“Going dark” refers to the gray zone tactic of strategically turning off a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) transponder to avoid detection.

Miao Shou | AUGUST 17, 2023

Miao Shou

Analyst

“Going dark” refers to the gray zone tactic of turning off a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) transponder to avoid detection. AIS is a signaling system used to identify a vessel’s type, position, course, speed and other navigation safety information, and is required by the International Maritime Organization for larger non-military ships operating in international waters. Read our primer on the AIS system here.
 
Going Dark in the Recent Water Cannon Incident

In a recent incident that involved the blockade and water-cannoning of a small Philippine resupply vessel and its escorts, six of the blockading ships were from the China Coast Guard. Of these, only one ship (CCG 5402) remained AIS-visible during the entire engagement, while two other ships (CCG 4203 and CCG 3302) broadcast AIS only intermittently. 

Tiếp tục đọc “Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Going Dark” →

This tactic consists of blasting another ship with a powerful stream of water using a high-pressure water cannon.

Gaute Friis | AUGUST 7, 2023

Gaute Friis

Analyst

As of this writing, the Philippines has just produced evidence that its coast guard and resupply vessels were subjected to assault by water cannons from China Coast Guard ships on 5 August 2023. This occurred during the regular rotation and resupply mission to the Philippine Navy’s outpost aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre at Second Thomas (Ayungin) Shoal, and is reminiscent of a similar incident in November 2021.

Tiếp tục đọc “Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Water Cannoning” →

While China’s use of maritime gray zone tactics is well known, few resources describe the actual tactics in detail. We’ve developed a publicly available systematic examination of these concrete tactics, which we will roll out for you in the coming weeks.

Gaute Friis | JULY 6, 2023

Tiếp tục đọc “Introducing China’s Maritime Gray Zone Tactics Playbook” →

Spoofing is the act of deceptively and deliberately falsifying a vessel’s AIS identifying information or location.

Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 3, 2023

Gaute Friis

Analyst

Spoofing is a deception tactic meant to disrupt monitoring of maritime activities. It is frequently employed by Chinese gray zone actors in the South China Sea. In contrast to the “going dark” tactic of simply disabling a vessel’s Automatic Information System (AIS) broadcast, the spoofing tactic involves manipulating transmitting signals in order to falsify a vessel’s identity and/or location.

Tiếp tục đọc “Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Spoofing” →

Cable-cutting is a sabotage and harassment tactic in which a ship will attempt to sever the cable to another ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars.

Gaute Friis | JULY 26, 2023

Gaute Friis, analyst

This tactic is an act of sabotage which aim to cut the cables to a ship’s trailing equipment, such as trawler lines or towed array sonars. 

Cable-cutting is most frequently used against commercial research vessels conducting survey operations in disputed maritime zones, such as within China’s huge “nine-dash line” claim in the South China Sea. 

Tiếp tục đọc “Gray Zone Tactics Playbook: Cable-Cutting” →

Dazzlers are non-lethal laser weapons meant to cause temporary blindness in humans or confound sensors. Recently employed against the Philippine Coast Guard, laser dazzlers have also been employed against U.S. and Australian military helicopters and surveillance planes operating in the region.

Gaute Friis | SEPTEMBER 12, 2023

Gaute Friis Analyst

Dazzlers are an emerging category of non-lethal but potentially dangerous weapons and a relatively recent addition to China’s gray zone arsenal. They can be used as a harassment tool; for destroying sensitive electro-optical sensors as an electronic warfare component; or as a weapon of psychological warfare. 

Dazzlers are not themselves considered illegal. The U.S. military — which refers to them as “non-lethal optical distractors” — considers them an essential capability to “minimize fatalities,  protect the innocent and limit collateral damage” when the alternative is lethal force, with the caveat that:

“Prior to fielding, all previously and currently fielded lasers or distracter devices have undergone legal reviews to ensure compliance with obligations assumed by the U.S. under applicable treaties, customary international law, and the law of armed conflict.”

China has used dazzlers to temporarily blind the crew of other countries’ ships. Because dazzlers have both physical and psychological effects their use against vessels at sea is hazardous, eroding their crews’ ability to navigate and react to maritime contingencies.

As detailed in our “going dark” playbook entry, a Chinese Coast Guard cutter used a dazzler to harass a Philippine resupply escort mission on February 6th, 2023.

The Philippine Coast Guard later clarified that was the second time this had occurred during a resupply mission.

China has also employed dazzlers against U.S. and Australian aircraft since at least 2018, as documented in incidents over the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, the Arafura Sea, and near the Horn of Africa. 

Note: Any use of lasers to permanently blind personnel is illegal under Protocol IV (Blinding Laser Weapons) under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which China joined in 1998.

See the rest of the gray zone playbook here.