Introducing SeaLight 333

Sealight 333 Episode 1 – Phlippines v. China – The 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award

None of the Reefs or Rocks in the Spratly Islands Are Big Enough to Generate Their Own EEZ

SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way.

Ray Powell | JULY 11, 2023

Introducing SeaLight 333

Ray Powell

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SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way. 

Our first video explains the meaning of the 2016 Aribitral Tribunal case, Philippines v. China, and why the Philippines’ victory was so important infirmly establishing how China’s expansive nine-dash line claim–and the aggressive methods it uses to enforce it–systematically violate the rights of the Philippines and all its smaller neighbors.

Ray Powell

Ray is the Director of SeaLight and Project Lead for Project Myoushu at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. He’s a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force and was a 2021 Fellow at Stanford’s Distinguished Careers Institute.

Buoys Placed in the Spratly Islands

PUBLISHED: JULY 11, 2023, ATMI

In May, the Philippines and China took turns installing buoys in the disputed Spratly Islands. The deployment of buoys and other sovereignty markers in the South China Sea has a long history. But amid a flurry of new activity by the Philippines, including publicized patrols and surveillance missions, it is noteworthy that the buoy deployment triggered an almost immediate reaction from China, which installed its own. And with the Philippines planning to install more buoys by the end of 2023, this trend will remain a point of contention between Manila and Beijing for the foreseeable future.

On May 15, the Philippine Coast Guard installed 30-foot navigational buoys at five features in the Spratly Islands: Philippine-occupied Flat Island, Loaita Island, and Loaita Cay, and unoccupied Irving Reef and Whitsun Reef. The buoys are of the same type as five installed in May of 2022 at four Philippine-occupied features: Nanshan Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, and Thitu Island.

BUOY BATTLE IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS


PUBLISHED: JULY 11, 2023 CSIS

In May, the Philippines and China took turns installing buoys in the disputed Spratly Islands. The deployment of buoys and other sovereignty markers in the South China Sea has a long history. But amid a flurry of new activity by the Philippines, including publicized patrols and surveillance missions, it is noteworthy that the buoy deployment triggered an almost immediate reaction from China, which installed its own. And with the Philippines planning to install more buoys by the end of 2023, this trend will remain a point of contention between Manila and Beijing for the foreseeable future. Tiếp tục đọc “BUOY BATTLE IN THE SPRATLY ISLANDS”

2016 Philippines v. China: Arbitration Outcomes

On July 12 , 2016, an arbitral tribunal issued a long-awaited ruling in Manila’s case against Beijing’s claims in the South China Sea. How did the judges rule and how does the area of the South China Sea they found to be legally disputed compare to China’s infamous nine-dash line claim?

The tribunal invalidated Beijing’s claims to ill-defined historic rights throughout the nine-dash line, found that Scarborough Shoal is a rock entitled only to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, and surprised many observers by ruling on the legal status of every feature in the Spratly Islands raised by the Philippines. It found that none of the Spratlys, including the largest natural features—Itu Aba, Thitu Island, Spratly Island, Northeast Cay, and Southwest Cay—are legally islands because they cannot sustain a stable human community or independent economic life. As such, they are entitled only to territorial seas, not EEZs or continental shelves. Of the seven Spratlys occupied by China, the court ruled that Johnson Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Fiery Cross Reef, and Gaven Reef are rocks, while Hughes Reef and Mischief Reef are below water at high-tide and therefore generate no maritime entitlements of their own. It also ruled that Kennan Reef is a low-tide elevation, while Second Thomas Shoal and Reed Bank are submerged and belong to the Philippine continental shelf. Taken together, these decisions effectively invalidate any Chinese claim within the nine-dash line to more than the disputed islets themselves and the territorial seas they generate.

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Thỏa thuận an ninh ngáng chân Trung Quốc ở Thái Bình Dương

VNE – Thứ ba, 20/6/2023, 13:47 (GMT+7)

Thỏa thuận an ninh ký với Papua New Guinea và Philippines giúp Mỹ hoàn thiện bố phòng quân sự, ngăn ảnh hưởng của Trung Quốc tại khu vực.

Thỏa thuận Hợp tác Quốc phòng (DCA) được Mỹ ký với Papua New Guinea hồi tháng 5 sẽ cho phép quân đội Mỹ toàn quyền tiếp cận mọi cảng biển cùng sân bay tại quốc gia có diện tích lớn nhất và đông dân nhất trong nhóm các đảo quốc Thái Bình Dương.

Vị trí chuỗi đảo thứ nhất và chuỗi đảo thứ hai. Đồ họa: Cofda

Giới quan sát đánh giá thỏa thuận này là một động thái lớn, giúp Mỹ cải thiện đáng kể khả năng hỗ trợ các căn cứ quân sự trên đảo Guam, đồng thời ngăn chặn ảnh hưởng ngày càng tăng của Trung Quốc ở khu vực nam Thái Bình Dương.

Tiếp tục đọc “Thỏa thuận an ninh ngáng chân Trung Quốc ở Thái Bình Dương”

Cambodia seeks to sink joint ASEAN naval drills

Indonesia proposal for first-ever bloc exercises in South China Sea meets vocal resistance from China’s top regional ally Cambodia

By RICHARD JAVAD HEYDARIAN JUNE 17, 2023 Asia Times

A Cambodian naval officer salutes at the Ream Naval Base in a file photo. Image: Twitter

Rising Sino-American rivalry and fears of an accidental superpower clash are forcing states to step up their diplomatic games.

That’s particularly true for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is now scrambling to forge greater internal unity and nudge the US and China toward greater dialogue to avoid a conflict in its neighborhood.

Tiếp tục đọc “Cambodia seeks to sink joint ASEAN naval drills”

PULLING BACK THE CURTAIN ON CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA


PUBLISHED: NOVEMBER 18, 2021 CSIS

Over the past year, the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and the Center for Advanced Defense Studies conducted a study of China’s maritime militia using remote sensing data and open-source Chinese language research. The resulting report, Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia, features the most comprehensive study to-date of the structure, subsidies, and ownership networks of China’s maritime militia in the South China Sea, as well as a methodology for identifying Chinese maritime militia vessels and a list of over 120 militia vessels thus identified.

The full report can be accessed here:

Pulling Back the Curtain on China’s Maritime Militia (full PDF download)

Translations:

Menyingkap Semula Tirai Tentera Maritim Cina (Malay Translation)

Vén màn sự thật về Dân quân Hàng hải Trung Quốc (Vietnamese Translation)

Executive Summary

Since completing the construction of its artificial island outposts in the Spratly Islands in 2016, China has shifted its focus toward asserting control over peacetime activity across the South China Sea. A key component of this shift has been the expansion of China’s maritime militia—a force of vessels ostensibly engaged in commercial fishing but which in fact operate alongside Chinese law enforcement and military to achieve Chinese political objectives in disputed waters.

Tiếp tục đọc “PULLING BACK THE CURTAIN ON CHINA’S MARITIME MILITIA”

Chinese Survey Vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10’s Encroachment on Vietnam’s Waters: Intention and Consequences

30/05/2023 Nghiencuubiendong

    

In response to reporters’ questions on the afternoon of May 25, 2023, Deputy Spokeswoman of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Pham Thu Hang said that Chinese survey vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10 (XYH-10), Coast Guard vessels, and fishing ships had violated Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) established in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982).[1] According to Reuters, the ship XYH-10 and its escorts have appeared in Vietnam’s EEZ since May 8.[2] Data from open vessel-tracking sources such as Marine Traffic or Sea Vision also show this occurrence. Looking back from the beginning of 2023 until now, China has deployed many so-called “survey and research vessels” to operate in Vietnam’s EEZ, such as the case of the Haiyang Dizhi 4 in early March 2023, but it is noteworthy that the XYH-10 this time is approaching the coast of Vietnam and blatantly conducting activities that China calls “normal”. Against the backdrop of China’s efforts to build the image of a “responsible major power”, this move of China has obviously infringed on the UNCLOS and seriously violated Vietnam’s sovereign rights and jurisdiction in its EEZ and continental shelf established in accordance with UNCLOS.

Tiếp tục đọc “Chinese Survey Vessel Xiang Yang Hong 10’s Encroachment on Vietnam’s Waters: Intention and Consequences”

Tàu Hướng Dương Hồng 10 của Trung Quốc vi phạm vùng biển Việt Nam: Ý đồ và Hậu quả quốc tế

Nghiencuubiendong – 26/05/2023

Trả lời câu hỏi phóng viên chiều ngày 25/5/2023, Phó Phát ngôn Bộ Ngoại giao Việt Nam Phạm Thu Hằng cho biết, tàu khảo sát Hướng Dương Hồng 10 (XYH-10) của Trung Quốc cùng một số tàu hải cảnh, tàu cá bảo vệ đã xâm phạm vùng đặc quyền kinh tế của Việt Nam được xác lập phù hợp với các quy định của Công ước Liên Hiệp Quốc về Luật biển năm 1982. Trước đó, theo tin từ Reuters, tàu XYH-10 cùng loạt tàu hộ tống đã xuất hiện tại vùng đặc quyền kinh tế của Việt Nam từ ngày 8/5.    

Tiếp tục đọc “Tàu Hướng Dương Hồng 10 của Trung Quốc vi phạm vùng biển Việt Nam: Ý đồ và Hậu quả quốc tế”

Philippines-Vietnam teaming up on China in South China Sea

Marcos Jr-Chinh reviving dormant de facto alliance to check, balance and challenge China in disputed and militarized waters

By RICHARD JAVAD HEYDARIAN MAY 25, 2023 Asia Times

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr and Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh are in a strategic embrace. Image: Facebook

MANILA – Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has not only revitalized defense ties with traditional Western allies but has also doubled down on strategic cooperation with like-minded regional states pushing back against China’s South China Sea assertiveness.

In particular, Vietnam has emerged as a pivotal player in the Philippines’ emerging regional strategy to constrain and roll back China’s ambitions in the hotly contested and geostrategically crucial maritime area.

Tiếp tục đọc “Philippines-Vietnam teaming up on China in South China Sea”