This tactic consists of blasting another ship with a powerful stream of water using a high-pressure water cannon.
Gaute Friis | AUGUST 7, 2023
CCG 31101 blasts a VCG vessel with water cannon, May 5, 2014. (Source: VCG)
Gaute Friis
Analyst
As of this writing, the Philippines has just produced evidence that its coast guard and resupply vessels were subjected to assault by water cannons from China Coast Guard ships on 5 August 2023. This occurred during the regular rotation and resupply mission to the Philippine Navy’s outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, and is reminiscent of a similar incident in November 2021.
While China’s use of maritime gray zone tactics is well known, few resources describe the actual tactics in detail. We’ve developed a publicly available systematic examination of these concrete tactics, which we will roll out for you in the coming weeks.
Spoofing is the act of deceptively and deliberately falsifying a vessel’s AIS identifying information or location.
Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 3, 2023
A China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter transmits fraudulent AIS signals to nearby vessels, appearing as a fishing boat on their monitoring equipment (Credit: Gaille Powell).
Gaute Friis
Analyst
Spoofing is a deception tactic meant to disrupt monitoring of maritime activities. It is frequently employed by Chinese gray zone actors in the South China Sea. In contrast to the “going dark” tactic of simply disabling a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) broadcast, the spoofing tactic involves manipulating transmitting signals in order to falsify a vessel’s identity and/or location.
Cable-cutting is a sabotage and harassment tactic in which a ship will attempt to sever the cable to another ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.
Gaute Friis | JULY 26, 2023
Chinese fisherman using a boat hook pole in an attempt to snag the cable connecting U.S ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable’s towed sonar array, March 8, 2009. (Source: USN)
Gaute Friis, analyst
This tactic is an act of sabotage which aim to cut the cables to a ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.
Cable-cutting is most frequently used against commercial research vessels conducting survey operations in disputed maritime zones, such as within China’s huge “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea.
Dazzlers are non-lethal laser weapons meant to cause temporary blindness in humans or confound sensors. Recently employed against the Philippine Coast Guard, laser dazzlers have also been employed against U.S. and Australian military helicopters and surveillance planes operating in the region.
Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
CCG 5205 firing laser at Philippine Coast Guard cutter BRP Malapascua, February 6, 2023 (Source: Philippine Coast Guard)
Gaute Friis Analyst
Dazzlers are an emerging category of non-lethal but potentially dangerous weapons and a relatively recent addition to China’s gray zone arsenal. They can be used as a harassment tool; for destroying sensitive electro-optical sensors as an electronic warfare component; or as a weapon of psychological warfare.
Dazzlers are not themselves considered illegal. The U.S. military — which refers to them as “non-lethal optical distractors” — considers them an essential capability to “minimize fatalities, protect the innocent and limit collateral damage” when the alternative is lethal force, with the caveat that:
“Prior to fielding, all previously and currently fielded lasers or distracter devices have undergone legal reviews to ensure compliance with obligations assumed by the U.S. under applicable treaties, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict.”
China has used dazzlers to temporarily blind the crew of other countries’ ships. Because dazzlers have both physical and psychological effects their use against vessels at sea is hazardous, eroding their crews’ ability to navigate and react to maritime contingencies.
As detailed in our “going dark” playbook entry, a Chinese Coast Guard cutter used a dazzler to harass a Philippine resupply escort mission on February 6th, 2023.
The Philippine Coast Guard later clarified that was the second time this had occurred during a resupply mission.
Note: Any use of lasers to permanently blind personnel is illegal under Protocol IV (Blinding Laser Weapons) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which China joined in 1998.
The latest “standard map” released by China on August 28, 2023, has sparked a rare display of unity among its neighbours against the expanded territorial claims by Beijing. Japan joined a list of countries, which also include India, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, that have lodged protests against territorial claims by China in disputed areas in the region. The release of the new map came ahead of the attendance of Chinese Premier Li Qiang at two key summits: Asean and the Group of 20.
The South China Sea is a crucial waterway in Asia – and a source of regional tensions. Without a code of conduct, Filipinos living in or near disputed waters say they are being impacted by overlapping territorial claims.
Near Scarborough Shoal, fishermen are struggling to eke out a living, as they cannot easily enter some fishing grounds. A tour to the Spratly Islands shows how tensions are playing out, with radio challenges and the constant presence of vessels from some claimant states.
Thitu Island, also known as Pagasa – meaning “hope” – is a crucial outpost for the Philippines in the Spratlys. But infrastructure is limited; and while there are plans to ramp up the building of facilities, this also means pressure on the marine ecosystem, in a region where conflicting claims risk overshadowing the need for marine conservation. CNA Correspondent travels to the contested waters of the South China Sea to find out how the dispute is affecting the Philippines and its people
0:00 Introduction 0:48 Fishing challenges in Scarborough Shoal 6:58 Tourism in trouble at Spratly Islands? 15:25 Limited infrastructure on remote outpost 18:52 Amid conflicting claims, hope for marine protection?
Seven years have passed since the July 2016 South China Sea arbitral ruling was issued. Through 2022, most countries’ positions on the arbitration had remained the same as their initial positions taken in the weeks following the ruling. But in the last year, amid renewed concern for international rules and norms in the wake of the war in Ukraine and with a more active Philippine policy on the South China Sea, numerous countries have voiced their support for the ruling as legally binding.
Rafting is the tactic of tying ships at anchor together to establish a semi-persistent floating outpost that is hard to uproot.
Gaute Friis | JULY 16, 2023
Rows of PAFMM trawlers rafting near Whitsun Reef, March 25, 2021 (Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Maxar Technologies)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
“Rafting” refers to the gray zone tactic of tying ships together at anchor to establish semi-persistent floating outposts that are difficult disperse due to their collective mass.
The ships are generally the component of China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) known as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV). According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s detailed report on the PAFMM, these SBFVs receive generous government subsidies to remain at sea for most of the year, specifically to assert Beijing’s expansive maritime claims.
This tactic describes maneuvering one’s ship dangerously across the bow of another, often forcing the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision.
Gaute Friis | JULY 18, 2023 Sealight 333
PLAN Destroyer Lanzhou, at right, is seen here sailing within 40 meters of the USS Decatur, to the left (Source: USN)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Bow-crossing describes a harassment tactic in which a ship abruptly maneuvers to cross dangerously across the bow of another in violation of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) and the 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
This maneuver is intended to force the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision. It may be used to disrupt freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) or other assertions of international law or national sovereignty.
A recent example was documented in June 2023, when a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel crossed dangerously in front of U.S. Navy destroyer USS Chung-Hoon during a joint Taiwan Strait passage with the Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal, forcing the U.S. ship to reduce speed to avoid a collision:
China’s ships use bow-crossing to protest the activities of other countries’ ships in waters over which it claims sovereignty or jurisdiction, and to send the message that Beijing is willing to escalate tensions in defense of its claims.
In nautical terms, it involves a closest point of approach (CPA) of less than 2 lengths of the ship being intercepted. They are usually referred to by the U.S. Navy as “unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers”.
Other examples:
On September 30, 2018, the PLAN Type 052C Luyang II-class destroyer Lanzhou intercepted the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Decatur, which was conducting a FONOP with 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied artificial islands in the South China Sea. The picture at the top of this post shows how close the two ships came to colliding.
On June 21, 2014, CCG vessel Haijian 2168 approached Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) ship CSB 4032 at high speed. The VCG ship had to change directions repeatedly to avoid a collision as the distance between the two ships came within 30 meters.
On December 5, 2013, a Chinese warship cut across the bow of the missile cruiser U.S.S. Cowpens at a distance of less than 200 yards in international waters.
In March 2009, five Chinese ships (a combination of PLAN, CCG and militia) harassed the U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable in international waters in the South China Sea, forcing the American ship to make an emergency maneuver to avoid a collision.
Editor’s note: This post was originally published on 7 July under the title “Unsafe Maneuvers”, but was retracted when we decided to divide it into two separate categories. Apologies for any confusion.
Gaute Friis
Gaute is a Defense Innovation Scholar at Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National Sec
Swarming is a commonly used tactic involving dispatching a flotilla to overwhelm and intimidate other actors, assert dominance, or provide a security screen for certain Chinese ships on special missions.
Chinese fishing vessels head out to sea from Zhoushan in Zhejiang Province, China. (Source: China Foto Press)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Swarming is a commonly used tactic involving dispatching a flotilla (often a combination of militia, coast guard, and sometimes navy vessels) to overwhelm and intimidate other countries’ assets, assert dominance, or provide a security screen for certain Chinese ships on special missions.
Examples:
Starting on May 7, 2023, Chinese survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 10 and a flotilla of escort vessels consisting of China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Militia (PAFMM) vessels spent nearly a month conducting survey operations deep within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). These activities led to a formal protest from the Vietnamese government.
On March 4, 2023, one People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship, one CCG ship and 42 PAFMM vessels gathered near Thitu Island. Thitu Island (also known as Pag-Asa) is home to one of the Philippines’ most important military outposts in the West Philippine Sea, as well as a small civilian population.
On July 22, 2014, a Vietnamese fishing boat was surrounded by Chinese vessels 5 nautical miles South of Collins Reef. Chinese coast guard ships then rammed the fishing boat, which nearly sank.
On June 29, 2014, 45 nautical miles to the southwest of Paracel Islands, about 34 Chinese fishing vessels, supported by 2 coast guard ships, closely followed, obstructed and intimidated Vietnamese fishing vessels operating in the area.
Sealight 333 Episode 1 – Phlippines v. China – The 2016 Arbitral Tribunal Award
None of the Reefs or Rocks in the Spratly Islands Are Big Enough to Generate Their Own EEZ
SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way.
Ray Powell | JULY 11, 2023
Ray Powell
Team Member
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SeaLight is pleased to announce the first of our new video educational series, SeaLight 333. Over the coming months we will be developing these short-form videos to explain key maritime gray zone concepts in a very accessible way.
Our first video explains the meaning of the 2016 Aribitral Tribunal case, Philippines v. China, and why the Philippines’ victory was so important infirmly establishing how China’s expansive nine-dash line claim–and the aggressive methods it uses to enforce it–systematically violate the rights of the Philippines and all its smaller neighbors.
Ray Powell
Ray is the Director of SeaLight and Project Lead for Project Myoushu at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation. He’s a 35-year veteran of the U.S. Air Force and was a 2021 Fellow at Stanford’s Distinguished Careers Institute.
In May, the Philippines and China took turns installing buoys in the disputed Spratly Islands. The deployment of buoys and other sovereignty markers in the South China Sea has a long history. But amid a flurry of new activity by the Philippines, including publicized patrols and surveillance missions, it is noteworthy that the buoy deployment triggered an almost immediate reaction from China, which installed its own. And with the Philippines planning to install more buoys by the end of 2023, this trend will remain a point of contention between Manila and Beijing for the foreseeable future.
On May 15, the Philippine Coast Guard installed 30-foot navigational buoys at five features in the Spratly Islands: Philippine-occupied Flat Island, Loaita Island, and Loaita Cay, and unoccupied Irving Reef and Whitsun Reef. The buoys are of the same type as five installed in May of 2022 at four Philippine-occupied features: Nanshan Island, West York Island, Northeast Cay, and Thitu Island.
CVD 