‘I almost lost my will to live’: preference for sons is leaving young women in China exploited and abused


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Published: September 1, 2023 1.52pm BST The Conversation

Author: Chih-Ling Liu Senior Lecturer in Marketing, Lancaster University

Disclosure statement: Chih-Ling Liu does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

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Lancaster University provides funding as a founding partner of The Conversation UK.

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China has a gender crisis. The country has a huge surplus of men – around 722 million compared to 690 million women in 2022. This is largely because of sex-selective abortions linked to China’s one-child policy, which ended in 2015.

Though popular belief is that the policy was strictly enforced, many Chinese couples managed to have more than one child by paying fines, accepting benefit deprivations, or proclaiming their membership of a minority ethnic group. Often, they chose to do so because their first child was a girl. The one-child policy lasted three and a half decades, replaced by the two-child policy in 2016 and the three-child policy in 2021. But even today, the belief that boys have more value than girls persists.

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Inside the US-China battle for silicon chip supremacy

Al Jazeera English – 24-8-2023

From computers to toasters, smartphones to refrigerators, semiconductors are essential in our daily lives.

Advanced chips power military hardware, artificial intelligence and supercomputers.

But a persistent shortage is reshaping geopolitical relations, fuelling inflation and increasing tensions between the United States and China.

While demand for cutting-edge chips grows, only a few countries have the specialised knowledge and ability to produce them.

Taiwan produces 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips, making its stability critical to global economic and geopolitical security.

101 East investigates the battle to control the world’s semiconductor industry.

Why China’s economy won’t be fixed

economist.com

An increasingly autocratic government is making bad decisions

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Aug 24th 2023

Whatever has gone wrong? After China rejoined the world economy in 1978, it became the most spectacular growth story in history. Farm reform, industrialisation and rising incomes lifted nearly 800m people out of extreme poverty. Having produced just a tenth as much as America in 1980, China’s economy is now about three-quarters the size. Yet instead of roaring back after the government abandoned its “zero-covid” policy at the end of 2022, it is lurching from one ditch to the next.

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Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – 2 part

Japan And China: Competition Or Cooperation In Southeast Asia? | Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – Part 1

Japan is investing in a series of infrastructure and supply chain resilience projects in ASEAN. It’s all part of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific plan launched by the Japanese government. Is this an alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative? What is the current state of relations between Japan & China? Will the two Asian giants cooperate or compete?

***

How Will Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Impact Southeast Asia? | Japan’s Indo-Pacific Plan – Part 2

Japan is investing in infrastructure to alleviate the economic bottlenecks in ASEAN countries. In Indonesia, it’s building the country’s first MRT project. In Vietnam, it has invested in a network of roads, rail, ports and energy infrastructure. And in the Philippines, it’s investing in a flood mitigation project. What do these projects have in common? And why has Japan chosen to invest in them?

‘Let it rot’: surviving China’s high unemployment and cost of living

South China Morning Post – 6/8/2023

For more about the movement: https://sc.mp/4t0b

A new generation of Chinese are challenging the values and traditions that have been the foundation of the nation’s modern successes. Hard work, whether to build your future, beat your competitor or just get rich before you are too old, have long been core values in China. But what happens when a new generation of workers starts to question such ideas? Terms like “lying flat” and more recently “let it rot” have been used to describe a movement brewing among young Chinese who seem ready to give up when faced with challenges such as widespread unemployment and a high cost of living.

China dams make ‘upstream superpower’ presence felt in Asia

asiaa.nikkei.com PAK YIU JULY 24, 2023

Enormous water diversion projects spark concern across region

A large cloud of dust

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Water is released from the Xiaolangdi Reservoir Dam on the Yellow River in a sand-discharging operation. July 2022, Luoyang, China. (Footage via Getty Images)

Drought in China dried up parts of the Yangtze river last year – but the largest water transfer apparatus ever built still drew from it to supply Beijing’s needs. 

More than a billion cubic meters flowed through the colossal South-to-North Water Diversion Project in 2022. It traveled from a reservoir in central China to millions of households in the capital 1,200 kilometers away. The journey, via underground tunnels and canals that cross the Yellow River, roughly equaled the distance between Amsterdam and Rome.

The movement highlights the scale of China’s measures to shore up water security – and the profound potential effects these have on neighboring countries.

Many of Asia’s transboundary rivers originate in the Indo-Tibetan plateau in China. They flow into 18 downstream nations such as India, Kazakhstan, Bangladesh and Vietnam, delivering water to a quarter of the world’s population.


That alone makes the world’s second most populous nation an upstream superpower with enormous influence over irrigation of much of the continent. Projects such as building dams and hydropower plants potentially fuel existing regional political tensions – and create new ones.

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Harboring Global Ambitions: China’s Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases

POLICY REPORT

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Date Published: Jul 25, 2023

Authors: Alex Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, Sarina Patterson

Citation

Wooley, A., Zhang, S., Fedorochko, R., and S. Patterson. 2023. Harboring Global Ambitions: China’s Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases. Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary.

Abstract

China has emerged as a dominant maritime nation, with significant commercial and military influence across the world’s seas. Beijing has rapidly increased its investments in global port infrastructure, and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has evolved from a coastal force to the world’s largest blue-water navy. Yet, China has just one official overseas naval base: a facility in Djibouti. In Harboring Global Ambitions: China’s Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases, we scrutinize China’s options for establishing additional overseas naval bases. Leveraging a new dataset and additional research, we “follow the money” to identify the top 20 ports that have received the most official financing from China; analyze potential basing options ocean by ocean; and propose a shortlist of eight locations for future bases. Our accompanying dataset, China’s Official Seaport Finance Dataset, 2000-2021, tracks 123 seaport projects worth $29.9 billion financed by Chinese state-owned entities to construct or expand 78 ports in 46 countries. We argue that the potential for additional Chinese overseas naval bases has significant implications for global politics and requires cautious strategic responses from the West and developing countries.

PARTNERSHIPS & COMMUNICATIONS

Alex Wooley

Director of Partnerships and Communications

CHINA DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

Sheng Zhang

Research Analyst

CHINA DEVELOPMENT FINANCE

Rory Fedorochko

Junior Program Manager

PARTNERSHIPS & COMMUNICATIONS

Sarina Patterson

Communications Manager

Related Dataset

CHINESE-FINANCED PORT INFRASTRUCTURE

China’s Official Seaport Finance Dataset, 2000-2021

Publication Date: Jul 2023

This dataset tracks 123 seaport projects worth $29.9 billion officially financed by China to construct or expand 78 ports in 46 low-income and middle-income countries from 2000-2021.

China has plans for grand canals

economist.com

The building scheme is part of an effort to become a “transportation power”

Mandatory Credit: Photo by Xinhua/Shutterstock (13331262b)Aerial photo taken on Aug. 28, 2022 shows a construction site of the Pinglu Canal project in Lingshan County, south China's Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region. The construction of the Pinglu Canal project officially kicked off on Sunday. The canal, stretching about 135 km, aims to link Xijiang River with ports in the Beibu Gulf. Upon completion, the canal, starting from the Xijin reservoir in city of Hengzhou and ending at Luwu Town of Lingshan County, where ships could reach the Beibu Gulf via the Qinjiang River, will open a shorter route to the sea for Guangxi and other regions in southwest China.China Guangxi Pinglu Canal Project Construction - 28 Aug 2022

Sep 15th 2022Share

These are good times for local officials who want to build expensive infrastructure. To revive a flagging economy, battered by draconian pandemic-control measures, the central government is giving them freer rein. The southern province of Guangxi has a project that fits the bill: a canal costing $10.5bn that will link its main river system to the sea. It will involve a spree of demolition, digging, dredging and building over the next four and a half years. Mulled over for more than a century, the project began last month.

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A Review on Renewable Energy Transition under China’s Carbon Neutrality Target

mdpi.com

by Fuquan Zhao 1,2, Fanlong Bai 1,2, Xinglong Liu 1,2 and Zongwei Liu 1,2,*

1 State Key Laboratory of Automobile Safety and Energy, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China 2Tsinghua Automobile Strategy Research Institute, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

*Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. Sustainability 202214(22), 15006; https://doi.org/10.3390/su142215006 Received: 7 October 2022 / Revised: 5 November 2022 / Accepted: 7 November 2022 / Published: 13 November 2022 (This article belongs to the Special Issue Renewable Energy and Sustainable Economy Transition)

Abstract

To achieve their carbon peak and carbon neutrality target, China’s energy transition is seen as the most important instrument. Despite the rapid growth of renewable energy in China, there are still many challenges. Based on the review of the contemporary literature, this paper seeks to present an updated depiction of renewable energy in the Chinese context. The potential, status quo, and related policy of China’s renewable energy are thoroughly investigated. The challenges facing renewable energy development under the carbon neutrality target are analyzed, including enormous transition urgency and pressure, technology, and policy issues. Then, coping strategies are proposed to guide the direction of renewable energy development. Technology paths and policy recommendations are presented. This paper contributes to technology developing and policymaking by providing a comprehensive, thorough, and reliable review of renewable energy development in China.

Keywords: 

renewableenergy transitionpolicy incentivetechnology pathpower system

1. Introduction

In recent years, climate change and energy issues have become the prominent global challenge and a major concern of China. In 2020, president Xi Jinping pledged to achieve carbon peak by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 (referred to as the dual carbon target). China’s energy sector, which heavily relies on fossil energy, especially coal, is the largest contributor to China’s carbon emissions [1]. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), China’s energy consumption accounts for nearly 90% of China’s total CO2 emissions in 2020 [2]. The carbon neutrality target poses a huge challenge to China’s energy system, causing energy transition to be the key to the overall decarbonization of China’s economy and society.

Despite aggressive energy transition goals, China still faces many challenges in the energy sector. In terms of energy supply, fossil fuel still dominates with the problem of overcapacity to be addressed [1,3,4]. The supply and consumption of renewable energy resources in China are also highly mismatched, the center of renewable energy is in the northwest, and the electricity consumption center is in the east. In terms of energy consumption, the load profile of energy is becoming increasingly complex and the regional energy distribution is becoming more diversified, which demands a higher power system flexibility [5]. Moreover, China’s economy is still growing at a considerable rate and renewable energy cannot independently meet the energy requirement of the economy’s growth. Effective incentives for promoting renewable energy consumption are yet to be formulated [6].

In facing the above difficulties during the energy transition, renewable energy is recognized as the most important instrument and has attracted more and more attention. China has rich reserves of renewable energy. In recent years, the development of renewable energy has been impressively rapid. At present, renewable energy has accounted for nearly 30% of China’s electricity generation [7,8]. China has shown a great commitment to renewable energy. The target of renewable energy generation was set to taking up more than 50% of China’s total installed power generation by the end of the 14th Five-Year Plan [9]. It is estimated that by 2060, China will invest about RMB 122 trillion to build a new power system with clean energy as the main body [10].

There are many studies on the renewable energy transition in China. They can be classified into two groups. The first group of studies focus on quantitative analysis of the development of renewable energy. For example, Zhang et al. adopted the China TIMES model to analyze the required renewable energy supply and electrification rate in achieving carbon peak. The results showed that if emissions peak in 2025, the carbon neutrality goal demands a 45–62% electrification rate and 47–78% renewable energy in primary energy supply in 2050 [11]. Another study predicted that by 2050, renewable energy would account for 60% of the total energy consumption and 90% of the total power generation and the electrification rate would be close to 60% [12]. Liu et al. studied the latest hourly wind and solar data from 2007–2014 and provided the optimal wind/solar ratio for hybrid wind-solar energy systems [13]. Wen et al. presented an approach for the quantitative analysis of energy transition. They explained whether China’s cumulative carbon emissions can match the emission allowances under the global 2 °C target and provided directions for the low-carbon transition.

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RCEP- Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  – a boon or a bust for sustainable trade?

gtreview.com ASIA / 18-04-23 / BY ELEANOR WRAGG

As the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) machine whirrs into life and trade flows within the bloc increase, could its paucity of explicit ESG provisions lead to a lowering of sustainability ambitions for trade? Eleanor Wragg reports.

Just over a year has passed since RCEP, the world’s largest trade agreement, came into force. Covering a third of the world’s population and linking together least developed countries (LDCs) such as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar to wealthier nations like Australia, China, South Korea and Japan, the deal promises to inject new impetus into regional integration and cement the position of ‘Factory Asia’ at the centre of the world’s supply chains.

The well-documented linkages between trade liberalisation and increased productivity, wages and employment could help some of RCEP’s poorest countries inch closer to achieving United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 1 – no poverty, and 8 – decent work and economic growth.

However, unlike most recent preferential trade pacts, RCEP does not contain provisions on topics such as the environment or labour rights, raising questions about the extent to which it balances economic interest with social and environmental protections.

A shot in the arm for Asian trade

Thrashed out over eight long years of painstaking negotiations between the 10 Asean member states, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea as well as India – which walked away from talks before they were finalised – RCEP streamlines the tangled web of bilateral trade agreements among its signatories into a bumper megadeal that spans 510 pages of agreement text and thousands upon thousands of pages of associated schedules.

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China’s “National Unified Market” – Standardizing the Domestic Market to Spur Internal Circulation

china-briefing.com

April 14, 2022Posted by China BriefingWritten by Arendse HuldReading Time:  10 minutes

A new set of opinions from the central government describe how China will build a “national unified market” across a wide range of sectors and fields. The national unified market will seek to break down local protectionism and market segmentation by implementing standards and regulations that are applicable countrywide and integrating infrastructure across regions to increase market efficiency, promote fair competition, and ultimately boost domestic consumption and production. The national unified market is a key implementation of China’s “dual circulation” strategy and will likely act as a catalyst for further nationwide industry standards and market regulations in the coming years.

On April 10, 2022, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) and the State Council jointly released the Opinions on Accelerating the Construction of the National Unified Market (the “opinions”). This document outlines the creation of a “national unified market” to improve standardization and consistency in the implementation of regulations across a wide range of industries in China. 

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“The Mekong is Dying”: How China’s River Diplomacy Neglects Locals, Exacerbates Climate Change

File image of the aerial view of the Jinghong Hydropower Station on the Lancang River, the Chinese part of the Mekong River, in Jinghong city, Xishuangbanna Dai Autonomous Prefecture, southwest China’s Yunnan province. Imaginechina Limited / Alamy Stock Photo

Chinaglobalsouth.com

The rainy season would usually start in May, but this was late June and it was still not raining much. Niwat Roykaew, who grew up on the bank of the Mekong River in Thailand’s northern Chiang Rai province, noticed. 

Born and raised in the Chiang Khong district, Roykaew, 63, was taught to observe the Mekong River to tell the season. But, in the past two decades, the river has become unpredictable like it has “pulsated out of tune”.

Niwat Roykaew is a Thai activist who campaigns for China to share data about water restrictions by its dams upstream.

“The water would get high for two days, then on the third day it would suddenly drop, even during the rainy season,” said Roykaew. 

Local residents like him knew that this delay could mean another year of drought. Since at least 2019, that’s what has happened: the monsoon rain is late, and when it comes, it departs early.

The Mekong River’s water levels in the lower basin, including in Thailand, are now very unstable, being heavily affected both by climate change and hydropower dams upstream that are mostly powered by China, according to local residents, activists, and experts.

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The Countries Buying Fossil Fuels from Russia in 2023

visualcapitalist.com

While Russia’s revenues from fossil fuel exports have declined significantly since their peak in March of 2022, many countries are still importing millions of dollars a day worth of fossil fuels from Russia.

Revenue from fossil fuels exported to the EU has declined more than 90% from their peak, but in 2023 the bloc has still imported more than $18 billion of crude oil and natural gas so far.

This graphic uses data from the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) to visualize the top-importing countries of fossil fuels from Russia so far this year.

China Remains Russia’s Top Fossil Fuel Importer

China continues to be Russia’s top buyer of fossil fuels, with imports reaching $30 billion in 2023 up until June 16, 2023.

With nearly 80% of China’s fuel imports being crude oil, Russia’s average daily revenues from Chinese fossil fuel imports have declined from $210 million in 2022 to $178 million in 2023 largely due to the falling price of Russian crude oil.

Following China are EU nations collectively, which despite no longer importing coal from Russia since August of 2022, still imported $18.4 billion of fossil fuels in a 60/40 split of crude oil and natural gas respectively.

CountryRussian Fossil Fuel Imports* (Total)Crude OilNatural GasCoal
🇨🇳 China$30B$23.9B$2.7B$3.3B
🇪🇺 EU$18.4B$11.2B$7.2B$0
🇮🇳 India$15.2B$12.8B$0$2.5B
🇹🇷 Türkiye$12.1B$7.3B$3B$1.7B
🇦🇪 UAE$2.3B$2.3B$0$0
🇰🇷 South Korea$2.1B$0.6B$0.3B$1.2B
🇸🇰 Slovakia$2.0B$1.1B$0.9B$0
🇭🇺 Hungary$1.9B$0.8B$1.1B$0
🇧🇪 Belgium$1.9B$0.5B$1.4B$0
🇯🇵 Japan$1.8B$0$1.5B$0.3B
🇪🇸 Spain$1.7B$0.6B$1.1B$0
🇸🇬 Singapore$1.7B$1.7B$0$0
🇧🇷 Brazil$1.6B$1.4B$0$0.2B
🇳🇱 Netherlands$1.6B$1.5B$0.1B$0
🇸🇦 Saudi Arabia$1.5B$1.4B$0$0
🇪🇬 Egypt$1.4B$1.3B$0$0.2B
🇧🇬 Bulgaria$1.3B$1.1B$0.3B$0
🇮🇹 Italy$1.2B$0.8B$0.4B$0
🇲🇾 Malaysia$1.1B$1.0B$0$0.1B
🇨🇿 Czech Republic$1.0B$1.1B$0$0

*Over the time period of Jan 1, 2023 to June 16, 2023 in U.S. dollars

After China and the EU bloc, India is the next-largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, having ramped up the amount of fossil fuels imported by more than 10x since before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, largely due to discounted Russian oil.

Türkiye is the only other nation to have imported more than $10 billion worth of Russian fossil fuels in 2023, with every other country having imported fewer than $3 billion worth of fuels from Russia this year.

Navigating the Crude Reality of Oil Exports

Although crude oil is Russia’s chief fossil fuel export, the nation’s Urals crude traded at a $20 per barrel discount to Brent crude throughout most of 2023. While this discount has narrowed to around $16 following Russia’s announcement of further oil export cuts of 500,000 bpd (barrels per day), the price of Urals crude oil remains just 40 cents below the $60 price cap put in place by G7 and EU nations.

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The Global Movement Against China’s Economic Coercion Is Accelerating

COMMENTARY, RAND Corporation

(The Hill)G7 leaders before a meeting on economic security during the G7 summit, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan, May 20, 2023, photo by Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

G7 leaders before a meeting on economic security during the G7 summit, at the Grand Prince Hotel in Hiroshima, Japan, May 20, 2023

Photo by Jonathan Ernst/Reuters

by Bryan Frederick and Howard J. Shatz

June 9, 2023

With the launch of the Coordination Platform on Economic Coercion in May, the Group of Seven (G7) leading economies have taken an important step after years of U.S. allies and partners facing coercion from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) alone. Tiếp tục đọc “The Global Movement Against China’s Economic Coercion Is Accelerating”