago, when President Barack Obama envisioned a world that was inexorably moving toward eliminating all nuclear weapons. Instead, the United States is now facing questions about how to manage a three-way nuclear rivalry, which upends much of the deterrence strategy that has successfully avoided nuclear war.
China’s expansion, at a moment when Russia is deploying new types of arms and threatening to use battlefield nuclear weapons against Ukraine, is just the latest example of what American strategists see as a new, far more complex era compared to what the United States lived through during the Cold War.
China insists the breeder reactors on the coast will be purely for civilian purposes, and there is no evidence that China and Russia are working together on the weapons themselves, or a coordinated nuclear strategy to confront their common adversary.
But John F. Plumb, a senior Pentagon official, told Congress recently: “There’s no getting around the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is for weapons.”
It may only be the beginning. In a little-noticed announcement when President Xi Jinping of China met President Vladimir V. Putin in Moscow last month, Rosatom and the China Atomic Energy Authority signed an agreement to extend their cooperation for years, if not decades.
When President Xi Jinping of China met President Vladimir V. Putin in Moscow last month, Russia and China’s nuclear authorities signed an agreement to extend their cooperation for years.Credit…Grigory Sysoyev/Agence France-Presse, via Sputnik
Beijing clamps down on ‘expert networks’ over threats to national security, sending shockwaves through the financial world with experts saying the move will derail China’s push to attract foreign investors
Private conversations with corporate insiders and ex-government officials that cost upwards of US$10,000 an hour. Coded language and blurred regulatory lines.
For hedge funds and other global investors, China’s vast web of “expert networks” has become a key tool for navigating an opaque but potentially lucrative economic powerhouse. For Xi Jinping’s (習近平) Communist Party, the secretive industry represents something far more ominous: a threat to national security that must be reined in.
That contradiction is now sending shockwaves through the financial world as China’s government cracks down on the expert networks it had showered in praise less than a decade ago during Xi’s first term as president. The anti-espionage campaign — which centers on Capvision, a giant of the industry with offices in Shanghai and New York — has reignited concern among China watchers that Xi’s fixation on security and tightening grip on information will derail his push to attract foreign investors.
In this image taken from undated video footage run by China’s CCTV, Chinese police raid the Capvision office in Shanghai. China’s chief foreign intelligence agency has raided the offices of business consulting firm Capvision in Beijing and other Chinese cities as part of an ongoing crackdown on foreign businesses that provide sensitive economic data. Photo: AP
Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, explains the significance of Japan hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima, and how Tokyo centers its foreign policy on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This is Japan’s grand strategy,” Solís says, “this is really the roadmap that Japan has charted to achieve its security and prosperity.”
Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, explains the significance of Japan hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima, and how Tokyo centers its foreign policy on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This is Japan’s grand strategy,” Solís says, “this is really the roadmap that Japan has charted to achieve its security and prosperity.”
TRANSCRIPT
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DOLLAR: Hi, I’m David Dollar, host of the Brookings Trade podcast Dollar and Sense. Today, my guest is Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. Mireya is a leading expert on Japan’s trade and economic diplomacy, and she has a book coming out this summer on Japan’s quiet leadership. And one aspect of this quiet leadership, or maybe not so quiet right now, is Japan will be hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima starting on May 19. That’s the main thing we’re going to talk about.
Because of the Memorial Day holiday in the United States, we’re going to push back production one week. So, the next episode will come out on June 5th.
So, welcome to the show, Mireya.
SOLÍS: Thank you so much, David. It’s a pleasure to be here.
In an interview, Petr Pavel — a former general with NATO — argued China is benefiting too much from the war to play peacemaker.
Allies need to focus more on their military capabilities and ensuring that they have well-equipped forces at high readiness, according to the Petr Pavel | Vldimir Simicek/AFP via Getty Images
China cannot be trusted to mediate peace between Russia and Ukraine, Czech President Petr Pavel is warning, telling POLITICO that Beijing benefits from prolonging the war.
His comments come as China is trying to position itself as a peacemaker in Ukraine, recently floating a vague roadmap to ending the conflict. And while most Western allies have been skeptical of the overtures, some countries like France insist China could play a major role in peace talks.
This paper examines recent writings from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in order to highlight major themes and evolution in concepts of deterrence, strategic stability, and escalation control, particularly between 2017 and 2022.
PRC writings during this period display growing concern that innovations in military technology over the past several decades undermine strategic stability. Many PRC authors argue that the balance of military capabilities that enabled China to maintain a fairly small nuclear deterrent is becoming more fragile, and that as a result, Beijing can no longer be confident in its ability to deter other countries from attacking China with nuclear or other strategic weapons.
This paper provides a baseline for understanding, from a conceptual perspective, how PRC authors frame the challenges that these dynamics pose to China’s strategic deterrent and to strategic stability, and the implications they may have for Beijing’s approach to strategic capabilities.
KEY FINDINGS
STRATEGIC STABILITY, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES
PRC writings link the concepts of strategic stability, strategic deterrence, and strategic capabilities. Although PRC authors do not explicitly employ an ends-ways-means construct, based on their discussions we may think of strategic stability as the ends, strategic deterrence as the ways, and strategic capabilities as the means.
China operates one of the world’s largest ocean surveying fleets but survey routes have often lacked transparency and varied from one mission to another. Photo: Xinhua
Beijing has for the first time listed the specific locations to be visited regularly by Chinese ocean research vessels, including disputed areas of the South China Sea and waters close to US Pacific bases.
The 33 areas, or “reference sections”, cover a wide span of regional waterways – from the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea to the western Pacific and eastern Indian oceans – according to the announcement from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), a top government research funder.
Xi Jinping used the annual legislative session to lock in his tenure as president and reinforce China’s assertive foreign policy and the reemergence of its economy.
Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to take his oath during the Third Plenary Session of the National People’s Congress. Mark R. Cristino/Reuters
This month saw the Chinese rite of spring known as the lianghui, or “two sessions”: the annual meetings of the national advisory committee and the country’s parliament. Neither body holds much power, and it’s easy to write the whole exercise off as empty theater. Yet, public rituals are meant to deliver messages, and this year’s lianghui offered two important points: President Xi Jinping and his muscular foreign policy are here to stay, and China is back open for business after three years of fighting COVID-19—even if its return to growth is bolstered through unsustainable deficit spending.
As China’s economy moved away from state planning and policymakers introduced market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, many observers expected that in addition to promoting the growth of the Chinese economy, privatization would also have substantial political implications. Most importantly, it was thought that the rise of the private sector could lead to the establishment of an independent business class that would seek to defend its interests, both in the short term through greater policy lobbying and over the longer term by pushing for institutionalized political change, including democratization. The actual economic and political trajectory of China’s private sector has been more complicated and has been a central area of contestation for economic and political power between firms and the Chinese party-state. Although Chinese companies have pushed to have greater autonomy, they have also faced immense pressure to adapt and cede authority in order to survive and grow.
When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most foreigners and multinational companies had already packed up and left Afghanistan.
Going against the stream of foreigners fleeing the country was a group looking for “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunities: Chinese entrepreneurs.
Despite the ongoing unrest, an economic crisis and United Nations’ concerns over human rights, more Chinese citizens are joining the country’s “gold rush”. Once a small minority, Chinese nationals now make up Afghanistan’s biggest group of expatriates.
With exclusive access to leading Chinese investors, 101 East investigates their growing influence across Afghanistan’s business and media sectors.
The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’ | 101 East Documentary
PacNet #7 – Dealing with Increased Chinese Aggressiveness – PART ONE
The following are some of the key findings and recommendations from the August 2022 US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue. PacNet 7 provides a summary of the dialogue. The full report, with expanded key findings and recommendations can be found here.
Taiwan is under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global—and not just a Taiwan or US—problem which demands a global response.
CVD 