“Going dark” refers to the gray zone tactic of strategically turning off a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) transponder to avoid detection.
Miao Shou | AUGUST 17, 2023
Vessels operating without AIS inside a country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). (Credits: Unseenlabs)
Miao Shou
Analyst
“Going dark” refers to the gray zone tactic of turning off a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) transponder to avoid detection. AIS is a signaling system used to identify a vessel’s type, position, course, speed and other navigation safety information, and is required by the International Maritime Organization for larger non-military ships operating in international waters. Read our primer on the AIS system here.
Going Dark in the Recent Water Cannon Incident
In a recent incident that involved the blockade and water-cannoning of a small Philippine resupply vessel and its escorts, six of the blockading ships were from the China Coast Guard. Of these, only one ship (CCG 5402) remained AIS-visible during the entire engagement, while two other ships (CCG 4203 and CCG 3302) broadcast AIS only intermittently.
This tactic consists of blasting another ship with a powerful stream of water using a high-pressure water cannon.
Gaute Friis | AUGUST 7, 2023
CCG 31101 blasts a VCG vessel with water cannon, May 5, 2014. (Source: VCG)
Gaute Friis
Analyst
As of this writing, the Philippines has just produced evidence that its coast guard and resupply vessels were subjected to assault by water cannons from China Coast Guard ships on 5 August 2023. This occurred during the regular rotation and resupply mission to the Philippine Navy’s outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, and is reminiscent of a similar incident in November 2021.
While China’s use of maritime gray zone tactics is well known, few resources describe the actual tactics in detail. We’ve developed a publicly available systematic examination of these concrete tactics, which we will roll out for you in the coming weeks.
Spoofing is the act of deceptively and deliberately falsifying a vessel’s AIS identifying information or location.
Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 3, 2023
A China Coast Guard (CCG) cutter transmits fraudulent AIS signals to nearby vessels, appearing as a fishing boat on their monitoring equipment (Credit: Gaille Powell).
Gaute Friis
Analyst
Spoofing is a deception tactic meant to disrupt monitoring of maritime activities. It is frequently employed by Chinese gray zone actors in the South China Sea. In contrast to the “going dark” tactic of simply disabling a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) broadcast, the spoofing tactic involves manipulating transmitting signals in order to falsify a vessel’s identity and/or location.
Cable-cutting is a sabotage and harassment tactic in which a ship will attempt to sever the cable to another ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.
Gaute Friis | JULY 26, 2023
Chinese fisherman using a boat hook pole in an attempt to snag the cable connecting U.S ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable’s towed sonar array, March 8, 2009. (Source: USN)
Gaute Friis, analyst
This tactic is an act of sabotage which aim to cut the cables to a ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.
Cable-cutting is most frequently used against commercial research vessels conducting survey operations in disputed maritime zones, such as within China’s huge “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea.
Dazzlers are non-lethal laser weapons meant to cause temporary blindness in humans or confound sensors. Recently employed against the Philippine Coast Guard, laser dazzlers have also been employed against U.S. and Australian military helicopters and surveillance planes operating in the region.
Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 12, 2023
CCG 5205 firing laser at Philippine Coast Guard cutter BRP Malapascua, February 6, 2023 (Source: Philippine Coast Guard)
Gaute Friis Analyst
Dazzlers are an emerging category of non-lethal but potentially dangerous weapons and a relatively recent addition to China’s gray zone arsenal. They can be used as a harassment tool; for destroying sensitive electro-optical sensors as an electronic warfare component; or as a weapon of psychological warfare.
Dazzlers are not themselves considered illegal. The U.S. military — which refers to them as “non-lethal optical distractors” — considers them an essential capability to “minimize fatalities, protect the innocent and limit collateral damage” when the alternative is lethal force, with the caveat that:
“Prior to fielding, all previously and currently fielded lasers or distracter devices have undergone legal reviews to ensure compliance with obligations assumed by the U.S. under applicable treaties, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict.”
China has used dazzlers to temporarily blind the crew of other countries’ ships. Because dazzlers have both physical and psychological effects their use against vessels at sea is hazardous, eroding their crews’ ability to navigate and react to maritime contingencies.
As detailed in our “going dark” playbook entry, a Chinese Coast Guard cutter used a dazzler to harass a Philippine resupply escort mission on February 6th, 2023.
The Philippine Coast Guard later clarified that was the second time this had occurred during a resupply mission.
Note: Any use of lasers to permanently blind personnel is illegal under Protocol IV (Blinding Laser Weapons) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which China joined in 1998.
Rafting is the tactic of tying ships at anchor together to establish a semi-persistent floating outpost that is hard to uproot.
Gaute Friis | JULY 16, 2023
Rows of PAFMM trawlers rafting near Whitsun Reef, March 25, 2021 (Source: Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Maxar Technologies)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
“Rafting” refers to the gray zone tactic of tying ships together at anchor to establish semi-persistent floating outposts that are difficult disperse due to their collective mass.
The ships are generally the component of China’s People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) known as Spratly Backbone Fishing Vessels (SBFV). According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative’s detailed report on the PAFMM, these SBFVs receive generous government subsidies to remain at sea for most of the year, specifically to assert Beijing’s expansive maritime claims.
This tactic describes maneuvering one’s ship dangerously across the bow of another, often forcing the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision.
Gaute Friis | JULY 18, 2023 Sealight 333
PLAN Destroyer Lanzhou, at right, is seen here sailing within 40 meters of the USS Decatur, to the left (Source: USN)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Bow-crossing describes a harassment tactic in which a ship abruptly maneuvers to cross dangerously across the bow of another in violation of the 1972 International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREG) and the 2014 Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).
This maneuver is intended to force the other ship to take evasive action to avoid a collision. It may be used to disrupt freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS) or other assertions of international law or national sovereignty.
A recent example was documented in June 2023, when a Peoples Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessel crossed dangerously in front of U.S. Navy destroyer USS Chung-Hoon during a joint Taiwan Strait passage with the Canadian frigate HMCS Montreal, forcing the U.S. ship to reduce speed to avoid a collision:
China’s ships use bow-crossing to protest the activities of other countries’ ships in waters over which it claims sovereignty or jurisdiction, and to send the message that Beijing is willing to escalate tensions in defense of its claims.
In nautical terms, it involves a closest point of approach (CPA) of less than 2 lengths of the ship being intercepted. They are usually referred to by the U.S. Navy as “unsafe and unprofessional maneuvers”.
Other examples:
On September 30, 2018, the PLAN Type 052C Luyang II-class destroyer Lanzhou intercepted the U.S. Arleigh Burke-class destroyer USS Decatur, which was conducting a FONOP with 12 nautical miles of Chinese-occupied artificial islands in the South China Sea. The picture at the top of this post shows how close the two ships came to colliding.
On June 21, 2014, CCG vessel Haijian 2168 approached Vietnam Coast Guard (VCG) ship CSB 4032 at high speed. The VCG ship had to change directions repeatedly to avoid a collision as the distance between the two ships came within 30 meters.
On December 5, 2013, a Chinese warship cut across the bow of the missile cruiser U.S.S. Cowpens at a distance of less than 200 yards in international waters.
In March 2009, five Chinese ships (a combination of PLAN, CCG and militia) harassed the U.S. surveillance ship USNS Impeccable in international waters in the South China Sea, forcing the American ship to make an emergency maneuver to avoid a collision.
Editor’s note: This post was originally published on 7 July under the title “Unsafe Maneuvers”, but was retracted when we decided to divide it into two separate categories. Apologies for any confusion.
Gaute Friis
Gaute is a Defense Innovation Scholar at Stanford’s Gordian Knot Center for National Sec
CCG 5201 blocks the path of BRP Malapascua, forcing it to abort its planned patrol of the Second Thomas Shoal after a 30 minute stand-off, April 26, 2023 (Source: BBC)
Gaute Friis
Team Member
Blocking is a form of bow-crossing meant to physically impede the passage of another ship to its destination. Blocking is typically used by Chinese ships to hinder other countries from resupplying or reinforcing their outposts in the South China Sea.
Distinct from other forms of bow-crossing, blocking is used for area denial rather than operations disruption and will often result in more protracted stand-offs. China uses this tactic to assert its claims of jurisdiction as well as to prevent certain activities–most notably the reinforcement of other claimants’ existing Spratly Island outposts.
One such blocking maneuver occurred on April 26th, 2023, when China Coast Guard (CCG) ship 5201 blocked the path of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) patrol vessel BRP Malapascua. This forced the much smaller PCG ship to abort its planned route to the entrance of Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal during a resupply mission to the Philippines’ outpost aboard BRP Sierra Madre:
China routinely prevents the entry of Philippine ships into the interior of Second Thomas Shoal as a cornerstone of its strategy to prevent the rusting outpost from being repaired or replaced until it breaks up or otherwise becomes uninhabitable. For nearly a decade it has allowed only small wooden boats carrying food and replacement troops to pass through its blockade.
Resupply boat brings food and replacement troops to the Philippine Navy’s outpost aboard BRP Sierra Madre, Second Thomas Shoal, 21 June 2022. Credit: Inquirer/ Marianne Bermudez
Other examples:
On September 19, 2019, also near Second Thomas Shoal, a CCG ship blocked Philippine civilian vessels while they were conducting a resupply mission to the BRP Sierra Madre.
On November 13, 2015, about 13 nautical miles from Subi Reef, CCG cutters 35115 and 2305 blocked the path of a Vietnamese replenishment ship heading towards the Vietnamese outpost on Southwest Cay, forcing the ship to find a different route to its destination. PLA Navy Type 072A landing ship 995 later blocked the ship’s path again, this time brandishing small arms and firing a warning shot.
On August 31, 1951, representatives of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines signed the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in Washington. In recognition that “an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to [the] peace and safety” of both countries, the treaty declared that each state would “act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes.”i However, like most conventional defense treaties and standards, the MDT is not clear about the increasingly common unconventional gray zone threats that skirt the definition of war to avoid prompting a kinetic response. Since its inception, the United States’ commitment to the MDT regarding attacks on Philippine assets in contested waters in the South China Sea has been unclear. Along with the controversial policies of the administration of Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, the uncertainty of the MDT has strained U.S.-Philippine relations and caused Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana to call for a review of the relevance of the MDT in October 2018 with the main goal of determining whether the government should “maintain it, strengthen it, or scrap it.”ii
China is beating the United States in the “gray zone,” where a state attempts to make gains at the expense of a strategic competitor by using tactics that, while aggressive, remain below the level that usually triggers conventional military retaliation. Tiếp tục đọc “CSIS Pacific Forum – China wins the gray zone by default”→
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