Global Engagement Center Special Report: How the People’s Republic of China Seeks to Reshape the Global Information Environment

REPORT

GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT CENTER

SEPTEMBER 28, 2023

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Every country should have the ability to tell its story to the world. However, a nation’s narrative should be based on facts and rise and fall on its own merits. The PRC employs a variety of deceptive and coercive methods as it attempts to influence the international information environment. Beijing’s information manipulation spans the use of propaganda, disinformation, and censorship. Unchecked, the PRC’s efforts will reshape the global information landscape, creating biases and gaps that could even lead nations to make decisions that subordinate their economic and security interests to Beijing’s.

PRC Information Manipulation

The PRC spends billions of dollars annually on foreign information manipulation efforts.2 Beijing uses false or biased information to promote positive views of the PRC and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At the same time, the PRC suppresses critical information that contradicts its desired narratives on issues such as Taiwan, its human rights practices, the South China Sea, its domestic economy, and international economic engagement. More broadly, the PRC seeks to cultivate and uphold a global incentive structure that encourages foreign governments, elites, journalists, and civil society to accept its preferred narratives and avoid criticizing its conduct.

The PRC’s approach to information manipulation includes leveraging propaganda and censorship, promoting digital authoritarianism, exploiting international organizations and bilateral partnerships, pairing cooptation and pressure, and exercising control of Chinese-language media. Collectively, these five elements could enable Beijing to reshape the global information environment along multiple axes:

Overt and covert influence over content and platforms. Beijing seeks to maximize the reach of biased or false pro-PRC content. It has acquired stakes in foreign media through public and non-public means and sponsored online influencers. Beijing has also secured sometimes restrictive content sharing agreements with local outlets that can result in trusted mastheads providing legitimacy to unlabeled or obscured PRC content. In addition, Beijing has also worked to coopt prominent voices in the international information environment such as foreign political elites and journalists. Beyond focusing on content producers, the PRC has targeted platforms for global information dissemination, for example, investing in digital television services in Africa and satellite networks.

Constraints on global freedom of expression. On issues it deems sensitive, the PRC has employed online and real-world intimidation to silence dissent and encourage self-censorship. The PRC has also taken measures against corporations in situations where they are perceived to have challenged its desired narratives on issues like Xinjiang. Within democratic countries, Beijing has taken advantage of open societies to take legal action to suppress critical voices. On WeChat, an application used by many Chinese-speaking communities outside the PRC, Beijing has exercised technical censorship and harassed individual content producers. Notably, data

harvested by PRC corporations operating overseas have enabled Beijing to fine-tune global censorship by targeting specific individuals and organizations.

An emerging community of digital authoritarians. The PRC promotes digital authoritarianism, which involves the use of digital infrastructure to repress freedom of expression, censor independent news, promote disinformation, and deny other human rights.3 Through disseminating technologies for surveillance and censorship, often through capabilities bundled under the umbrella of “smart” or “safe cities,” the PRC has exported aspects of its domestic information environment globally. Beijing has also propagated information control tactics, with a particular focus on Africa, Asia, and Latin America. In parallel, the PRC has promoted authoritarian digital norms that other countries have adopted at a rapid pace. As other countries emulate the PRC, their information ecosystems have become more receptive to Beijing’s propaganda, disinformation, and censorship requests.

Future Impact

The PRC’s global information manipulation is not simply a matter of public diplomacy – but a challenge to the integrity of the global information space. Unchecked, Beijing’s efforts could result in a future in which technology exported by the PRC, coopted local governments, and fear of Beijing’s direct retaliation produce a sharp contraction of global freedom of expression. Beijing would play a significant – and often hidden – role in determining the print and digital content that audiences in developing countries consume. Multilateral fora and select bilateral relationships would amplify Beijing’s preferred narratives on issues such as Taiwan and the international economy. Access to global data combined with the latest developments in artificial intelligence technology would enable the PRC to surgically target foreign audiences and thereby perhaps influence economic and security decisions in its favor. Lastly, Beijing’s global censorship efforts would result in a highly curated international information environment characterized by gaps and inherent pro-PRC biases.

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China issues white paper on global community of shared future

BEIJING, Sept. 26 (Xinhua) — China’s State Council Information Office on Tuesday released a white paper titled “A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions.”

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China dams make ‘upstream superpower’ presence felt in Asia

asiaa.nikkei.com PAK YIU JULY 24, 2023

Enormous water diversion projects spark concern across region

A large cloud of dust

Description automatically generated

Water is released from the Xiaolangdi Reservoir Dam on the Yellow River in a sand-discharging operation. July 2022, Luoyang, China. (Footage via Getty Images)

Drought in China dried up parts of the Yangtze river last year – but the largest water transfer apparatus ever built still drew from it to supply Beijing’s needs. 

More than a billion cubic meters flowed through the colossal South-to-North Water Diversion Project in 2022. It traveled from a reservoir in central China to millions of households in the capital 1,200 kilometers away. The journey, via underground tunnels and canals that cross the Yellow River, roughly equaled the distance between Amsterdam and Rome.

The movement highlights the scale of China’s measures to shore up water security – and the profound potential effects these have on neighboring countries.

Many of Asia’s transboundary rivers originate in the Indo-Tibetan plateau in China. They flow into 18 downstream nations such as India, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, delivering water to a quarter of the world’s population.


That alone makes the world’s second most populous nation an upstream superpower with enormous influence over irrigation of much of the continent. Projects such as building dams and hydropower plants potentially fuel existing regional political tensions – and create new ones.

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China has plans for grand canals

economist.com

The building scheme is part of an effort to become a “transportation power”

Mandatory Credit: Photo by Xinhua/Shutterstock (13331262b)Aerial photo taken on Aug. 28, 2022 shows a construction site of the Pinglu Canal project in Lingshan County, south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The construction of the Pinglu Canal project officially kicked off on Sunday. The canal, stretching about 135 km, aims to link Xijiang River with ports in the Beibu Gulf. Upon completion, the canal, starting from the Xijin reservoir in city of Hengzhou and ending at Luwu Town of Lingshan County, where ships could reach the Beibu Gulf via the Qinjiang River, will open a shorter route to the sea for Guangxi and other regions in southwest China.China Guangxi Pinglu Canal Project Construction - 28 Aug 2022

Sep 15th 2022Share

These are good times for local officials who want to build expensive infrastructure. To revive a flagging economy, battered by draconian pandemic-control measures, the central government is giving them freer rein. The southern province of Guangxi has a project that fits the bill: a canal costing $10.5bn that will link its main river system to the sea. It will involve a spree of demolition, digging, dredging and building over the next four and a half years. Mulled over for more than a century, the project began last month.

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A Review on Renewable Energy Transition under China’s Carbon Neutrality Target

mdpi.com

by Fuquan Zhao 1,2, Fanlong Bai 1,2, Xinglong Liu 1,2 and Zongwei Liu 1,2,*

1 State Key Laboratory of Automobile Safety and Energy, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China 2Tsinghua Automobile Strategy Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Sustainability 202214(22), 15006; https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215006 Received: 7 October 2022 / Revised: 5 November 2022 / Accepted: 7 November 2022 / Published: 13 November 2022 (This article belongs to the Special Issue Renewable Energy and Sustainable Economy Transition)

Abstract

To achieve their carbon peak and carbon neutrality target, China’s energy transition is seen as the most important instrument. Despite the rapid growth of renewable energy in China, there are still many challenges. Based on the review of the contemporary literature, this paper seeks to present an updated depiction of renewable energy in the Chinese context. The potential, status quo, and related policy of China’s renewable energy are thoroughly investigated. The challenges facing renewable energy development under the carbon neutrality target are analyzed, including enormous transition urgency and pressure, technology, and policy issues. Then, coping strategies are proposed to guide the direction of renewable energy development. Technology paths and policy recommendations are presented. This paper contributes to technology developing and policymaking by providing a comprehensive, thorough, and reliable review of renewable energy development in China.

Keywords: 

renewableenergy transitionpolicy incentivetechnology pathpower system

1. Introduction

In recent years, climate change and energy issues have become the prominent global challenge and a major concern of China. In 2020, president Xi Jinping pledged to achieve carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 (referred to as the dual carbon target). China’s energy sector, which heavily relies on fossil energy, especially coal, is the largest contributor to China’s carbon emissions [1]. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s energy consumption accounts for nearly 90% of China’s total CO2 emissions in 2020 [2]. The carbon neutrality target poses a huge challenge to China’s energy system, causing energy transition to be the key to the overall decarbonization of China’s economy and society.

Despite aggressive energy transition goals, China still faces many challenges in the energy sector. In terms of energy supply, fossil fuel still dominates with the problem of overcapacity to be addressed [1,3,4]. The supply and consumption of renewable energy resources in China are also highly mismatched, the center of renewable energy is in the northwest, and the electricity consumption center is in the east. In terms of energy consumption, the load profile of energy is becoming increasingly complex and the regional energy distribution is becoming more diversified, which demands a higher power system flexibility [5]. Moreover, China’s economy is still growing at a considerable rate and renewable energy cannot independently meet the energy requirement of the economy’s growth. Effective incentives for promoting renewable energy consumption are yet to be formulated [6].

In facing the above difficulties during the energy transition, renewable energy is recognized as the most important instrument and has attracted more and more attention. China has rich reserves of renewable energy. In recent years, the development of renewable energy has been impressively rapid. At present, renewable energy has accounted for nearly 30% of China’s electricity generation [7,8]. China has shown a great commitment to renewable energy. The target of renewable energy generation was set to taking up more than 50% of China’s total installed power generation by the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan [9]. It is estimated that by 2060, China will invest about RMB 122 trillion to build a new power system with clean energy as the main body [10].

There are many studies on the renewable energy transition in China. They can be classified into two groups. The first group of studies focus on quantitative analysis of the development of renewable energy. For example, Zhang et al. adopted the China TIMES model to analyze the required renewable energy supply and electrification rate in achieving carbon peak. The results showed that if emissions peak in 2025, the carbon neutrality goal demands a 45–62% electrification rate and 47–78% renewable energy in primary energy supply in 2050 [11]. Another study predicted that by 2050, renewable energy would account for 60% of the total energy consumption and 90% of the total power generation and the electrification rate would be close to 60% [12]. Liu et al. studied the latest hourly wind and solar data from 2007–2014 and provided the optimal wind/solar ratio for hybrid wind-solar energy systems [13]. Wen et al. presented an approach for the quantitative analysis of energy transition. They explained whether China’s cumulative carbon emissions can match the emission allowances under the global 2 °C target and provided directions for the low-carbon transition.

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Sudan conflict: how China and Russia are involved and the differences between them

theconversation.com

Published: June 8, 2023 12.44pm BST

As clashes continue between the Sudanese military and rapid support forces, the current and historic role of foreign governments in Sudanese affairs is under close examination.

Unsurprisingly, the Sudan conflict has amplified concerns from the US and other countries about the roles Russia and China are playing in Sudan specifically, and in Africa.

Researchers had been concerned that Beijing’s loans for infrastructure and development to countries including Sudan might be “debt-trap diplomacy”, a predatory attempt to acquire key foreign infrastructure such as ports.

Analysts had previously suggested the implications of China’s growing military engagement with Africa including establishing naval bases and its use of security contractors are examples of Beijing wanting to expand its military power and political influence abroad.

Others have suggested that Russian activity in Africa could be a return to Soviet-era levels of influence through arms sales, joint military exercises, and installing their own set of security contractors to train the Sudanese military.

The Wagner Group, a high profile group of Russian mercenaries, has denied any involvement in events in Sudan, saying in a post on Telegram: “Due to the large number of inquiries from various foreign media about Sudan, most of which are provocative, we consider it necessary to inform everyone that Wagner staff have not been in Sudan for more than two years.”

China favours stability

Our work for PeaceRep, an international research consortium led by Edinburgh law school, suggests that the US and Europe should be cautious about lumping Russia and China’s goals in Africa together. It found that Beijing and Moscow are taking different approaches. China has its own set of interests, but its approach appears to fundamentally favour stability.

As a result, China is keener to work with the broader international community on issues such as peacekeeping and mediation of conflicts. Conversely, Russia pursues its interests in Africa without as much cooperation with international institutions.

Our new report looks at the available data for pre-war Sudan to see how well claims from scholars and commentators match Russia and China’s behaviour.

We consolidated data from the United Nations, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the AidData research lab on Chinese and Russian engagement with Sudan, as well as news reports to examine how well the arguments from scholars and policymakers hold up.

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The Global Movement Against China’s Economic Coercion Is Accelerating

COMMENTARY, RAND Corporation

(The Hill)G7 leaders before a meeting on economic security during the G7 summit, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan, May 20, 2023, photo by Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

G7 leaders before a meeting on economic security during the G7 summit, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan, May 20, 2023

Photo by Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

by Bryan Frederick and Howard J. Shatz

June 9, 2023

With the launch of the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion in May, the Group of Seven (G7) leading economies have taken an important step after years of U.S. allies and partners facing coercion from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) alone. Tiếp tục đọc “The Global Movement Against China’s Economic Coercion Is Accelerating”

Thâm Quyến: Trao quyền phải trao cho tới

NGUYỄN THÀNH TRUNG – 26/06/2023 06:21 GMT+7

TTCTNếu như Trung Quốc có bao giờ thực hiện thành công một cuộc Đại nhảy vọt, thì đó chính là ở Thâm Quyến. Và lý do cơ bản của thành công này là vì thành phố này được phân quyền một cách đích thực.

Tôi vẫn còn nhớ cách đây khoảng 10 năm, một người bạn Hong Kong dẫn tôi tới dải đất sát bờ biển Hong Kong, chỉ vào một dãy nhà cao tầng san sát ở bờ bên kia và nói đó là thành phố Thâm Quyến.

Anh kể trước đây rất nhiều người Trung Quốc đại lục bị hấp dẫn bởi Hong Kong phồn hoa đã bơi từ Trung Quốc đại lục để vượt biên, nhập cảnh trái phép vào Hong Kong. Tôi bèn hỏi vui: “Bây giờ còn không anh?”. Anh trả lời rất nhanh: “Bên đó bây giờ thậm chí còn giàu hơn bên đây thì vượt biên làm gì”.

Một góc Thâm Quyến nhìn từ trên cao. Ảnh: Tân Hoa xã (chụp ngày 13-8-2020).Một góc Thâm Quyến nhìn từ trên cao. Ảnh: Tân Hoa xã (chụp ngày 13-8-2020).

Anh bạn Hong Kong không quá lời. Giờ đây, GDP của Thâm Quyến đã vượt Hong Kong. Thành phố đại lục này cũng đi trước Hong Kong về đổi mới công nghệ và là nơi có nhiều công ty nằm trong top 500 công ty thành công nhất thế giới. Năm 2019, Liên đoàn Công nghiệp và Thương mại toàn Trung Quốc đã thực hiện cuộc khảo sát cho thấy Thâm Quyến được coi là thành phố kinh doanh số 1 Trung Quốc. Tiếp tục đọc “Thâm Quyến: Trao quyền phải trao cho tới”

‘Don’t see why not’: China envoy on backing Ukraine’s ’91 borders

China’s EU envoy, Fu Cong, says Beijing respects the territorial integrity of all countries and stands for peace.

fu cong
Fu Cong, China’s ambassador to the EU and former head of the arms control department of the Chinese foreign ministry, speaks at a news conference in Beijing [File Photo: Shubing Wang/Reuters]

By Priyanka Shankar

Published On 27 Jun 202327 Jun 2023 AL JAREEZA

Brussels, Belgium – China’s envoy to the European Union has suggested that Beijing could back Ukraine’s aims of reclaiming its 1991 territorial integrity, which includes Crimea – the peninsula annexed by Russia in 2014.

In a recent interview with Al Jazeera and two other media outlets, when Fu Cong was asked about supporting Kyiv’s goals, which includes reclaiming other Ukrainian regions now occupied by Russia, the senior Chinese diplomat said: “I don’t see why not.

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Can Vietnam Replace China? No, But it was Never Supposed to Either

vietnam-briefing.com

March 27, 2023Posted by Vietnam BriefingWritten by Pritesh SamuelReading Time: 

An opinion piece in Bloomberg titled ‘Trying to Replace China’s Supply Chains? Don’t Bother?’, published March 1, 2023, claims that ‘Vietnamese factories were supposed to save globalization’ but that they cannot. This is incorrect and here’s why, writes Dezan Shira and Associates, Head of Business Intelligence, Pritesh Samuel.


Vietnam’s factories were never supposed to save globalization. They offer businesses an alternate location for manufacturing – in line with a China+1 strategy that myriad companies now pursue due to rising costs in China.

Globalization is shaped by several factors, including geopolitics, national interests of governments, regional trade and investment initiatives, public policymaking directives by key trade bodies, and so on. It cannot be trivialized into the assumption that a single country can save it.

China’s advanced supply chain and supplier network, driven by the government’s long-term national policies, make it a manufacturing giant. At present, no single country, including Vietnam, can fully replace China’s manufacturing capacity.

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3 Nuclear Superpowers, Rather Than 2, Usher In a New Strategic Era

nytimes.com

China is on track to massively expand its nuclear arsenal, just as Russia suspends the last major arms control treaty. It augurs a new world in which Beijing, Moscow and Washington will likely be atomic peers.

By David E. SangerWilliam J. Broad and Chris Buckley David E. Sanger and William J. Broad have covered nuclear weapons for The Times for four decades. Chris Buckley reports on China’s military from Taiwan.

  • April 19, 2023

阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版

WASHINGTON — On the Chinese coast, just 135 miles from Taiwan, Beijing is preparing to start a new reactor the Pentagon sees as delivering fuel for a vast expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal, potentially making it an atomic peer of the United States and Russia. The reactor, known as a fast breeder, excels at making plutonium, a top fuel of atom bombs.

The nuclear material for the reactor is being supplied by Russia, whose Rosatom nuclear giant has in the past few months completed the delivery of 25 tons of highly enriched uranium to get production started. That deal means that Russia and China are now cooperating on a project that will aid their own nuclear modernizations and, by the Pentagon’s estimates, produce arsenals whose combined size could dwarf that of the United States.

This new reality is prompting a broad rethinking of American nuclear strategy that few anticipated a dozen years ago, when President Barack Obama envisioned a world that was inexorably moving toward eliminating all nuclear weapons. Instead, the United States is now facing questions about how to manage a three-way nuclear rivalry, which upends much of the deterrence strategy that has successfully avoided nuclear war.

China’s expansion, at a moment when Russia is deploying new types of arms and threatening to use battlefield nuclear weapons against Ukraine, is just the latest example of what American strategists see as a new, far more complex era compared to what the United States lived through during the Cold War.

China insists the breeder reactors on the coast will be purely for civilian purposes, and there is no evidence that China and Russia are working together on the weapons themselves, or a coordinated nuclear strategy to confront their common adversary.

But John F. Plumb, a senior Pentagon official, told Congress recently: “There’s no getting around the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is for weapons.”

It may only be the beginning. In a little-noticed announcement when President Xi Jinping of China met President Vladimir V. Putin in Moscow last month, Rosatom and the China Atomic Energy Authority signed an agreement to extend their cooperation for years, if not decades.

President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir V. Putin walk side by side smiling down a hall with people in suits.
When President Xi Jinping of China met President Vladimir V. Putin in Moscow last month, Russia and China’s nuclear authorities signed an agreement to extend their cooperation for years.Credit…Grigory Sysoyev/Agence France-Presse, via Sputnik

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Xi upends secret world of US$10,000 an hour China experts

bloomberg.com

Beijing clamps down on ‘expert networks’ over threats to national security, sending shockwaves through the financial world with experts saying the move will derail China’s push to attract foreign investors

Private conversations with corporate insiders and ex-government officials that cost upwards of US$10,000 an hour. Coded language and blurred regulatory lines.

For hedge funds and other global investors, China’s vast web of “expert networks” has become a key tool for navigating an opaque but potentially lucrative economic powerhouse. For Xi Jinping’s (習近平) Communist Party, the secretive industry represents something far more ominous: a threat to national security that must be reined in.

That contradiction is now sending shockwaves through the financial world as China’s government cracks down on the expert networks it had showered in praise less than a decade ago during Xi’s first term as president. The anti-espionage campaign — which centers on Capvision, a giant of the industry with offices in Shanghai and New York — has reignited concern among China watchers that Xi’s fixation on security and tightening grip on information will derail his push to attract foreign investors.

In this image taken from undated video footage run by China’s CCTV, Chinese police raid the Capvision office in Shanghai. China’s chief foreign intelligence agency has raided the offices of business consulting firm Capvision in Beijing and other Chinese cities as part of an ongoing crackdown on foreign businesses that provide sensitive economic data. Photo: AP

ABRUPT CRACKDOWN

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Japan’s quiet leadership as it hosts the G7 summit in Hiroshima

brookings.edu

Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, explains the significance of Japan hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima, and how Tokyo centers its foreign policy on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This is Japan’s grand strategy,” Solís says, “this is really the roadmap that Japan has charted to achieve its security and prosperity.”

Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at Brookings, explains the significance of Japan hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima, and how Tokyo centers its foreign policy on promoting a free and open Indo-Pacific region. “This is Japan’s grand strategy,” Solís says, “this is really the roadmap that Japan has charted to achieve its security and prosperity.”

TRANSCRIPT

[music]

DOLLAR: Hi, I’m David Dollar, host of the Brookings Trade podcast Dollar and Sense. Today, my guest is Mireya Solís, director of the Center for East Asian Policy Studies here at Brookings. Mireya is a leading expert on Japan’s trade and economic diplomacy, and she has a book coming out this summer on Japan’s quiet leadership. And one aspect of this quiet leadership, or maybe not so quiet right now, is Japan will be hosting the G7 summit in Hiroshima starting on May 19. That’s the main thing we’re going to talk about.

Because of the Memorial Day holiday in the United States, we’re going to push back production one week. So, the next episode will come out on June 5th.

So, welcome to the show, Mireya.

SOLÍS: Thank you so much, David. It’s a pleasure to be here.

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China doesn’t want peace in Ukraine, Czech president warns

In an interview, Petr Pavel — a former general with NATO — argued China is benefiting too much from the war to play peacemaker.

SLOVAKIA-CZECH-POLITICS-DIPLOMACY
Allies need to focus more on their military capabilities and ensuring that they have well-equipped forces at high readiness, according to the Petr Pavel | Vldimir Simicek/AFP via Getty Images

BY LILI BAYER AND KETRIN JOCHECOVÁ

APRIL 25, 2023 4:03 AM CET, Politico.eu

China cannot be trusted to mediate peace between Russia and Ukraine, Czech President Petr Pavel is warning, telling POLITICO that Beijing benefits from prolonging the war. 

His comments come as China is trying to position itself as a peacemaker in Ukraine, recently floating a vague roadmap to ending the conflict. And while most Western allies have been skeptical of the overtures, some countries like France insist China could play a major role in peace talks.

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