Thẻ: China

PRC WRITINGS ON STRATEGIC DETERRENCE

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

TECHNOLOGICAL DISRUPTION AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY

Alison A. KaufmanBrian Waidelich

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BACKGROUND

This paper examines recent writings from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in order to highlight major themes and evolution in concepts of deterrence, strategic stability, and escalation control, particularly between 2017 and 2022.

PRC writings during this period display growing concern that innovations in military technology over the past several decades undermine strategic stability. Many PRC authors argue that the balance of military capabilities that enabled China to maintain a fairly small nuclear deterrent is becoming more fragile, and that as a result, Beijing can no longer be confident in its ability to deter other countries from attacking China with nuclear or other strategic weapons.

This paper provides a baseline for understanding, from a conceptual perspective, how PRC authors frame the challenges that these dynamics pose to China’s strategic deterrent and to strategic stability, and the implications they may have for Beijing’s approach to strategic capabilities.

KEY FINDINGS

STRATEGIC STABILITY, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, AND STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

PRC writings link the concepts of strategic stability, strategic deterrence, and strategic capabilities. Although PRC authors do not explicitly employ an ends-ways-means construct, based on their discussions we may think of strategic stability as the ends, strategic deterrence as the ways, and strategic capabilities as the means.

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China plots 33 spots for regular research ship visits, in Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Pacific and Indian oceans

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Stephen Chen in Beijing,SCMP

Published: 6:00pm, 1 Apr, 2023

Why you can trust SCMP

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China operates one of the world’s largest ocean surveying fleets but survey routes have often lacked transparency and varied from one mission to another. Photo: Xinhua

China operates one of the world’s largest ocean surveying fleets but survey routes have often lacked transparency and varied from one mission to another. Photo: Xinhua

Beijing has for the first time listed the specific locations to be visited regularly by Chinese ocean research vessels, including disputed areas of the South China Sea and waters close to US Pacific bases.

The 33 areas, or “reference sections”, cover a wide span of regional waterways – from the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea to the western Pacific and eastern Indian oceans – according to the announcement from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), a top government research funder.

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How to Read Xi’s Muscular Message on China’s Global Role

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Xi Jinping used the annual legislative session to lock in his tenure as president and reinforce China’s assertive foreign policy and the reemergence of its economy.

Article by Ian Johnson

March 17, 2023 4:05 pm (EST)

Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to take his oath during the Third Plenary Session of the National People’s Congress.
Chinese President Xi Jinping prepares to take his oath during the Third Plenary Session of the National People’s Congress. Mark R. Cristino/Reuters

This month saw the Chinese rite of spring known as the lianghui, or “two sessions”: the annual meetings of the national advisory committee and the country’s parliament. Neither body holds much power, and it’s easy to write the whole exercise off as empty theater. Yet, public rituals are meant to deliver messages, and this year’s lianghui offered two important points: President Xi Jinping and his muscular foreign policy are here to stay, and China is back open for business after three years of fighting COVID-19—even if its return to growth is bolstered through unsustainable deficit spending.

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Can Chinese Firms Be Truly Private?

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bigdata.csis.org

As China’s economy moved away from state planning and policymakers introduced market reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, many observers expected that in addition to promoting the growth of the Chinese economy, privatization would also have substantial political implications. Most importantly, it was thought that the rise of the private sector could lead to the establishment of an independent business class that would seek to defend its interests, both in the short term through greater policy lobbying and over the longer term by pushing for institutionalized political change, including democratization. The actual economic and political trajectory of China’s private sector has been more complicated and has been a central area of contestation for economic and political power between firms and the Chinese party-state. Although Chinese companies have pushed to have greater autonomy, they have also faced immense pressure to adapt and cede authority in order to survive and grow.

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The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Al Jazeera English – 24 thg 11, 2022

When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most foreigners and multinational companies had already packed up and left Afghanistan.

Going against the stream of foreigners fleeing the country was a group looking for “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunities: Chinese entrepreneurs.

Despite the ongoing unrest, an economic crisis and United Nations’ concerns over human rights, more Chinese citizens are joining the country’s “gold rush”. Once a small minority, Chinese nationals now make up Afghanistan’s biggest group of expatriates.

With exclusive access to leading Chinese investors, 101 East investigates their growing influence across Afghanistan’s business and media sectors.

The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’ | 101 East Documentary

Dealing with Increased Chinese Aggressiveness (2 parts)

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

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PacNet #7 – Dealing with Increased Chinese Aggressiveness – PART ONE

The following are some of the key findings and recommendations from the August 2022 US-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue. PacNet 7 provides a summary of the dialogue. The full report, with expanded key findings and recommendations can be found here.

Taiwan is under attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) politically, economically, psychologically, and militarily—the latter through more aggressive Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) gray zone military operations short of actual direct conflict. This multidimensional threat requires a multidimensional response in ways that complement and enhance military deterrence. PRC behavior represents a global—and not just a Taiwan or US—problem which demands a global response.

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Nuclear Power in China

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world-nuclear.org

(Updated January 2023)

  • The impetus for nuclear power in China is increasingly due to air pollution from coal-fired plants.
  • China’s policy is to have a closed nuclear fuel cycle.
  • China has become largely self-sufficient in reactor design and construction, as well as other aspects of the fuel cycle, but is making full use of western technology while adapting and improving it.
  • Relative to the rest of the world, a major strength is the nuclear supply chain.
  • China’s policy is to ‘go global’ with exporting nuclear technology including heavy components in the supply chain.

Operable Reactors : 53,150 MWe

Reactors Under Construction: 21,867 MWe

Reactors Shutdown: 0 MWe

Electricity sector

Total generation (in 2019): 7541 TWh

Generation mix: 4899 TWh (65%) coal; 1304 TWh (17%) hydro; 406 TWh (5%) wind; 348 TWh (5%) nuclear; 226 TWh (3%) natural gas; 225 TWh (3%) solar; 121 (2%) biofuels & waste.

Import/export balance: 4.4 TWh net export (17.2 TWh imports; 21.7 TWh exports)

Total consumption: 6568 TWh

Per capita consumption: c. 4700 kWh in 2019

Source: International Energy Agency and The World Bank. Data for year 2019

Most of mainland China’s electricity is produced from fossil fuels, predominantly coal – 69% in 2019. Wind and solar capacity in 2019 was 21% of total installed generating capacity, but delivering under 9% of the electricity.

Rapid growth in demand has given rise to power shortages, and the reliance on fossil fuels has led to much air pollution. The economic loss due to pollution is put by the World Bank at almost 6% of GDP,1 and the new leadership from March 2013 prioritized this.* Chronic and widespread smog in the east of the country is attributed to coal burning.

* Official measurements of fine particles in the air measuring less than 2.5 micrometres, which pose the greatest health risk, rose to a record 993 micrograms per cubic metre in Beijing on 12 January 2013, compared with World Health Organization guidelines of no higher than 25.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) notes that since 2012, China has been the country with the largest installed power capacity, and it has increased this by 85% since then to reach 2011 GWe in 2019, about a quarter of global capacity.

In August 2013 the State Council said that China should reduce its carbon emissions by 40-45% by 2020 from 2005 levels, and would aim to boost renewable energy to 15% of its total primary energy consumption by 2020. In 2012 China was the world’s largest source of carbon emissions – 2626 MtC (9.64 Gt CO2), and its increment that year comprised about 70% of the world total increase. In March 2014 the Premier said that the government was declaring “war on pollution” and would accelerate closing coal-fired power stations.

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China’s Failed Covid Vaccine Nationalism

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Beijing rejected foreign mRNA shots, putting its citizens at greater risk.

WSJ.com

The disaster of China’s zero-Covid policy has many contributors, starting with the Communist Party’s need for political control. One of the byproducts of that control that deserves more attention is Beijing’s vaccine nationalism, and President Xi Jinping’s decision not to offer China’s 1.4 billion citizens access to Western-made mRNA Covid vaccines.

Months into the pandemic, as vaccine manufacturers around the world began their race to develop the shots, countries including Canada and the U.S. signed contracts with multiple vaccine suppliers. The fastest and best would be deployed. But China let Communist nationalism drive its procurement decisions and rejected foreign vaccines.

That decision is still haunting the Chinese public. China’s homegrown vaccines—including Sinovac and Sinopharm—are much less effective against Covid than are the mRNA shots created by Pfizer-BioNTech and Moderna. Sinovac was much less effective initially against symptomatic Covid—only about 50%—compared with more than 90% for the mRNA vaccines.

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China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này
CNN Nectar Gan, Jessie Yeung and Laura He ---------- Passengers pull suitcases at a departure lobby in the Beijing international airport on December 27, 2022. After a tumultuous end to a momentous and challenging year, China heads into 2023 with a great deal of uncertainty – and potentially a glimpse of light at the end of the pandemic tunnel.  The chaos unleashed by leader Xi Jinping’s abrupt and ill-prepared exit from zero-Covid is spilling over into the new year, as large swathes of the country face an unprecedented Covid wave.  But the haphazard reopening also offers a glimmer of hope for many: after three years of stifling Covid restrictions and self-imposed global isolation, life in China may finally return to normal as the nation joins the rest of the world in learning to live with the virus.  “We have now entered a new phase of Covid response where tough challenges remain,” Xi said in a nationally televised New Year’s Eve speech. “Everyone is holding on with great fortitude, and the light of hope is right in front of us. Let’s make an extra effort to pull through, as perseverance and solidarity mean victory.”  Tiếp tục đọc “China – From the unwinding of zero-Covid to economic recovery: What to watch in 2023 “ →

New Zealand is done with speaking softly to China

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

Wellington’s shift to a firmer stance on Chinese abuses unlikely to go further

asia.nikkei.com

December 21, 2022 05:00 JST

Jacinda Ardern and Xi Jinping shake hands in Beijing in April 2019: New Zealand is finally waking up to the reality of the potential geostrategic threat posed by China.   © Reuters

Derek Grossman is a senior defense analyst at the think tank RAND Corp. in Santa Monica, California and adjunct professor in the practice of political science and international relations at the University of Southern California. He formerly served as an intelligence adviser at the Pentagon.

During her meeting with Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation leaders’ summit last month in Bangkok, New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern expressed interest in continued cooperation, but also pressed the Chinese president on controversial issues, including Xinjiang, Hong Kong, the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The meeting was the clearest sign yet that Wellington has adopted a harder line on Beijing. This will be good news for allies who have questioned whether New Zealand has been the weak link in collective approaches to countering China. But Wellington’s increasingly hard-line stance could antagonize Beijing, risking what has heretofore been a productive partnership.

For years, Wellington has assiduously tried to keep its political and economic interactions with Beijing separate.

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Xi Jinping Ramps Up China’s Surveillance, Harassment Deep in America

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BY DIDI KIRSTEN TATLOW ON 12/03/22 AT 4:00 AM EST

Share on FacebookShare on TwitterShare on LinkedInShare on RedditShare on FlipboardShare via EmailComments08:22

How Xi Jinping’s Chinese Spies are Striking Fear in U.S. and Beyond

NEWSCHINAUNITED STATESXI JINPINGCHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

AChinese man strikes at a banner saying “Chinese Communist Party Step Down!” in New York City. He is challenged briefly, then disappears in the crowd at a Columbia University protest against China’s “Zero COVID” policy.

Another man pummels a female student after she shouts that Chinese authorities must be held accountable for the deaths of 10 people in a fire in an apartment complex under lockdown in Urumqi, sparking a rare wave of demonstrations in China. In Berkeley, California, a suspected Communist Party supporter sets ablaze a memorial placed by protesters mourning the dead in Urumqi.

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The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

The Chinese entrepreneurs chasing an Afghan ‘gold rush’ | 101 East Documentary

Al Jazeera English – 24 thg 11, 2022

When the Taliban returned to power in August 2021, most foreigners and multinational companies had already packed up and left Afghanistan.

Going against the stream of foreigners fleeing the country was a group looking for “once-in-a-lifetime” opportunities: Chinese entrepreneurs.

Despite the ongoing unrest, an economic crisis and United Nations’ concerns over human rights, more Chinese citizens are joining the country’s “gold rush”. Once a small minority, Chinese nationals now make up Afghanistan’s biggest group of expatriates.

With exclusive access to leading Chinese investors, 101 East investigates their growing influence across Afghanistan’s business and media sectors.

Tự lực tự cường và chip bán dẫn

~ Phạm Thu Hương ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

NGUYỄN TRUNG DÂN 10/11/2022 07:49 GMT+7

TTCT – Sau gần 10 năm, cuộc đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip bán dẫn của Trung Quốc đã thành bại ra sao

Tự lực tự cường và chip bán dẫn - Ảnh 1.

Triển lãm chip của Tsinghua Unigroup. Ảnh: AFP

Sau gần 10 năm, cuộc đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip bán dẫn của Trung Quốc đã thành bại ra sao, và con đường sắp tới sẽ thế nào, khi Tổng bí thư Tập Cận Bình lại vừa kêu gọi đất nước của ông “phải giành chiến thắng trong cuộc chiến công nghệ cốt lõi”?

Năm 2020, Trung Quốc chi 350 tỉ USD cho nhập khẩu chip bán dẫn, trong khi tiền nhập dầu mỏ chỉ có 200 tỉ USD, theo số liệu hải quan. 

Việc Trung Quốc, vốn cung cấp cho thế giới hầu như tất cả các mặt hàng từ lao động thủ công rẻ tiền cho đến cả các mặt hàng công nghệ cao, là nước nhập khẩu dầu mỏ và nhiên liệu lớn nhất thế giới không có gì lạ. 

Song phải chi nhập chip nhiều hơn mua dầu thì đáng chú ý, nhất là khi tính đến 2021 các chính sách chạy đua trong lĩnh vực phát triển và sản xuất chip của nước này đã đi được hơn 7 năm.

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Anti-Xi protest spreads in China and worldwide as Chinese leader begins third term

~ Trần Đình Hoành ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

By CNN Staff

Updated 11:20 PM EDT, Sat October 22, 2022

Anti-Xi posters on a notice board at a university campus in London.

CNN — 

Jolie’s nerves were running high as she walked into the campus of Goldsmiths, the University of London, last Friday morning. She’d planned to arrive early enough that the campus would be deserted, but her fellow students were already beginning to filter in to start their day.

In the hallway of an academic building, Jolie, who’d worn a face mask to obscure her identity, waited for the right moment to reach into her bag for the source of her nervousness – several pieces of A4-size paper she had printed out in the small hours of the night.

Finally, when she made sure none of the students – especially those who, like Jolie, come from China – were watching, she quickly pasted one of them on a notice board.

“Life not zero-Covid policy, freedom not martial-lawish lockdown, dignity not lies, reform not cultural revolution, votes not dictatorship, citizens not slaves,” it read, in English.

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China’s corporate debts

~ Đào Thu Hằng ~ Bình luận về bài viết này

See more: STATE-OWNED FIRMS BEHIND CHINA’S CORPORATE DEBT

qz.com

Published October 28, 2021Last updated July 21, 2022

China has a massive amount of corporate debt. At $27 trillion, it boasts a debt-to-GDP ratio of 159%, almost 60% higher than the global rate and nearly twice that of the US, according to research published this month by S&P Global Ratings.

“China’s growth has been largely driven by two contours: One is credit, and the other is carbon,” says Eunice Tan, one of the report’s lead authors and head of credit research for S&P Global Ratings’ Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing now wants to tame both those economic engines—credit and carbon—while maintaining stability and control, and while continuing to hit GDP growth targets. On the carbon front, it has released a high-level policy framework outlining a path to peaking carbon emissions by 2030. On the credit front, the central bank has sought to tame debt in the property sector and shield banks from exposure to troubled developers.

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